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Overview:
This thesis studies the coordination of individuals’ transactions in a large, decentralized 
market. The first half of the thesis examines the role of market institutions in an environment 
with frictions. In particular, it studies the interaction between “intermediaries” (banks, shops) 
and decentralized “equilibrium arrangements” such as money or credit. The second half of the 
thesis studies the role of public and private information in coordinating individual actions, as 
well as the macro-economic effects of such coordination:
First Half:
I study a search economy in which intermediaries are the driving force co-ordinating the 
economy on the use of a unique, common medium of exchange for transactions. If search fric­
tions delay trade, intermediaries offering immediate exchange opportunities can make arbitrage 
gains from a price spread, but they have to solve the search market’s allocation problem. Inter­
mediaries solve this problem best by imposing a common medium of exchange to other agents, 
and a Cash-in-Advance constraint arises in equilibrium: Agents trade twice in order to con­
sume, once to exchange their production against the medium of exchange, and once to purchase 
their consumption. I extend my analysis to the study of fiat currencies and, in particular, free 
banking regimes.
Second Half:
The second half consists of two essays studying the role of public and private information 
in coordination games. In the first, I relate the convergence of equilibria to the convergence of 
higher-order beliefs. The central result of this essay relates the convergence of players’ higher- 
order beliefs (and hence equilibrium convergence) to the parameters of the signal structure. 
This provides a limit condition determining the uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibria in the 
coordination game.
Building on the previous chapter, the second essay studies the effects of information pohcies 
on output and inflation, when price-setters face higher-order uncertainty concerning the money 
supply. I show that this may lead to substantial delays in price-adjustment following a shock.
To the extent that public announcements coordinate expectations, they reduce this delay, and 
thereby reduce the effect and persistence of monetary shocks on output in the short-run. On the 
other hand, public announcements introduce a second component of noise, and may therefore 
increase short-run volatility.
Thesis Supervisor; Nobuhiro Kiyotaki 
Title: Professor, London School of Economics
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0.1 In tro d u ctio n  an d  O verv iew
This thesis presents a theoretical investigation into the forces which determine how a large num­
ber of independent actors are able to œordinate their actions in environments, where decisions 
are taken independently. The coordination problems studied in this thesis go beyond the simple 
coordination implied by the notion of a Nash equilibrium, rather, the difficulties arise because 
of a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. I first study, how evolutionary forces may lead to efficient 
coordination on a medium of exchange in a market environment with intermediaries. In the 
second half of the thesis, I study how lack of information may prevent efficient coordination 
to take place. To summarize the results in this thesis in one sentence, "In a stable market 
environment, evolutionary forces eliminate suboptimal outcomes in the long-run, while in the 
short run, or in response to shocks, incomplete information may lead to substantial delays of 
adjustment, or a failure to coordinate on an efficient outcome."
Of course, this one-sentence summary is too abstract to be directly useful or apphcable, 
and to the outside reader, the conclusions may not appear to be that novel either. The purpose 
of this introduction is therefore to discuss briefly in more detail the motivations for this study, 
discuss more specifically the environments that are used for establishing the main results, and 
comment on how, in my view, they fit into the large picture, i.e. the literature and the state of 
knowledge of economic theory.
In the first half of the thesis, I study the emergence of money and and intermediaries in a 
decentralized trading economy. In such an environment, the coordination problem lies in the 
selection of a medium of exchange, and complementarities arise between the trading strategies 
of different agents. The study was motivated by the historical observation that intermediaries 
play a central role in introducing and using media of exchange, or more generally are a constant 
force of innovation in the transactions process. The paper then proposes a reason for why this 
would be the case, in an environment where intermediaries respond to the existing market 
frictions. Since intermediaries are typically restricted in the number of goods that they deal 
with, i.e. they cannot handle all commodities at once, their success in alleviating frictions 
crucially depends on their ability to provide their customers ways of carrying purchasing power 
from one intermediary to another, which motivates the interest that the intermediaries have in
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promoting a common medium of exchange.
Furthermore, intermediaries have the ability to introduce such a medium of exchange, if 
they mutually coordinate on its use. Under certain conditions, I show that the unique stable 
equilibrium of the trading game that I study is one in which fiat money is used as a common 
medium of exchange, all producers and consumers trade through intermediaries, and fiat money 
is used in every transaction. There do exist other stationary equilibria, however, in all of them, 
the explicit coordination of strategies by even a small set of players will induce the remaining 
players to break away from the equihbrium strategies.
To understand the significance of these results, it may be useful to think of the exist­
ing prior frameworks for monetary economics. The classical approach consists in augmenting 
the atemporal Arrow-Debreu economy, or the dynamic general equihbrium model by some as­
sumptions that justify the circulation of money. TypicaUy, this involves the imposition of a 
Cash-in-Advance constraint, i.e. the assumption that cash must be used for the purchase of 
commodities, or in less exphcit form, involves modeUing the liquidity services of money directly 
by embedding them in the utihty or production functions of households and firms. ^  This ap­
proach is not directly concerned with the justification of such a constraint, but rather serves as 
a workhorse which has been extremely influential in monetary macroeconomics.
Introducing the use of money into general equihbrium theory in this form leads to the 
challenge of providing a foundation for monetary theory, i.e. a foundation for the use of such 
constraints. But the general equihbrium model provides an even bigger challenge, namely that 
of thinking about what markets are, how they are established, how they evolve, and what the 
respective roles of different market participants are, i.e. who determines how commodities are 
exchanged, by whom they are exchanged, and at what prices. This question is shortcircuited 
entirely by the general equihbrium model, which assumes that prices are set to clear markets,
i.e. equalize demand and supply for each commodity, and hence remains silent about the entire 
process of interaction.
* More elaborate versions of the same theme are the shopping time model, in which money saves on time spent 
purchasing goods, and hence leaves more time for production and leisure, and the cash-credit economy, in which 
only a subset of goods are bought using money.
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The challenge of thinking about market evolution is theoretical more than it is empirical: 
it seems plausible that markets behave almost as if they were perfect, i.e. they clear, and the 
exact structure of interaction seems to have little effect on prices and allocation. Furthermore, 
once the perfect functioning of markets is assumed as empirically plausible, it is easy to agree 
that the role of money is precisely as a convenient way of exchanging goods, and that a Cash- 
in-Advance constraint exactly reflects the way in which market transactions are carried out.
The challenge of providing a foundation for money, as well as market interaction then imphes 
going beyond the Walrasian model. One class of models that has taken up this challenge, and 
attempts to provide a formal foundation for the use of money, is the search model. This model 
assumes that transactions occur in bilateral meetings, and are temporarily delayed by a lack 
of suitable trading partners - market participants have to search (and find) them, before they 
can trade. It is thus shown that the use of a common medium of exchange reduces the delays 
in transactions that would arise from the double coincidence problem in a barter economy; it is 
then not only socially desirable, but also individually rational that market participants agree on 
the use of a common medium of exchange. The search model takes an explicitly evolutionary 
view of money, in the sense that it views the use of a medium of exchange as the steady-state 
equilibrium of an evolutionary process of individually rational transaction decisions. The model 
itself, however, runs up against some powerful criticisms: First, it inherently leads to multiple 
equihbria, and a selection problem: since the ’saleabihty’ of goods (the relative ease with which 
they are traded) is endogenous to their use in transactions, in principle any good could become 
a medium of exchange, provided that it is sufficiently durable and not to costly to transact - as 
historical examples have shown, the minimum requirements of durability and ease to transact 
are not very stringent; how else could one reconcile the use of such goods as raw tobacco or cattle 
as media of exchange? Second, the model is based on a market environment that is entirely 
different from Walrasian markets, which raises the question of what is the role of money in 
close to perfect markets. FinaUy, current media of exchange are essentially flat objects, which 
maintain its value only because they are used as media of exchange, but not because of any 
intrinsic use in consumption and production. Since the search model focuses on steady-states, 
it remains silent about how such objects would come into circulation, i.e. how one would evolve
11
from a commodity money world to one with fiat money.
These questions mostly arise because the search model takes an evolutionary view on money, 
while taking the market environment as given. In contrast, the first half of the thesis studies the 
evolution of money and market jointly, and is thus able to provide answers. The evolutionary 
view of markets comes from the observation that markets are organized, and that so-called 
’intermediaries’^  perform an important role of organizing transactions and matching buyers 
and sellers. These intermediaries are often the ones who experiment with and innovate the 
way transactions are carried out, and historically were a driving force in the development and 
circulation of money. Formally, I capture this role of intermediaries by focusing on evolutionarily 
stable equilibria , i.e. steady-states, where no small set of agents by explicitly coordinating their 
actions is able to induce the rest of the population to change their strategies. Evolutionary 
stabihty has entirely different effects in an environment where intermediaries can coordinate, 
as compared to the pure search model without intermediation. As a central result, I find that 
under weak restrictions, the unique evolutionarily stable equilibrium of the decentralized trading 
economy with intermediaries has transaction patterns that effectively mimick the Walrasian 
Cash-in-Advance model. I also study, under what conditions this Cash-in-Advance equilibrium 
can be implemented by the coordination of intermediaries who start to circulate’bank notes’ 
and accept them from each other, i.e. a free banking arrangement. The model derives some 
conditions under which such a free banking equihbrium is stable, and in the thesis, I briefly 
discuss those and compare them to the historical evidence on free banking regimes.^
I should note the evolutionary view of markets and money has a long-standing tradition in 
economics, most notably in the Austrian school. This view, for instance, underhes Menger’s 
classical essay on the origin of money. Menger, however, did not recognize the multiphcity 
issue, and hence the need for explicit coordination to arise endogenously in some form. He also 
does not discuss the role of intermediaries in this context. In the classical hterature on money,
use this term for any agent who performs a role as a middleman in a transaction, whether this is a store that 
buys goods from producers and sells them to consumers, a financial intermediary, or quite possibly takes on a 
different form. One of my personal favorites is the language school as an intermediary for language teaching. They 
essentially buy teaching hours from teachers, and sell them to customers, providing a some quality guarantee, 
but little else, other than a matching service.
^The discussion on free banking regimes has since led to subsequent work with Guido Lorenzoni, where the 
discussion is framed in the context of contractual frictions, liquidity provision and borrowing constraints, see [5].
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the ’evolutionary theorists’ are opposed to institutional economists who emphasize the role of 
governments in introducing a medium of exchange (see Goodhard [4] for an exposition of this 
alternative view); with the discussion of this thesis in mind, it should be noted that it remains 
undisputed that somehow the coordination problem of introducing a medium of exchange to 
the market needs to be internalized. This thesis takes a stand that evolutionary forces might be 
able to accomplish this if intermediaries are able to explicitly coordinate; however, this should 
not be interpreted as denying that the same role could be played (and has at times been played) 
by a government, but it does raise the question of what is, and what should be, the role of a 
government in the organization of markets and the provision of transaction services, in the 
presence of competitive intermediaries, or other private market institutions that provide such 
services.
Having studied forces that lead to efficient coordination in the long run, the second half of 
the thesis studies the role of information in coordination failures in the short run. Incomplete 
information has long been recognized as a reason why individuals may not be able to agree 
on an equihbrium, even though it Pareto-dominates other outcomes. The idea of coordination 
failures due to informational reasons has long been conceptualized by the notion of ’sunspots’ i.e. 
informationally irrelevant events that lead market participants to coordinate on one of multiple 
equilibrium outcomes (depending on the environment, these equilibria may be Pareto-ranked, 
but they don’t need to be).
The more recent literature on so-called global games has taken an alternative approach 
towards modelling incomplete information. The idea of the global games hterature is to argue 
that individuals observe the payoff-relevant information or "fundamentals" with noise, more 
over they have different information about the state of the world. Breaking away from the 
assumption that the state is common knowledge, Carlsson and van Damme [3] introduce the 
idea of a "global" coordination game, where instead of observing the state of the world perfectly, 
players receive noisy signals about the state, moreover, conditional on the fundamental, signals 
are uncorrelated across players. In 2 x 2 coordination games, Carlsson and van Damme then 
show that there exists a unique equihbrium. The reason for uniqueness can be roughly sketched 
as follows: a single player may use his signal to draw some inference about the state of the world.
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but it does not enable him to learn anything about what the other players have observed relative 
to him. If a player is indifferent between two strategies in a coordination setting, his action will 
depend much on what he thinks the other players are hkely to do; the fact that the information 
structure prevents him from gaining any such information implies that in the equilibrium of a 
2 x 2  game, at the margin he must assign a probability of ^ to the event that the other player 
plays either action, conditional on which the assumptions of strategic complementarities imply 
that there is a unique signal, at which the player is indifferent between playing either action, i.e. 
the equihbrium must be unique. Moreover, in the hmit as the private signals become infinitely 
precise, the equihbrium is insensitive to the exact distribution of signals. At first hand, this 
unique hmit equihbrium might therefore be used as a very convenient ’selection’ for comparative 
static or dynamic purposes, when multiphcity in coordination games at first prevents any such 
analysis. Subsequent applications of global games, most prominently Morris and Shin [6], have 
done just that: use the global games approach as a selection mechanism in coordination games 
to study the effects of policy proposals, or perform other comparative statics exercises. There 
are plenty of potential applications which are essentially variations on similar static coordination 
games: Bank runs, currency crises, coordination among debt holders, to name a few, are just 
the most prominent ones; if the global games methods were to be properly extended to dynamic 
coordination games, the establishment of a medium of exchange that was discussed during the 
first half of the thesis might also prominently figure among the potential applications of this 
theory.
The second half of this thesis argues against this view. Instead of exploiting uniqueness, 
it takes the global games approach as what it is and takes an agnostic view on the issue of 
uniqueness vs. multiplicity. I rather argue that this modelhng approach opens up the black 
box of expectations in macroeconomic models. By exphcitly modelhng different information 
structures, I study the ability of market participants to coordinate on one or the other outcome. 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I study the hnkages between the information structure, 
equihbrium selection (uniqueness vs. multiphcity) and the structure of higher-order behefs 
(behefs that players have about each others’ behefs). In particular, I study the role of public 
information in this context, and show that if agents have access to sufficiently precise public 
information, then the multiphcity of equihbria will be maintained. In the hmit, as both pubhc
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and private signals become infinitely precise, I obtain a unique equilibrium if and only if the rate 
of convergence of the private signal variance is more than twice as fast as the rate of convergence 
of the public signal variance; otherwise, the set of equilibria converges to the one obtained under 
common knowledge.'* Hence, even if the public signal contains almost no informational value 
concerning the fundamental, it has an enormous impact on the set of equilibria. The intuition 
for this result is that even if the public signal provides httle information about the fundamental, 
it does provide information about the beliefs of other players, and that is what enables them 
to coordinate, i.e. leads to multiplicity. This convergence condition is then translated into its 
effect on higher-order beliefs, and I show that the same condition determines whether in the 
hmit the behef structure will be "close" (in a weU-defined sense) to common knowledge or not.
My results are first meant to strike a cautionary note with respect to the use of the private 
information hmit as an equihbrium selection in coordination games; however, the translation 
of signal structures into behef structures has a second purpose: it iUustrates the usefulness of 
the global games approach for thinking about how bayesian expectations are formed, not only 
with respect to the underlying states, but also with respect to the actions of other players; 
in macro-economic contexts, the latter problem of behef formation is typicaUy ’solved’ by the 
assumption of rational expectations and, possibly sunspots, assumptions which brush away the 
underlying coordination problems that may arise. While questioning the use of global games for 
equihbrium selection purposes, the paper stresses its importance for thinking about expectation 
formation, and the possibility for economic and information pohcies to influence expectations.
This approach towards modeUing expectation formation is translated into a different context 
and pursued further in the last chapter of the thesis. There, I study the effects of higher-order 
uncertainty on the adjustment dynamics in a macro-economic game with complementarities; 
the discussion is embedded into a version of Lucas’ incomplete information model of incomplete 
nominal adjustment, but the main points apply directly to other environments with higher- 
order uncertainty and strategic complementarities : ^  in a model of strategic complementarities
^The mathematical intuition for this condition is given in the text.
^The model that I study is a mix between Woodford [9] and Morris and Shin [8]. Woodford makes the point
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in price-setting, I show that the speed of nominal adjustment following a monetary shock 
depends on the degree of higher-order uncertainty. Public information has two effects in this 
environment: by reducing higher-order uncertainty, better public information leads to faster 
price adjustment; on the other hand, pubhc information is itself inherently noisy, and hence 
better information may expose an economy to additional sources of noise in the short run. To 
conclude, I embed the model into the Barro-Gordon framework to study the Welfare effects of 
information provision by the central bank. I show that a higher degree of transparency not 
only improves central bank monitoring, but has a second positive welfare effect by reducing 
the gains from "surprise monetary expansion". I further discuss the informational benefits of 
a formal framework for monetary policy, and argue that information provision by the central 
bank may have positive welfare effects through coordinating expectations.
The use of the global games framework to study expectation formation also appears in other 
papers, and in concluding this overview of my thesis, I shall briefiy discuss those studies. In 
two closely related papers on static coordination problems, Morris and Shin [7,8] study the role 
of the information structure and the coordinating role of public information. These two papers 
are mostly motivated by observations of the coordinating and potentially destabilizing role of 
public information, in particular, the role of news media. Their analysis takes a setting with a 
unique equilibrium as given, and mostly focuses on identifying the relevant comparative statics 
effects. In contrast, in joint work with G.-M. Angeletos and A. Pavan [1,2], I further push 
this interpretation of global games as opening up the black box of expectations: In the first 
paper, we study the informational role of pohcies in environments where the pohcymaker has 
private information, and come to the conclusion that, since the policy publicly reveals private 
information, it may enable market participants to coordinate their actions, and opens up the 
door to multiple equilibria and ’policy traps’, where the pohcy maker is forced to follow a certain 
equihbrium policy that is ex ante determined by the market’s expectations. In the second paper, 
we study the dynamics of exogenous and endogenous information revelation in a currency crisis
that higher-order uncertainty leads to delays in price-adjustment, however his model does not allow to study the 
effects of different types of information, nro does it readily extend to other settings. Morris and Shin study the 
effects of public information in a static model similar to the one studied by Woodford. This paper translates 
Morris’ and Shin’s analysis into a dynamic environment, and discusses how the insights regarding higher-order 
uncertainty and persistence, as well as the effects public information, translate generally into macro-economic 
environments with strategic complementarities. I also substantially simplify the exposition from Woodford.
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game that is played out over time. This analysis shows how the exogenous and endogenous 
flow of information naturally leads to a staggering of attacks; each unsuccessful speculative 
attacks reveals a large amount of information about the central bank, notably improving its 
reputation. It then takes time for new information to gradually offset this positive effect, until 
market participants are sufficiently uncertain about the central bank’s defense pohcy to start 
a new attack. In both of these applications of global games, multiplicity is an integral feature 
of the model’s outcomes; nevertheless, we are able to gain some insights into the forces that 
enable market participants to coordinate their actions in each of the environments.
Thinking about how expectations are formed in macro-economic environments or games 
is central for understanding the effects of information pohcies. In this sense, the second half 
of this thesis, as well as the other papers that I briefly discussed, propose a framework in 
which to think about these issues. Whether this framework stands the test of time depends on 
its usefulness in other apphcations - and to what extent they are able to guide the informed 
pohcymaker. Of course, this entire research program is still very much in the beginning, and 
the contributions of this thesis represent httle more than a flrst step. It will be interesting to 
see how this discussion unfolds, and how its conclusions are altered by subsequent work - just 
as this thesis has tried to put Carlsson and van Damme’s contribution into a different hght. 
Similarly, it will be interesting to see to what extent the intermediation model of the flrst half 
of the thesis holds up against the evolutionary pressures that shape the market place for ideas 
in ways not too different from their effect on other markets.
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Chapter 1
M oney, Interm ediaries and  
C ash-in-A dvance C onstraints
Sum m ary o f Chapter 1 I  study a search economy in which intermediaries are the driving 
force coordinating the economy on the use of a unique, common medium of exchange for trans­
actions. I f  search frictions delay trade, intermediaries offering immediate exchange opportuni­
ties can make arbitrage gains from a price spread, but they have to solve the search market’s 
allocation problem. Intermediaries solve this problem best by imposing a common medium of 
exchange to other agents, and a Cash-in-Advance constraint arises in equilibrium: Agents trade 
twice in order to consume, once to exchange their production against the medium of exchange, 
and once to purchase their consumption. By studying the evolutionary stability of equilibria, I  
discuss which equilibria are likely to arise as long run outcomes. I  extend my analysis to the 
study of fiat currencies and free banking systems.
JEL classification numbers: D51, E40
Keywords: Monetary Exchange Economy, Intermediation, Search, Cash-in-Advance Con­
straints
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1.1 In tro d u ctio n
W hat accounts for the use of money in economic transactions in competitive markets? This 
simple, seemingly trivial question has been the cause of much debate and a rich tradition 
of research in economics. The answer that is typically given today starts from Jevons’ [17] 
suggestion that the use of a medium of exchange eliminates the need for a “double coincidence 
of wants” , if market participants trade bilaterally, and have to spend time and resources to 
find suitable trade partners. If all market participants instead agree on the use of a common 
medium of exchange, they will sell their production for the medium of exchange, and will use 
the medium of exchange to buy what they consume. In a large economy, this reduces the 
waiting time until an agent can receive his consumption good. In the purest statement of this 
idea, Kiyotaki and Wright [18] show that the use of a common medium of exchange may be 
the equihbrium outcome of individually rational transaction decisions in an economy where 
encounters between market participants are random.^
This paper attempts to provide an alternative explanation for the transactions role of money 
in an economy that appears close to the frictionless, competitive benchmark. The observation 
of transactions in markets will suggest that we rarely have to search randomly to find the 
goods that we want to consume, or to find a buyer for the products that we want to offer; 
indeed, in most instances, we don’t even face a delay in the transactions we carry out. For 
most products, we know where we can buy or sell them, and we just go and buy them whenever 
we want to, and we expect to find them at that time and place. In other words, the same 
frictions that account for the use of money do not enter into the theoretical model for which 
we are trying to provide a foundation, nor do they seem to be relevant for the use of money 
in most transactions. The challenge of providing microfoundations thus lies not so much in 
providing an explanation for the transactions role of money, but in providing this explanation 
in the context of an exchange economy that is perceived as frictionless and competitive. This 
implies going outside the Wahasian framework and leads to a broader underlying question: 
How do individuals interact in a decentrahzed market, so that the market outcome appears to
’ See Aiyagari and Wallace [1] for a general discussion of this statement in the context of the model of Kiyotaki 
and Wright [18].
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be virtually without frictions; in other words, how do markets evolve?
A natural way of dealing with search frictions is the centralization of transactions through 
a system of intermediaries of known location and specialization. Of course, money and inter­
mediaries are both essential features of transactions in markets. However, insofar as they are 
studied separately, they are implicitly regarded as substitutes in deahng with the frictions in 
the market. In other words, if intermediaries are capable of alleviating market frictions, what 
would be the role of money (or vice versa)? In order to fully account for the transactions role of 
money, one therefore has to ask how money interacts with intermediation in alleviating market 
frictions.^
Here, I discuss this interaction of money and intermediation in the context of a decentralized 
exchange economy where trade is bilateral and potentially subject to delay. Individuals can 
modify the trading environment by acting as intermediaries, thereby reducing the frictions to 
which other agents are subject. Intermediaries are immediately accessible, and delays in trade 
with them only depend on their abihty to accommodate the transactions demanded. They 
centralize transactions more easily, if a common medium of exchange is used by the agents 
with whom they trade. On the other hand, they have the possibihty to introduce it to all 
other agents, who, in turn, are willing to use it, if it allows them to buy from the intermediary 
whatever good they want to consume. The analysis thus points to a complementarity between 
the use of a medium of exchange and the centralization of transactions by intermediaries that 
roughly matches historical facts: Throughout history, intermediaries were often the ones who 
developed more efficient ways of exchanging goods, and they were particularly important in 
introducing and using money. On the other hand, they were also the primary beneficiaries of 
the introduction of a common medium of exchange.^
^This question could of course be raised in a variety of contexts, in which money helps to alleviate or even 
eliminate frictions. Consider the issue of record-keeping and contract enforcement in a dynamic environment: 
Kocherlakota [19] argues that “Money is Memory”, i.e. in an environment where imperfect record-keeping limits 
the possibility of writing and enforcing contracts in the future, money may serve as a substitute of memory, 
and implements allocations that would only have been feasible under perfect memory. On the other hand, Dixit 
[8] also studies an enviroment with imperfect record-keeping, citing the mafia as an information intermediary 
who makes a profitable business out of centralizing record-keeping i.e. memory, and contract enforcement. To 
fully understand the role of money as a substitute for memory, one would have to ask how it interacts with 
the intermediary, who also may act as a possible substitute for memory. In the conclusion, I discuss why the 
mechanism at play in the search environment of this paper may also apply to other contexts.
 ^A particularly neat example of these effects, that also highlights the mechanisms in this paper, is Radford’s
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Intermediaries have been introduced into models with trade frictions in the past.'^ These 
models usually focus on the exchange of a single good with a given number of buyers and sellers 
who trade off the delay in the transaction against the price at which they trade. Interme­
diaries act as arbitrageurs who offer immediate transactions, but charge a mark-up for their 
services. W ith many commodities, the success of intermediaries depends on their ability to 
match buyers and sellers for each good. This becomes a problem, if the number of goods that 
an intermediary can trade is restricted, and consumers may not always be willing to consume 
what a given intermediary would be willing to offer them for their production. This transfers 
the double coincidence problem from the search market to the intermediaries. They solve it by 
introducing and promoting a common medium of exchange that enables consumers to transfer 
purchasing power from transactions with one intermediary to transactions with another. That 
an intermediary cannot trade with all commodities at once is an important part of the argu­
ment; Otherwise, one intermediary would be able to perfectly ehminate the frictions, and there 
would be no need for a common medium of exchange. Consumers could simply trade their 
excess demand in all goods at once with an intermediary, at the prices set by the latter. If the 
intermediary fixes market-clearing prices, then no medium of exchange is needed to buy some 
goods from a different intermediary. Similarly, if the medium of exchange solved the allocations 
problem perfectly, there would be no role for the intermediary. It is precisely the fact that each 
of them on its own is unable to perfectly alleviate frictions that makes them complementary.
The emergence of intermediaries alters the way in which trade decisions are made by other 
agents. Trade with intermediaries enables consumers and producers to direct their search to­
wards a particular good, as opposed to the random search in economies without intermediation. 
By limiting their chents’ choices to the use of a unique, common medium of exchange, inter­
mediaries introduce its use to the entire economy. In an equilibrium of the economy considered
[24] description of exchanges in a Prisoner of War camp. He describes how economic institutions and markets 
developed within the completely unorganized environment of a PoW-camp, driven mainly by the scope for trade 
arising from differences in endowments (Red-Cross packages) and tastes. In the early days of the camp, some 
individuals who exploited the price margins between different parts of the camp ( “intermediaries”) promoted 
and established the cigarette as common money. This was fundamental for the later development of more 
sophisticated market institutions, such as a store, and even the introduction of a paper money, backed by the 
store’s inventories of goods.
^Rubinstein and Wolinsky [26] explore intermediation in a search-theoretic model in which one good is traded. 
The present analysis is closer in spirit to Gehrig [9].
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here, all agents trade twice to acquire what they want to consume: once to obtain the medium 
of exchange (sell their production), and once to buy their consumption good. Effectively, a 
Cash-in-Advance constraint for transactions with intermediaries is introduced, whereby mar­
ket participants have to use the common medium of exchange. Since the medium of exchange 
enables intermediaries to match buyers and sellers, the latter face no waiting time to perform 
the desired transaction. As a result, the search market empties, since producers and consumers 
take advantage of the intermediaries’ services. Equilibrium allocations bear the characteristics 
of Walrasian allocations, and the resulting transaction patterns resemble trade in frictionless 
Walrasian markets: At any time, almost all agents are able to trade, and consume in every 
other (unless they produce or consume the common medium of exchange, and only need one 
transaction).
Intermediation also provides a mechanism by which the economy can coordinate on the 
common use of an efficient medium of exchange. If a small set of agents coordinates their 
activities and offers some new organization of transactions, they may induce other agents, 
and eventually the entire economy, to adopt their innovation. This can be assimilated to the 
historical role of intermediaries in developing more efficient means of exchange. Formally, I study 
which of the resulting equilibria are evolutionarily stable. In contrast to the standard search 
model, evolutionary stability imphes Pareto efficiency in an environment with intermediaries.^ 
I also allow for the circulation of fiat money. Under a general set of conditions, the unique 
evolutionarily stable steady-state is then a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium in which fiat money 
circulates as the common medium of exchange.
Finally, I study how fiat money may come into circulation, and again illustrate the coordi­
nating role of the intermediaries: assuming that these intermediaries can write out demandable 
debt certificates ("notes"), I discuss under what conditions they become perfect substitutes in 
a "free banking equilibrium". I illustrate how the clearing mechanism serves to monitor the 
note issue of banks. In practice, a free banking regime has to rely on (i) the clearing mech­
anism to monitor the competitive issue of notes, and (ii) rehable punishment mechanisms in
“In large population matching games, such as the search model of money, evolutionary stability considerations 
have little effect on equilibrium selection, since the "mutants" have no possibility to interact with each other to 
explicitly coordinate their actions. Intermediation provides such a channel.
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case of default. It is important to note that with free entry into note issue, i.e. in a truly 
competitive environment, the loss of the banking hcence is insufficient to prevent overissue and 
strategic defaults, since no rents are directly associated with being an intermediary. Histori­
cally, it seems that the most successful free banking regimes were the ones that effectively used 
the note clearing, and used harsh punishments in case of default. But free banking systems also 
faced difficulties, even when those conditions were met: the model illustrates a coordination 
problem arising in the clearing market, i.e. if notes are entirely safe, and costs are associated 
with clearing, banks may prefer to hold notes in reserve, or bring them back into circulation 
rather than return them to the issuer.
1.2 R e la ted  L iterature
The results in this paper have various implications for existing equihbrium models of monetary 
exchange. Money is, of course, one of the essential elements of our understanding of macro- 
economic fluctuations, and of the role of pohcy in response to them. Since the competitive 
Arrow-Debreu framework does not endogenously account for such a transactions demand for 
money, its existence is usually assumed into the model by way of a restriction on the trans­
actions in which individuals engage: money must be used to buy consumption goods.® This 
leads to the use of money as a short-term store of value, and the demand for real balances 
will depend on the availabihty of other assets for short- or longer term savings, and on their 
liquidity when they are to be sold to satisfy consumption needs. Of course, the observation of 
how transactions take place in markets makes such a restriction appealing, and it has proven 
successful for the purposes of macroeconomic analysis. However, the same observations suggest 
that the main purpose of money is not its use as a store of value, but as a convenient medium
® Exam pies where such a Cash-in-Advance constraint is made explicit are Svensson [32] and Lucas and Stokey 
[20]. The constraint that money is used to buy goods also appears in Romer’s [25] general equilibrium treatment of 
Baumol’s [4] and Tobin’s [33] inventory demand for Cash. An alternative approach assumes that the transactions 
services of money enter directly into the market participants’ utility functions, following Sidrauski [28]. The 
overlapping generations model, introduced by Samuelson [27], provides one example where money is essential in 
improving allocations, (without such a constraint that it must be used in transactions, or a direct effect on the 
utility function) - however, it is used to transfer wealth between generations, and it looses its role once its rate 
of return is dominated by other assets.
Hellwig [13] provides a detailed, critical discussion of the recent and not-so-recent literature on monetary 
equilibrium theory, on which some of the ideas in this paper are based.
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for transactions, and money is used as a short-term store of value only because it has a primary 
purpose as a medium of exchange.
Precisely such a Cash-in-Advance constraint is the result of equilibrium trading strategies in 
the present model, where market interaction is viewed as an ongoing evolutionary process/ This 
paper may therefore be viewed as providing a microfoundation for the structure of transactions 
in the macroeconomic applications that exogenously impose such a constraint. However, the 
efficiency of the constraint here is in stark contrast with its macroeconomic counterpart - in 
fact, viewing such a constraint as efficiency enhancing seems contradictory. Efficiency follows 
from the strategic interaction of intermediaries, as the consequence of an evolutionarily stable 
steady-state. It turns out that the Cash-in-Advance constraint enables intermediaries to achieve 
Pareto-efficiency in the trade process, if they can enforce it on all agents who want to trade with 
them. The constraint is observed in all intermediated exchange, but is not binding for exchange 
outside intermediation. Formally, I do not assume away the possibility that two agents exchange 
“goods” for “goods” outside intermediated transactions, but in equihbrium, they never incur a 
situation in which they agree to exchange “goods” for “goods”.
The paper also responds to some of the weaknesses of existing search models of money that 
follow Kiyotaki and Wright [18]. While they succeed in explaining why it may be individually 
rational and socially efficient that ah agents use a common medium of exchange, they cannot 
account for the fact that the vast majority of transactions involves the exchange of goods for 
money - indeed, one of the conclusions from the literature following Kiyotaki and Wright is 
that such a Cash-in-Advance constraint where “goods” are only traded for “money” fails to 
materiahze (Aiyagari and Wallace, [2]), since the delays in trade provide a sufficient incentive 
to accept “goods” for further exchange, instead of immediate consumption. The same search 
frictions which motivate the use of a medium of exchange render the existence of a Cash-in- 
Advance constraint impossible.*
^Such an evolutionary view of markets has a long tradition in the Austrian school. For example, in his classical 
article on the origin of money, Menger [22] views money as the determinate outcome of an evolutionary process; 
however his analysis does not recognize the potential for multiplicity inherent in coordination problems, nor does 
he explicitly refer to intermediaries as a coordinating force in the market.
® While this result obviously clashes with the observation of Cash-in-Advance constraints in quasi-perfect 
markets, it has some intuitive appeal with respect to the importance of barter trade in environments, in which 
markets are far from frictionless.
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A second weakness of search models is the multiplicity of equilibria. The strategic comple­
mentarity that exists between players for using a single good as a common medium of exchange 
also implies that players may coordinate on any good as the common medium of exchange in 
equihbrium; in other words, the model remains silent about the choice of a medium of exchange. 
Similarly, while the search model can be used to show that a fiat object, which no one con­
sumes and no one produces, may be valued and used as money, the very same set-up always 
implies that this need not be the case in equihbrium. Hence, the search model is unable to say 
anything about how a fiat money comes into circulation in a decentralized exchange economy. 
In contrast, intermediation arguably provides a natural framework for studying these selection 
issues, as weU as the emergence of fiat money.
It should be noted that the general equihbrium as weU as the search models of money have 
multiple equihbria. As discussed in Hahn [10], this multiplicity of equilibria is the manifestation 
of an intertemporal coordination problem: the acceptance of money today is based on the 
acceptance of money tomorrow. The evolutionary approach taken here resolves the multiplicity. 
It should be noted, however, that the solution rehes on the assumption that individuals are able 
to coordinate their strategies explicitly not only within a single period, but also across time, 
at least on a small scale.
Formally, this paper is most closely related to, and shares much of its motivation with, a 
series of contemporaneous papers that discuss monetary trade in a "trading-post" environment. 
In such an environment, markets are in separate locations, and typically each location repre­
sents a different pair of goods that can be traded at that location. Iwai [16] studies such an 
environment with search frictions. In Starr [31], as well as Howitt [14] and Howitt and Glower 
[15], these trading posts are run by intermediaries similar to the ones encountered here.^ In 
all these papers, a combination of increasing returns to scale in the intermediary’s transaction 
technology and the double coincidence problem lead to a concentration on the smallest possible 
number of trading posts and the thereby the use of a common medium of exchange. In another 
paper that uses a trading-post environment, Matsui and Shimizu [21] discuss the emergence of 
money in a market place environment, where the location, rather than an intermediary defines
'See also Corbae, Temzelides and Wright [7] for an endogenous matching environment with similar outcomes.
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the trading post. As in this paper, they study the evolutionary stability of equihbria, and show 
that a unique "single-price equilibrium" survives, in which the supply of fiat money is equal in 
value to its demand for market transactions. All these papers take the trading post structure 
as given, and are more concerned with the properties of the resulting equihbria, i.e. when a 
monetary equihbrium exists and what its properties are, as well as the relation of money and 
prices.
In contrast, this paper abstracts from the problems of price formation, and instead concen­
trates on the evolutionary aspects of the emergence of money and markets. In order to embed 
intermediation into the search framework of Kiyotaki and Wright [18], I restrict transactions 
to one-for-one swaps, emphasizing the role of the double coincidence problem in the exchange 
process. The trading posts generate exchange opportunities only insofar as intermediaries be­
come active, the choice of becoming an intermediary is itself endogenous in this model. This 
environment provides a few simplifying insights: In equihbrium, the speciahzation between pro­
duction and intermediation takes place in such a way that intermediaries optimize the number 
of transactions they carry out, and no transactions take place as a result of pure search. From 
a much less structured trading environment, we therefore obtain the same transaction patterns, 
but using the search-theoretical framework as a background, we give a strategic account as to 
how intermediation develops and induces improvements in the transaction process until at some 
point, transaction patterns and aUocations closely resemble Walrasian equihbrium allocations.
An alternative account of the role of money in Walrasian markets is Banerjee and Maskin
[3]. In contrast to our paper, they focus on asymmetric information (a lemons problem between 
buyers and sellers) as the source of frictions. While their paper shares many of the motiva­
tions and results with this one, including a foundation for Cash-in-Advance constraints, the 
assumption of Walrasian markets leaves open the question of how money interacts with other 
institutions that may serve to alleviate the lemons problem, namely intermediaries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3 describes the basic economic envi­
ronment and introduces the notion of steady-state equihbrium. I then derive some preliminary
'in this sense, I view the afore-mentioned papers very much as complementary to this one.
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results, to provide conditions that a steady-state has to satisfy. Section 4 considers one type of 
equihbrium, in which a particular good is used as a common medium of exchange. I contrast 
the findings of the economy with intermediation with the monetary equihbria resulting from 
pure search. Section 5 introduces evolutionary stability, and shows that any evolutionarily 
stable equihbrium must be Pareto efficient. Section 6 extends the initial set-up to allow for 
the circulation of fiat money. Under general conditions, it is then shown that the unique evo­
lutionarily stable equihbrium has a Cash-in-Advance constraint for fiat money. I also discuss 
the implementation of this equihbrium in a free banking environment. I conclude the paper 
with some remarks on how the mechanism described here may be extended, or apply to other 
contexts.
1.3 T h e  M od el
1.3.1 T he physical environm ent
I consider a continuum of measure 1 of infinitely-hved agents. There are N  > 4 different goods 
and N  types of agents in the economy. Type i agents always consume good i. There is a 
measure of ^  of each type.
In this economy, time is discrete and infinite, and all goods are perfectly durable. In order to 
consume, an agent chooses to act either as a producer or as an intermediary. A  producer always 
holds one unit of a good, and tries to obtain, after a sequence of one-for-one exchanges, a unit of 
his own consumption good, labelled i. He then consumes and immediately thereafter produces 
a unit of good i + \  (good N  consumers produce good 1). An intermediary does not produce, 
but instead holds one unit of her own consumption good, and has a shop, where she trades.
In each period, the intermediary uses her inventory to offer a one-for-one exchange between 
her own consumption good i and some other good j  and vice versa. She can immediately be 
located by all other producers and intermediaries. Whenever she gives out her consumption
 ^’ I use male pronouns to refer to producers, and female pronouns to refer to intermediaries.
^^An earlier version of this paper allowed intermediaries to accumulate inventories for transactions. The main 
results of this paper go through almost identically, but the restriction to one unit substantially simplifies the 
analysis.
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Figure 1-1: Timing of actions within each period
good and acquires the other good, the unit she gives out is reduced by a fraction aij. Whenever 
she acquires her consumption good and gives out the other good, she sells a full unit for a full 
unit. The intermediary hves off this mark-up.
W ithin a period, the sequence of actions is described in hgure 1. At the end of each period, 
every intermediary decides on the size of the unit of her consumption good that she offers during 
the next period, and consumes the residual. She thus starts with a unit of her own consumption 
good that is reduced by a fraction CTij. She then lets all producers know that during the period, 
she is wilhng to exchange one unit of size 1 — aij of good i against an integer unit of good j ,  and 
an integer unit of good j  against an integer unit of good i. Producers observe these, and then 
decide if they want to trade with an intermediary, and which one they want to trade with. Then, 
transactions with intermediaries take place. To visualize this transactions process, it is useful 
to order all intermediaries for a given fj-transaction according to the size of their mark-up. All 
producers who intend to carry out a transaction of i for j  then form a queue (the position of each 
individual within the queue being random), and each one chooses the intermediary with the 
lowest mark-up available to him to carry out the transaction. Furthermore, producers cannot 
use the intermediary to coordinate on a location for carrying out their transactions without 
going through the intermediary (i.e. producers cannot coordinate amongst each other to ’’meet 
in front of the shop” ). Once producers are allocated to intermediaries, each intermediary first 
sells her unit of good i for an integer unit of good j ,  and then sells the unit of good j  to acquire 
an integer unit of good i. I assume that an intermediary is wilhng to trade only if she is able 
to carry out a two-way transaction, that is, if she is allocated one producer for each side of the 
transaction. If there is an insufficient number of intermediaries to carry out all desired two-way
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transactions, or if there is an excess of producers on one or the other side of the market, then 
some producers are not allocated to an intermediary and are unable to carry out the desired 
transaction. On the other hand, if there are too many intermediaries compared to the total 
number of two-way transactions demanded by producers, then some intermediaries are unable 
to trade. W ithin each period, the total measure of two-way transactions between any pair of 
goods i and j  is thus bounded by the total measure of 2j-intermediaries, as well as by the 
number of agents who want to complete the transaction in each direction.
If the intermediaries’ total inventory is insufficient to accommodate all transactions, or if 
there is a difference between the total demand for exchanging good i for good j  and the demand 
for the opposite exchange, some producers are unable to acquire their desired good from an 
intermediary. In a second stage of the period, after all transactions with intermediaries are 
completed, every producer, who was either unable or unwilhng to trade with an intermediary, 
randomly meets someone else who also has not traded with an intermediary, and they have a 
second opportunity for a transaction. In such a random match, each producer observes which 
good his trading partner holds, and decides whether or not to swap his inventory good for the 
good held by the other agent. An exchange takes place if and only if both agree to it. Since 
the matches are random, the probability of encountering a type i producer who holds good j  
(henceforth called ij-agent) in such a meeting is given by the measure of -agents who enter 
the bilateral matching stage.
After trading in the random meetings has taken place, all agents decide on their consump­
tion, and on their role during the following period. A producer can consume only if he has 
acquired a full or reduced unit of his own consumption good. In this case, he can also choose 
to become an intermediary, simply by using his unit as inventory for intermediation. An inter­
mediary decides what proportion of her own consumption good unit to consume, and thereby, 
with what size of a unit she wants to enter the following period. An intermediary has the option 
to become a producer in any period, simply by consuming her entire inventory and producing 
one unit of the production good. There is no cost of setting up or abandoning intermediation.
To complete the description of trading, I assume that no agent (intermediary or producer) 
ever accepts a reduced unit of a good in a transaction. Reduced units are therefore acceptable
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only for immediate consumption, and are never held in inventory.
Preferences are assumed to be symmetric across types. Consumption utility is linear: An 
intermediary obtains an instantaneous utility cU from consuming a fraction c of her inventory 
unit. A producer obtains utility U — a) from consuming a unit of his consumption good of 
size 1 — (T. Consuming any other good yields 0 utility. All agents discount time by a constant 
rate 5 smaller than but close to 1. Whenever an agent trades, he incurs a direct transaction 
cost. Producers incur a cost of /dj, whenever they accept good z in a one-for-one exchange, 
or in a transaction with an intermediary. Goods are strictly ranked by transaction costs, and 
for further reference, good 1 is defined as the good which has the lowest cost of acceptance. 
Intermediaries incur a cost of from carrying out a two-way transaction between good i for
good j .  In addition, there is no fixed cost involved in setting up or maintaining intermediation.
The main iimovation with respect to the original search-theoretic model of money by Kiy­
otaki and Wright [18] is the formal introduction of intermediation. As in their framework, 
this paper’s aim is to analyze transaction patterns and the emergence of a common medium of 
exchange within a decentralized economy. This requires an environment in which all goods are 
durable, and no commodity is predestined by its storability qualities to become a medium of 
exchange. Many of the seemingly ad hoc modelling choices are motivated by the aim to allow 
for trade in random matches as well as through intermediaries within the same environment, at 
the expense of a formal modelling of price setting by intermediaries. It should be noted that the 
steady-state results in this paper are not affected by the way in which producers are assigned to 
intermediaries. Related papers that abstract from search trade (Howitt [14], Starr [31], Matsui 
and Shimizu [21]) suggest that the conclusions presented here for intermediated transactions 
apply to settings, where intermediaries set prices and act as ” market-makers”, and producers 
determine the quantities that they want to trade.
1.3.2 Strategies and equilibrium
I now introduce the notation for strategic variables to describe individual behavior, as well 
as the distribution of individual inventories to describe the evolution of the entire economy,
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given individual behavior. Throughout the paper, I restrict attention to symmetric strategy 
profiles, in which (z) all producers of the same type choose the same mixed-strategy profile for 
transaction strategies, and {ii) in each period, all intermediaries who offer the same transaction 
set the same markup. This is a weak restriction, but simplifies our notation considerably; In 
a stationary environment, i.e. one where the distribution of individual inventories across the 
population remains identical over time, identical and stationary markups will naturally come 
as a consequence of Bertrand competition among intermediaries.
Individual behavior and the aggregate state of this economy are described as follows: Trad­
ing strategies are (probabilistic) decision rules that indicate to a producer, which intermediary 
to visit, given his inventory good and the mark-ups. Under the given assumptions concerning 
the matching between intermediaries and producers, these decision rules only need to indicate 
which transaction a producer intends to carry out, but not the intermediary’s identity. I denote 
these decision rules by functions where (f)^ j {k,l) denotes the probabihty that an zj-agent 
(type z producer who holds good j )  visits a fcZ-intermediary, and Tij for trade in random meet­
ings, where Tij (k) indicates the probabihty that an zj-agent accepts good k for good j  in a 
bilateral meeting. Intermediaries determine the mark-up <7^ . Finally, the aggregate state of 
the economy is given by the distribution of inventories and role choices, i.e. (z) the measures 
of type z intermediaries who trade good z for good j  (henceforth: zj-intermediaries), denoted 
by Uij, and (zz) the distribution of inventories across producers, where we let denote the 
measure of zj-agents. This notation leaves aside a formahzation of the decision problem for role 
choices, which is given by an indifference condition between the two activities: any type who 
holds one unit of his own consumption good has to be indifferent between either becoming an 
intermediary or consuming and becoming a producer.
Introducing the strategies in this way implicitly assumes symmetric and stationary behavior, 
but this will also be the outcome of optimizing behavior in a symmetric, stationary environment. 
Since each agent has no direct effect on the aggregate state, we can consider the optimization 
problem for each type of intermediaries and producers separately, taking the behavior of others 
and the aggregate states as given. Furthermore, our set-up imphes that mark-ups are de­
termined by Bertrand competition, and an open-entry condition is at work. In equihbrium.
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mark-ups will be at a level where (i) no producer has an incentive to become an intermediary, 
and no intermediary has an incentive to become a producer, and (ii) no intermediary has an 
incentive to slightly undercut all other intermediaries to offer the same transaction, in order to 
increase his trading volume. Finally, a stationarity condition determines the equihbrium inven­
tory distribution of intermediaries. Summing up, this leads to the foUowing informal definition 
of a symmetric stationary equilibrium:
D efin ition  1 A symmetric, stationary equilibrium is a vector crÿ,Ty such
that
(i) for all ij-intermediaries, it is optimal to set their mark-up equal to (Tij in each period,
{ii) (f)ij and Tÿ are optimal trading strategies for producers,
(in) no intermediary wants to become a producer, and no producer wants to become an 
intermediary, and
(iv) the distribution of inventories and role choices remains constant over
time, given these strategy choices.
1.3.3 Prelim inary R esults
In this section, I derive some preliminary results that formahze the definition of a symmetric 
steady-state equihbrium given above. Formally, a trading strategy for an ij-agent consists of 
two decision rules, one that relates the current inventory to the choice of visiting an interme­
diary, and one that indicates the probabihty with which a good is accepted in exchange for 
another one in a bilateral meeting. FormaUy, for a type i producer, a strategy for trade with 
intermediaries is a vector of functions {4>ij}j^^ • {1 , 2 ,..., N Ÿ  —^ [0 , 1], where (jy^ j {k, I) indicates 
the probabihty that a type i producer with good j  (an iji-agent) visits a /cZ-intermediary. The 
residual probabihty 1 — ^ ^ 1=0 ^ij (^» 0  is assigned to the event that he chooses not to visit 
an intermediary. Since a /cZ-intermediary does not trade good j ,  we observe immediately that 
(fc, Z) =  0, whenever j  ^  k and j  ^  Z. Also, {k, j)  = 0, whenever k ^  i, since no producer 
is wilhng to acquire a reduced unit of a good other than his consumption good. This leaves as 
possible choices the visit of any jfc-intermediary, to trade j  for a fuh unit of k (either for further
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exchange, or for consumption of a full unit of i), and the visit of an ij-intermediary to acquire 
a reduced unit of good i for consumption.
Similarly, trading rules for bilateral meetings are described by a collection of functions 
: {1, 2 ,..., jV) [0 , 1], where Tij (k) indicates the probability that an -agent ac­
cepts good k for good j .  When an ij-agent meets an /fc-agent, trade occurs with probability 
T i j  {k) Tlk (j).
For given values of {/iÿ, Cÿ, Tij}, it is straight-forward to express a producer’s op­
timization problem by a set of Bellman equations. The aggregate state and the strategy profile 
determine conditional trading probabilities for trade with intermediaries: for this purpose, de­
fine TTij (k) as the probability that an % j-intermediary is able to dehver a unit of good k E {i , j }  
to a producer who wants to trade with her. Define Vi (j) as the fife-time discounted utility of 
a producer of type i who holds good j  at the end of a period. Then, Vi {j) satisfies:
(1 -  (5) Vi (j) =  Ô max I (K (0  - P i - V i  U)) <Pij Ü, 0  T^ ji (0
1 = 1
+  {Vi (i) -  aijU - f i i - V i  (j)) <^ ij ( i , j )  TTij (i)
+  ^1 -  ^  <!>ij { j ,  0  '^ji  ( 0  -  <f>ij { h j )  T i^j ( 0  j






Vi { i ) ^U +  Vi{i + l ) - , VN{ N) ^U + VN{l)
Xj = fj'ij ^  <t>ij Ü, 0 (0 -  (b j )  T^ ij (0 j
'■^Standard results imply that under stationarity, the solution to this set of Bellman equations is equivalent to 
the corresponding sequential optimization problem.
35
denotes the measure of zj-agents who did not visit an intermediary, and as a result enter a
bilateral match. Before discussing the imphcations of (1.1) in more detail, it is worth noting
that for any agent, trading away his own consumption good against some other good is strictly 
dominated by immediate consumption.
Several results follow from (1.1). One observes that for every producer, not visiting an 
intermediary is a weakly dominated strategy. The analysis of optimal strategies for trade with 
intermediaries and bilateral trade can be separated. The following proposition summarizes the 
findings and gives simple rules which optimal trading strategies have to satisfy:
L em m a 1 I f  4>i]j^i ^  an optimal trade strategy for a producer of type i, then the following 
must be true:
(i) I f  <f>ij {j, k) > 0, then k G argmax/ {Vi (I) -  -  Vi (j)) ttji (I), and
max {Vi ( 0  - 0 1 - V i  {j)) iXji {I) > {Vi {i) -  aijU  -  0 ^ - Vi {j)) TTij ( 0
I f  k is a unique maximizer, then (f)^ j {j, A:) =  1 
{ii) I f  (f)ij { i J )  > 0, then
{Vi {i) -  (TijU -  0 i - V i  {j)) TTij {i) > max {V {I) -  0 i - V i  {j)) TTji {I)
where 4>j^j {i, j) — 1 , if the inequality is strict
{Hi) I f  Tij {k) > 0, then Vi {k) — 0 .^ -  Vi {j) > 0; and Vi {k) -  0^ -  V  {j) > 0 implies
Tij {k) = 1
While evident in its content, lemma 1 highlights the main difference between trade with 
intermediaries and random bilateral trade: Strategies for the latter amount to simple decision 
rules that indicate whether one good is accepted in exchange for another, and agents might 
be wilhng to accept more than one good in exchange for their current inventory. As a result, 
trading patterns remain indeterminate, and there may be many possible sequences of exchanges 
which lead a producer from his current inventory to his consumption good. Trading with an
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intermediary enables a producer to follow a different strategy and direct himself towards the 
one trade where his expected surplus is maximized. The producer can follow a predetermined 
sequence of intermediated exchanges in order to eventually receive his consumption good, and 
generically, only one such sequence is optimal. Thus, intermediation rephcates the structure 
of models with deterministic trading zones, where agents need to visit an “ij-island” in order 
to trade good i for good j .  However, in contrast to those models, the structure here arises 
endogenously from the activity of intermediaries. Consequently, any delay in trade results from 
the inability of intermediaries to accommodate all the transactions demanded by producers.
Next consider the requirements for stationarity of the distribution of inventories. Taking as 
given {iyij,(pij,Tij}, {nij}  has to satisfy:
N
i^ij =  ^  (f, ;  ) TT/j (j) +  W - ; -  ^  X/ ^  U) (0





whenever j  ^  i , i  + 1 , and
N
( f ,  î )  TTzi { i )  +  4>ii { i ,  I) n u  ( z ) ]  ^   ^ ^  { i )  Tki  ( 0




1 -  (0  Tki (j)
/  V l^kl k,l 
\  k,l /
(1.3)
An z-agent’s production good is treated separately from all other goods he may hold as an
N
inventory. Condition (1.2) can be explained as follows: { l , j ) 7Tij {j) fiu is the measure
1 = 1
of z-agents who acquire good j  from an intermediary. /zC is the set of zj-agents who are
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unsuccessful in trading with an intermediary, and was already defined above. A fraction 1 — 
(j) of y^ 'ij is unsuccessful in bilateral exchange as well, which gives the
k,i
third term. Finally, a measure of 0 ) ( 0  acquires good j  through
/ k
k,l
a bilateral match. Similarly, can be decomposed into those agents who were able to
consume after visiting an intermediary, or after a successful bilateral meeting, and those who 
held good z +  1 at the start of the period, but were unable to trade. Since holding one’s own 
production good stands at the beginning of any sequence of trades, no agent will trade in his 
inventory for good z +  1.
Trading probabilities for trade with intermediaries can be derived from the distribution of 
inventories and role choices as
min I  Uij, Hij(l>ij (z, j ) , Ç  (z, j )  |
min I Uij,fiij(pij (z ,j ) , (b j)  >
and TTij (j) = ----------  ^
( i J )
I
respectively, simply the maximum possible measure of two-way transactions divided by the 
measure of agents wishing to perform the same transaction.
Finally, I look at the equihbrium implications of competition among intermediaries, which 
are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Bertrand competition and open entry into and exit from intermediation imply:
( 0
(') =  1 3 1  -  « (f t  +  f t ) ]  (1-4)
(zz)
Uij  = min I fiij(j>ij (z, j ) , ^  (b j )  \ ■ (1-5)
38
(i) follows from the fact that in equilibrium, any agent who holds a unit of size 1 or l — crtj of 
his consumption good i has to be just indifferent between consuming everything and remaining 
a producer, and retaining 1 — aij to become an intermediary.^'^ {ii) follows as a consequence 
of Bertrand competition: It states that Uij has to equal the measure of two-way transactions 
demanded between goods i and j .  If Uij > min (i, j )  fiucj^ u ( i , j ) | ,  then some inter­
mediaries would not be able to trade within the period, and would be better off either lowering 
their mark-up, or leaving intermediation altogether. If Vij < min | ( i , j ) , ^  f i n (b j )  | , 
then the demand for transactions exceeds the intermediaries’ capacity, and price competition 
has no bite, i.e. every intermediary would be free to raise his price. Since
Uij = min {i , j ) , ^  fin(j)ii (i, j ) |  ,
the trading probabilities can be rewritten as
TTij (z) =  min <
I J.
1 , ^ > and TTij (j) — min < 1 ,
i h j )
Summing up, in any steady-state equilibrium, lemma 1 provides necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the optimality of trading strategies (j)^ j and Tij, (1.2) and (1.3) have to hold for 
stationarity of {fiij],  and lemma 2 states that (1.4) and (1.5) determine <7^ and Uij.
problem possibly arises in a non-stationary environment, if d j  decreases from one period to the next. A 
producer would then be unable to use his unit of consumption to start as an intermediary. Since, in a steady- 
state, no intermediary has an incentive to lower her mark-up, however, this concern is irrelevant for steady-state 
analysis.
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1 .4  C o m m o d ity  M o n ey
1.4.1 Chciracterization
In this section, I discuss the development of a common medium of exchange as an equihbrium 
property of the economy outhned above. The concept of money referred to is commodity 
money, i.e. a good which is used by all producers for indirect exchange. For an economy with 
intermediaries, it is straight-forward to conjecture the existence of a type of equihbrium, where 
an arbitrary good m  circulates as money. Any producer chooses to first trade his production 
good for a fuh unit of good m, and, once he has acquired m, exchanges m  for a reduced unit 
of his own consumption good. Type m  producers trade their production good m -|- 1 directly 
for good m, and producers of good m  trade directly for their consumption good m — 1. In such 
an equihbrium, uim > 0 , for all i ^  m,  and uij = 0 otherwise, i.e. for each good different from 
771, there exists an active set of 7777-intermediaries. I caU this equihbrium a Cash-in-Advance 
equihbrium for good m,  because transactions with intermediaries necessarily involve the use of 
good 777 as a medium of exchange.
D efin ition  2 A stationary equilibrium exhibits a Cash-in-Advance constraint for some good m, 
i f  and only if  satisfies (f)ij {j, m) — 1, and (i, m) = 1 , for all i , j .
P ro p o s itio n  1 I f  transaction costs are sufficiently small, then for any good m, there exists a 
stationary equilibrium in which exhibits a Cash-in-Advance constraint for m.
P roo f. A simple way to prove this proposition is to proceed by guessing and verifying. Given 
the sets of intermediaries active in equihbrium, any producer has only one possible choice for 
transactions with intermediaries. If this transaction sequence leaves him with positive hfetime 
utihty, it will therefore be optimal for him to use these strategies. Now, let be the measure 
of type i producers who hold good m, and fi  ^ the measure of type i producers who hold 
their production good 7-1- 1. Conjecture further that intermediaries are able to carry out all the 
transactions demanded by producers with probabihty 1 , for all producer types different from 
777 -  1 or 777. This requires Uim =  fiim = ^ ( i  ~ ^im), or Uim = Him = Hi,i+1 = and
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one easily confirms the conjecture that trading probabilities for types i ^  m  — l ,m  are indeed 
equal to 1. Type m — 1 acquires good m — 1 with probability  ^ in each period, and type m  
acquires his consumption good with probability These types are the only ones that enter 
random matches, but they will never agree to swap their inventories in a random meeting, since 
type m — 1 would never be willing to give up good m  for a good that is not his own consumption 
good - we therefore conclude that no trade will ever take place as a result of a random meeting.
I next determine the mark-up for each intermediary. Whenever a consumer of type i ^  m  
holds a full unit of his consumption good, he has the choice of becoming an intermediary in the 
following period, in which case he consumes cr^ now, and uses the remainder to trade in the 
following period, or consuming the entire unit to become a producer in the following period. In 
equihbrium, he must be indifferent between the two. For types i 7  ^m — 1, m, the hfe-time utility 
of an im-intermediary is {(TimU — 0 (0 ^+ P^)),  where aimU is the utility from consuming 
the proceeds of one two-way transaction that the intermediary consumes at the end of each pe­
riod, and Ô {Pi + P ^)  is the discounted cost of the next period’s two-way transaction. The hfe­
time utihty of a type i producer before consuming his unit is U + ( u  (1 — CTim) ~ Pi ~
The type i producer consumes a unit of size 1 — aim in every other period, and during the in­
termediate periods he first incurs a transaction cost P ^  for acquiring the medium of exchange, 
and then a cost Pi of acquiring his own consumption good. Equating the two and solving for 
aim yields
<rimC7 =  ^ - p ^ ^ [ y  +  <5ft +  j X ] .  (1.6)






{cTm-l,mU — Ô {Pm- 1  +  Pm))
U +  7 {u  (1 -  am-l,m) — Pm-l)  ,
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respectively. In this case,
(Tm-l,mU = +  ^ ^ ^ Y + 6 '
To complete the proof, I derive the equilibrium welfare levels denoted by Wi, which must be 
positive at the point right after a producer has consumed:
S { U  — P i )  — P i  — P m  r—
(1.8)
{ l - S ) W m  = l s i U - 0 ^ ) .
As long as transaction costs are sufficiently small, these fife-time utility levels are strictly 
positive, and hence an equilibrium with good m  as medium of exchange exists. ■
In this equilibrium, the medium of exchange is the result of the intermediaries’ strategies: 
Their implicit coordination favors one good for the use as a medium of exchange. Intermediaries 
can deliver this good much more quickly than the search market. If transaction costs are small 
enough, Bertrand competition among intermediaries guarantees that the benefits of intermedi­
ation exceed its costs, so that producers have no incentive to deviate from the proposed trading 
sequence.
The characterization of Cash-in-Advance equilibria in the previous proposition leads to 
several immediate observations. First, (1.8) gives an upper bound on transaction costs that 
must be satisfied so that a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium for good m  exists. If all transaction 
costs are sufficiently small and the discount rate is close to 1 , (1 — 6) Wi is close to for all 
types. We also observe that the producer and consumer of good m  enjoy a kind of “rent” in 
equilibrium: If 6 is close to 1, these two types will always prefer to be in a Cash-in-Advance 
equilibrium for good m, rather than in a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium in which they have to 
trade twice.
The trading patterns in a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium exhibit a form of ’’market-clearing”: 
for all types except m  and m — 1 , trading probabilities for transactions with intermediaries are
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equal to 1, i.e. apart from the money producers and money consumers, no one faces delays in 
carrying out the desired transactions. Thus, in the Cash-in-Advance equilibria of proposition 
5, almost all desired transactions are carried out at the prices at which a Walrasian market 
would clear. Complete market-clearing is impossible due to a disequilibrium in transaction 
sequences: The producers and consumers of the commodity money only trade once in order to 
consume, while all other types trade at least twice between the time they produce and the time 
they consume. Thus, the commodity money equihbrium distorts demand and supply of goods 
m  and m -|- 1 away from equahty at the prices at which Walrasian markets for these goods 
would clear. Obviously, this result would not be robust, if the environment were altered in such 
a way that intermediaries could change prices to equate the aggregate quantities demanded 
and supplied for each transaction. Nevertheless, this discussion leads to an important insight: 
the liquidity demand for the commodity money distorts such market-clearing prices away from 
underlying Walrasian prices.
FinaUy, note the influence of intermediation on random transactions: In particular, observe 
that in the Cash-in-Advance equihbrium, transactions cease to occur in bilateral meetings. Here, 
this observation follows from the fact that the search market empties, but it is important to note 
that the conclusion continues to hold if intermediated transactions were only approximately able 
to clear the search market, i.e. trading probabihties for intermediated transactions are close to 
(but smaller than) 1 and some agents enter the matching stage: Each producer who enters
the random matching phase either holds the medium of exchange, or some other good. If he 
holds the medium of exchange, he is only willing to exchange it against his own consumption 
good. Any agent who holds a good other than the medium of exchange will only exchange it 
against the medium of exchange or his own consumption good in a random meeting. The only 
possible trade is then between a pair of agents where one acquires the medium of exchange for his 
production good, while the other one acquires his own consumption good against the medium 
of exchange, but those two types would have visited the same intermediary earlier in the period.
'^In an earlier version of this model, that allows for inventory accumulation by intermediaries, markets clear 
only approximately. The discussion here is based on the formal results there, which can be found in Hellwig [11].
Trading for a different good has to be dominated, since this can only be motivated by a reduction in future 
search costs, but with approximate market-clearing, expected future trading probabilities are already close to 1, 
and hence any reduction in search cost is more than outweighed by the direct cost of an additional transaction.
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and hence cannot both enter into a random match. The assumptions about who enters into the 
random matching phase imply that anyone who has successfully traded with an intermediary 
gets opportunities to trade in "chance" encounters. A more plausible, yet technically intractable 
assumption about the random matching process would have been to let all agents participate in a 
random meeting (independently of whether they were successful in trading with an intermediary 
or not). We would then come to the conclusion that if  intermediation leads to approximate 
market-clearing, then transactions occurring in random meetings have to enable the trading 
parties to save on the costs of intermediation, i.e. had the two trade partners not met by chance, 
they would have chosen to carry out the same transaction indirectly through an intermediary. 
The existence of market institutions that successfully eliminate search frictions therefore has a 
deep impact on the transactions that arise out of random meetings, and the Cash-in-Advance 
property of intermediated transactions also extends to random transactions.
1.4.2 Interm ediated  vs. Pure Search Econom ies
These observations about the Cash-in-Advance equihbria with intermediaries are in contrast 
with the characteristics of commodity money in a pure search economy. Since these properties 
have been studied extensively by Kiyotaki and Wright [18] and Aiyagari and Wallace [1,2], their 
main results wiU only briefly be reviewed here. In a pure search economy, a commodity money 
is deflned as a good that is accepted by all producers, whenever it is offered in an exchange. A 
strategy profile entails a Cash-in-Advance constraint, if the commodity money is part of every 
transaction that takes place in equihbrium.
The aforementioned papers on search economies show that while commodity money equi­
hbria do exist in pure search economies for at least some goods, these equihbria typically do 
not entail a Cash-in-Advance constraint: A Cash-in-Advance constraint imphes that any agent
* ' Note that intermediation widens the possible set of equilibria of this economy from the one originally studied 
in Kiyotaki and Wright. If no agent acts as an intermediary, it is weakly optimal for producers not to visit 
an intermediary. But then, no agent has an incentive for becoming intermediary and trade will only take 
place in bilateral meetings. Thus, any steady-state equilibrium of the original Kiyotaki-Wright economy can be 
supported as an equilibrium of this economy with intermediation, setting Uij =  (Jij =  0 and <t>^ j ( k , l )  =  0, for 
all This reduces the equilibrium definition to the distribution of inventories and to the search strategy
profile
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must first acquire the medium of exchange, before he can acquire his own consumption good. 
However, due to asymmetries across goods in the steady-state inventory distribution, goods are 
endogenously characterized by different qualities for indirect exchange, and there is an advan­
tage in terms of expected waiting time for holding one good rather than another. Since agents 
are unable to direct their search towards a predetermined sequence of transactions, there is a 
non-neghgible probability that the most preferred transaction cannot be carried out rapidly, 
which gives an incentive to swap inventories, even if neither of the goods is a universal medium 
of exchange. The Cash-in-Advance constraint breaks down because the existing search frictions 
give producers an incentive to trade “goods” for “goods” in an attem pt to reduce expected 
waiting time, before they acquire the medium of exchange.
This incentive is missing when intermediaries successfully eliminate waiting times. In the 
intermediated economy, the medium of exchange results from the strategic interaction of inter­
mediaries. Producers can direct their transaction strategy towards a predetermined sequence 
of trades, in this case the one imposed by intermediaries. If the intermediaries are efficient 
in carrying out transactions, producers are able to carry out the exchange proposed by the 
trade sequence (almost) immediately. Holding a particular good at time t becomes equivalent 
in value to exchanging it against the next good of the trading sequence at time t + \. In the 
Cash-in-Advance equilibrium, any good can almost directly be exchanged against the commod­
ity money, so that there is no incentive to reduce search frictions by goods-for-goods trade, as 
in the pure search model.
1.4.3 O ther Equilibria
We can give a simple representation of the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium, that will also be useful 
to characterize other equilibria: In figure 2, we represent the activity of -intermediaries by an 
arrow leading from i to j .  A feasible trading strategy for some producer type is represented 
by a sequence of arrows that lead from the producer’s production good to his consumption 
good, and only for the last arrow in the sequence, when he acquires his consumption good, the 





Figure 1-2: Cash-in-Advance equilibrium
In addition to the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium, other equilibria with intermediation exist. 
Any network of intermediaries that gives every producer type a positive welfare level and exactly 
one trading sequence by which he can acquire his consumption good can be supported as an 
equilibrium. In figures 3 through 6 , we consider just a few alternative examples of equilibrium 
intermediation networks, without attempting to provide an exhaustive analysis of all stationary 
Nash equilibria.
Among these alternative examples, the two-money equilibria are the most interesting ones, 
and it will be useful for further analysis to provide a characterization. Consider an arbitrary 
two-money equilibrium with goods I and m as media of exchange, and suppose that type m 
never becomes an intermediary. In this equilibrium, every producer type trades at most twice 
between the time when he produces, and the time when he consumes. Again, a simple guess- 
and-verify procedure shows that each set of intermediaries is of measure probabilities of 
trade with intermediaries are equal to 1, with the exception of types I — 1 and m — 1, who only 
trade once, and type m, who does not enter into intermediation. Types m — 1 and I — 1 trade 
their production good directly for their consumption good with probability  ^ in each period. 
For type m, the equilibrium inventory distribution (and hence the trading probabilities) are 




Figure 1-3: “Trade-one-up” equilibrium: for i =  1 , — 1, there exist + 1-intermediaries. 
All agents trade their production good directly against their consumption good, except for type 
N, who trade good 1 for good 2, then 3, etc. until they receive good N.
m + 2
m-1
Figure 1-4: This combines a Cash-in-Advance constraint with case (z): Types 1 to m — 1 trade 
their production good directly against their consumption good, type N  trades good 1 for good 
2, then good 3 and so on, until he receives the medium of exchange m, which is used as a 
medium of exchange by types m to N  — 1.
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I+I
Figure 1-5: Two-money equilibrium: for i = I + I, ...,m  — 1, there exist im-intermediaries, and 
for i = — 1, there exist ^/-intermediaries. In this case, goods I and rn are both locally
used as medium of exchange, I by types m to / — 1, and m  by types I to m — 1.
Figure 1-6: Alternative Cash-in-Advance equilibrium, in which m , m +  1-intermediaries replace 
the m + 1, m-intermediaries. Note that this also represents a special case of the two-money 
equilibrium, where goods m  and m +  1 are used as media of exchange.
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Thus, on average, type m consumes every third period. For all types different from m, the 
indifference condition for each type is equivalent to those obtained in the Cash-in-Advance 
equilibrium, (when adjusting the indices for the good which each type uses as a medium of 
exchange). Thus, ioT i ^  I — l , m  — l , m  the equilibrium mark-ups are
CT ij U — (1.9)
where j  € {I, m}  represents the medium of exchange for which i is traded. For zG {Z — l ,m  — 1}, 
the mark-ups are
and welfare levels are
5{U — Pi) — Pi — p. 1 + Ô
2 i
1 +  <5 +
, if i ^  m  — 1 , 1  — l , m
( 1.11)
The equilibrium welfare level for type m is indeterminate, since it depends on the equilibrium 
inventory distribution, i.e. on (. In the simplest case where C =  377 (i G- type m  trades good 
m -f 1 for Z with probability and then Z for m with probabihty 1), his welfare level is^ ^
{ l - 0 ) W m  =
2 +  Ô
s { u  -  pjn) -  -^Pi
The same observations that applied to the Cash-in-Advance equilibria also apply to any two- 
money equihbrium. In particular, there are equilibrium ’’rents” accruing to three types: those 
who produce the two media of exchange, and the one type who is able to consume in integer 
units. I conclude this section by showing that any equilibrium, in which producers trade at 
most twice in order to consume has to be either a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium or a two-money 
equihbrium. Furthermore, I show that any mixed strategy equilibrium is Pareto-dominated.
'*For other values of C, the welfare level is slightly lower, but for any Ç,, this discrepancy vanishes, if 5 is close 
to 1.
49
For ô close to 1 , and a small level of transaction costs, it then follows that these two classes 
Pareto-dominate any other stationary equihbrium profile. On the other hand, the existence of 
equilibrium ’’rents” prevents a Pareto ranking between equilibria within these two classes.
L em m a 3 (i) Any pure-strategy equilibrium, in which producers trade at most twice in order 
to consume is either a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium or a two-money equilibrium.
{ii) Any mixed-strategy equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by some Cash-in-Advance equilib­
rium or two-money equilibrium.
Proof, (i) In any pure-strategy equihbrium, an intermediation network consists of exactly 
N  — 1 sets of intermediaries.^® N  — 2 types trade twice, while the remaining two types trade 
once. If type i and i -f-1 both trade twice, they use the same good as a medium of exchange, and 
in equihbrium, at most two goods are used as commodity money, (ii) Consider an arbitrary 
mixed-strategy equihbrium, in which all types trade at most twice between the moment when 
they produce, and the moment, when they consume. The equihbrium transactions network has 
to connect ah N  types so as to enable them to trade their production good for their consumption 
good in some sequence of transactions. This imphes that the transaction structure of some Cash- 
in-Advance or two-money equihbrium (which are the minimal transactions networks) has to be 
included in any equihbrium transactions network; moreover, if the equihbrium is mixed, the 
inclusion is strict, and since some types follow two different transaction patterns in equihbrium, 
there must be at least two different Cash-in-Advance or two-money transactions networks that 
are embedded in the mixed strategy network. But since for each type, the welfare attained in 
the mixed strategy equihbrium has to be lower than either of the two pure-strategy networks, 
it follows that the mixed strategy equihbrium has to be Pareto-dominated. ■
— 1 is actually the minimum to sustain a complete intermediation network that enables everyone to carry 
out all transactions through intermediaries. If there are more sets of intermediaries active, at least one type must 
have at least two alternatives to trade from his production good to his consumption good, and hence must be 
indifferent and mix in equilibrium.
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1.5 E fficien cy  and E vo lu tion ary  S ta b ility
The previous discussion of Cash-in-Advance equihbria with and without intermediaries raises 
the problem of multiple equihbria, selection of a medium of exchange, and coordination of 
strategies. Related to the selection issue are the welfare properties of the various equihbria. In 
this section, I argue that intermediation may enable the market participants to coordinate equi­
librium strategies so as to achieve steady-state welfare levels that are Pareto-efficient. Loosely 
speaking, I study whether an arbitrarily small set of agents (containing both intermediaries 
and producers), by deviating from an equihbrium and coordinating their actions off the equi­
hbrium path, can improve their welfare level and consequently induce other agents to join their 
deviation. This idea is formahzed by the definition of evolutionary stabihty, which requires 
that no small set of "mutants" can induce a large population of players to alter their behavior. 
However, note that in contrast to the traditional application of evolutionary stabihty to large 
population matching games, it here acts through the coordination of strategies among various 
types of players, as considered by definitions of coalition proofness concepts. Below, I briefiy 
comment on the relation between the two concepts in the present environment.
D efin ition  3 A Stationary Equilibrium is evolutionarily stable, i f  for every e > 0, there exists 
r f  > 0 , such that whenever the strategies of a set of players of measure r] < r f  is exogenously 
fixed (i.e. a set of measure rj of players ’’explicitly coordinates their strategies” or ”deviates”), 
there exists a stationary equilibrium in this modified game, whose Euclidean distance from the 
original equilibrium does not exceed e.
Using a standard continuity notion, this definition thus formulates the requirement that 
the coordination of a small set of players should not have a large (discontinuous) effect on the 
equihbrium. From a historical perspective, the idea of smaU deviating coalitions is meant to 
capture the innovating role of intermediaries, whether it comes through explicit innovation and 
coordination, or through arbitrary ’’experimenting” , i.e. evolutionary forces: Someone proposes 
a new system for organizing transactions. If others find that this arrangement is efficient, they 
will also start using it. Since media of exchange, and more generahy trading strategies are
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complementary across agents, everyone will start using the new system, if it leads to a Pareto- 
improvement. Clearly, intermediation is essential in promoting an innovation in the transactions 
system.
One should note that in any kind of decentrahzed trading economy, explicit coordination of 
several types of players is necessary for any successful deviation from an equihbrium. Trading 
environments, however, differ in how many agents need to coordinate to break out of a given 
equihbrium. In a pure search economy a la Kiyotaki-Wright, equilibrium payoffs are continuous 
in the strategy profile and the equihbrium inventory distribution, and since the ’’mutants” have 
no way to directly trade with each other (even if they can agree on how to deviate), they have 
only a marginal impact on the payoffs of the non-mutant population. Hence any equilibrium 
where payoffs are strictly higher than the next-best alternative is immune to the invasion by 
a smaU set of mutants, and, in order to break out of an inefficient equihbrium, the exphcit 
coordination of a large coalition of players is needed.
This conclusion is fundamentally altered in the intermediated economy that we study here: 
To be specific, suppose that some equilibrium network of intermediaries is dominated by another 
one. In that case, a small set of agents may become intermediaries and coordinate their actions 
on the new intermediation network with some small set of consumer-producers. If, by doing so, 
both the intermediaries and their chents realize a higher life-time utihty than the equihbrium 
strategy profile, other agents have an incentive to deviate from their initial strategy profile to 
take advantage of the higher hfe-time utihty offered by the new intermediaries. If eventually, a 
non-zero measure of agents decides to abandon their equihbrium strategies, the old equihbrium 
is no longer stable and will be replaced by the new one. This type of coordination is more exphcit 
than the one resulting from Nash equihbrium strategies, yet it only requires coordination of 
an arbitrarily small, positive measure of agents. The key insight here is that intermediation 
enables the mutants not only to coordinate their trading strategies, but also to coordinate on 
trading with each other so as to make the deviation profitable for the mutants, and to provide 
others an incentive to join the deviation.
In a trading economy with intermediaries, it turns out that evolutionary stabihty is actually 
equivalent to a more general form of coalition proofness, where we assume that players can
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coordinate only their strategies with respect to intermediation. To see this, suppose that a large 
coalition could deviate from an existing equilibrium and leave all its participants better off by 
proposing a new network of intermediation. Then, this change could also be implemented by an 
arbitrarily small coalition that starts to form the new intermediation network. Over time, other 
agents will be induced to switch their strategies, until the entire large coalition has deviated 
from the existing network to a new one.
It follows immediately from the above discussion that a steady-state equihbrium is unstable, 
if there is an intermediation network, which Pareto-dominates it. To formahze this idea, I use 
a definition of Pareto efficiency that is constrained to comparisons of intermediation networks 
(i.e. changes in the strategy profile for transactions with intermediaries, This
excludes inefficiencies resulting from the transactions in bilateral search meetings, however, in 
an equilibrium, in which all agents trade with intermediaries with very high probabihty, the 
resulting strategies Tij are prescribed by the network of intermediaries, and have only minor 
welfare imphcations.
D efin ition  4 A stationary equilibrium { }  is constrained Pareto-efficient, if  
there does not exist 0 °^ , cr°j, such that
(z) <pij 7^  (f>ij for at least one pair i , j .
{ii) For all i, T? is optimal given j .
{in) , T ?  j  is a Pareto improvement over .
P roposition  2 A stationary equilibrium is evolutionarily stable, i f  and only i f  it is constrained 
Pareto-efficient.
P roof. Clearly, if some Pareto improvement can be implemented by a change in the in­
termediation network, then groups of intermediaries and producers can implement this change 
on a smaU scale, and increase their personal welfare. Everyone else now individuaUy has an 
interest in changing to the new strategies.
To show the converse, note that by virtue of lemma 3, in any constrained Pareto-efficient 
steady-state, at most two different goods are used as media of exchange, and if type i uses good
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m as a medium of exchange, then type i + l either consumes good m  or also uses m as a medium 
of exchange. Similarly, in a successful deviation, types i and 2 +  1 use the same medium of 
exchange (different from m). It follows that for a deviation to be successful, all N  types have 
to participate in the deviation, i.e. be made no worse of than initially, which contradicts the 
definition of constrained Pareto efficiency. ■
This result diverges from the main conclusions about search economies without intermedi­
aries, where the continuity of objective functions with respect to strategies implies that small 
deviations change overall utility only marginally. Changes in the intermediation network may 
lead to discontinuous changes in payoff, and thus to strategy changes by a large fraction of the 
population. The second half of proposition 2 critically relies on the assumption of full special­
ization of production, i.e. good 2 +  1 is produced only by type i. In the next section, we relax 
this assumption. In that case, a deviating coalition does not have to rely on the participation 
of all producer and consumer types, and hence an equilibrium may be Pareto-efficient, but not 
evolutionarily stable, if the implemented changes lead to welfare losses for agents who do not 
participate in the change. Some agents may strictly prefer the old equilibrium over the inno­
vation, but once the innovation is introduced, they will change, because their trade partners 
also start using the new medium of exchange. Loosely speaking, different media of exchange 
are substitutes, but there are complementarities in using a medium of exchange.
W hat are the implications for the steady-state equilibria considered in the previous section? 
As an immediate consequence of lemma 3 and proposition 2, we have the following result:
P ro p o sitio n  3 I f  transaction costs are sufficiently low, the set of evolutionarily stable equilibria 
is a subset of the Cash-in-Advance and two-money equilibria.
We thus come to the conclusion that the monetary structure of transactions appears in any 
evolutionarily stable equilibrium of the previous section. In either case, trading probabilities 
equal 1, i.e. markets clear. W hat importance can be attached to the evolutionarily stable 
equilibria where good 1 is not a universally accepted medium of exchange? In all minimally 
coalition-proof equilibria, one type i of agents does not offer any intermediation, and as a 
consequence, consumes his consumption good in integer units. Due to the assumption of full
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specialization of consumption and production in this model, a deviating coalition can impose 
a good as the universal medium of exchange, only if this type participates in the deviation. 
Among this remaining set of equilibria, an equilibrium is unstable, only if it is dominated for 
all types, including the types who benefit from a rent as producers or consumers of a medium 
of exchange. Precisely the existence of such rents makes it impossible to break away from some 
of the two-money and Cash-in-Advance equilibria.
1.6 G en eral R esu lts
1.6.1 Less than  full Specialization
In this section, I discuss how the previous results are affected by a generalization of the assump­
tions concerning consumption and production. The point of departure for this discussion is the 
observation that full specialization of production and consumption choices, i.e. the assumption 
that type i is the only type to produce good i-f 1, protects equihbrium rents to money producers 
and consumers and thereby induces multiple evolutionarily stable equilibria. The following set 
of assumptions departs from full specialization of production and consumption patterns:
(AO) There are N  goods and M  > N  types of measure of agents. Each type i iIS
characterized by a production good p{i) and a consumption good c{i).
(Al)  For each good, the total number of types consuming the good equals the total number 
of types who produce it.
(A2) For every pair of types i , j ,  i f  c(i) = p( j ) ,  then p{i)  ^  c{j).
(A3) For every triple of types i , j , k ,  if c{i) —p{j )  and c{j) = p{k),  then c{k) ^ p { i ) .
(A4) Each good is produced by at least two types.
Under (Al), this market would clear at relative prices of one for one, if the market envi­
ronment was Walrasian. (A2) introduces the weU-known ’’double coincidence problem”, that 
there are no two types of agents who could just produce for each other. (A3) excludes the 
possibility of ’’three-way coincidences”, i.e. situations, where a single type could successfully 
act as a middleman between two other types; effectively, (A3) implies that, to get exchange off
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the ground, at least two types must coordinate their transaction activities and agree on one 
good as a medium of exchange. (.44) rules out full specialization.
Under these assumptions, one notes that the only candidate for an evolutionarily stable pure 
strategy equihbrium is the Cash-in-Advance equihbrium, in which good 1 is used as a common 
medium of exchange. All other pure strategy equihbria are destabilized by a smaU group of 
players comprising a strict subset of types, who coordinate on using good 1 as a medium of 
exchange, but don’t have to rely on the participation of a type who enjoys an equihbrium 
rent (formahy, the converse of proposition 2 no longer applies). If transaction costs are small, 
these rents are small, and eventually aU types will prefer the more efficient equihbrium trading 
network.
It remains to be shown that the Cash-in-Advance equihbrium for good 1 exists, and is evo­
lutionarily stable. While existence is immediate, the properties of Cash-in-Advance equihbria 
do not automaticaUy carry over: As can be shown by example, the transaction probabihties 
for transactions with intermediaries need not equal 1, and hence the equihbrium may fail to 
exhibit market-clearing. Intuitively, the imbalance in transaction sequences induced by the use 
of one good as a common medium of exchange now affects trading probabihties throughout aU 
markets, and the overaU frequency of consumption then remains suboptimal. But since some 
small deviation that uses a more costly good as a medium of exchange can offer its members 
a higher frequency of consumption, the Cash-in-Advance equihbrium for good 1 wiU not be 
evolutionarily stable, if it fails to lead to market-clearing.
1.6.2 F iat M oney
I now extend the model to allow for the circulation of a fiat money, labeUed good 0, and traded 
with a transaction cost FoUowing the search literature, I assume that a fraction S  of the 
population each holds one indivisible unit of fiat money at any point in time. FoUowing along 
the same hnes as before, one can now discuss the existence of a Cash-in-Advance equihbrium 
for fiat money:
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P ro p o sitio n  4 Suppose that [i) S  = ^ and {ii) Pq < Pi- Then, under assumptions (AO) —(A4), 
the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium for fiat money clears markets and is the unique evolutionarily 
stable steady state equilibrium.
P roo f. Proceeding along the lines of proposition 1, it is straight-forward to show the 
existence of a Cash-in-Advance equihbrium for fiat money. If 5  =  | ,  markets clear exactly, and 
mark-ups and welfare levels are given by
~  1  - I -  ^  _j_  ^ 2
and
(1 - S ) W i  =
1 + 6  + 6 ^
6 {U — Pi) — P i~  pQ1 +  ÔÔ
Since no type produces or consumes fiat money, there are no rents associated with its production 
or consumption. Note that this equilibrium is evolutionarily stable, if and only if Pq < Pi'. In 
that case, (A2) and (A3) together imply that any coahtion that tries to deviate from the fiat 
money Cash-in-Advance equilibrium has to include one type who is willing to accept a higher- 
cost good as a medium of exchange, without enjoying a rent as a money producer or consumer. 
But then he must be made worse of, and no one will be willing to follow his strategy - on the 
other hand, if Pq > Pi, such a coalition may exist, and successfully deviate from the proposed 
equihbrium.
Finally, note that in any other equihbrium, (AO) — (A4) imply that there has to exist a 
subset of types i \ , i 2 , ■■■,in who form a circle, i.e. c{i\) =  p (Î2), 0 (23) =p{h) , - - i  c{in) = p { h ) ,  
where neither of these types produces or consumes a medium of exchange in equihbrium. This 
subset of types can successfully mutate to start using fiat money in a steady-state. ■
This proposition states the central theoretical result of this paper and provides a foundation 
for a Cash-in-Advance equihbrium with fiat money as the unique evolutionarily stable equihb­
rium in a decentrahzed trading economy with intermediaries. The result is tied to a series 
of conditions, which are arguably of a technical nature. The assumptions (AO) - (A4) rule 
out possibihties for double or three-way coincidences, and assume less than full specialization.
57
Their role is to rule out coordination among a small number of types^^, or the protection of 
rents, when a deviation has to rely on the participant of a money producer or consumer. The 
condition S  — ^ states that the supply of real balances has to equal the demand for transactions 
purposes. Matsui and Shimizu [21] show that such a condition arises as the unique evolutionar­
ily stable steady-state in a related model that makes stronger assumptions about the structure 
in which transactions take place and notably allows for nominal price adjustments, . Finally, 
the condition that Pq < Pi states that it has to be desirable from an individual perspective to 
use fiat money as a medium of exchange - alternatively, individuals always have an incentive to 
use commodities for indirect exchange to save on transaction costs.
Proposition 4 should not be read as a statement that rules out the observation of anything 
but a fiat money equihbrium in a steady-state. Rather, it states that as the long-run outcome of 
an evolutionary process, in which intermediaries play a central role in coordinating transaction 
strategies, one should expect the most efficient transactions arrangement (in this case a fiat 
money equilibrium) to prevail. Since the proposition emphasizes the uniqueness of the long- 
run outcome, it also contrasts with the multiphcity of equilibria within Walrasian and search 
models of monetary exchange, a ’problem’ that was first discussed by Hahn [10]. Of course, 
the result remains silent about the question of how the long-run equilibrium is obtained, or 
what is observed in the interim stages. In this respect, the multiplicity of equilibria retains 
its relevance, as many of the observations made within the context of the search fiterature, or 
earher in this paper with respect to commodity money may remain relevant as descriptions 
of intermediate stages of the evolutionary process, or as the consequence of aggregate shocks 
leading to a temporary break-down of market institutions and intermediation.
Nor should this proposition be viewed as stating that the final stage of the evolutionary 
process of market transactions will be a fiat money equihbrium as the one described here. In­
deed, one of the constants of the history of market organization and transactions is innovation 
and change, and virtually every innovation is promoted or coordinated by some kind of inter-
^"With three-way coincidences three types could coordinate a deviation towards a "local" commodity money, 
in such a way that one type trades twice, but consumes in integer units, while the other two types trade only once. 
Each type then gets to enjoy a small rent, which might be enough to offset the loss of using a higher-transaction 
cost medium of exchange. An even simpler argument applies, of course, for double coincidences.
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mediary. The introduction of credit cards and other cashless means of transactions for example 
can be viewed as a move away from cash towards more efficient alternatives.
1.6.3 Free Banking
While the previous section discussed the emergence of a fiat money Cash-in-Advance equilibrium 
as an evolutionarily stable steady state, it does not answer the question of how fiat objects get 
into circulation in the first place. This is also a question that existing search-theoretic models do 
not answer appropriately: by focusing on steady-state equilibria, they focus on environments, 
where fiat objects have been around forever in the past, and are valued, because they are 
expected to be valued forever into the future. The purpose of this section is to illustrate how 
fiat money may come into circulation in a "free banking" equilibrium. For this purpose, I adapt 
the model by enabling intermediaries to issue debt certificates on which they promise to pay a 
unit of physical goods in the future.
To be specific, suppose that every intermediary has the abihty to write out demandable 
debt claims, i.e. notes that are backed by her inventory of goods, and that are sold in trans­
actions. Under what conditions do these notes start to circulate as media of exchange, and 
become perfect substitutes from the producers’ perspective? To make such a system viable, it 
is necessary that in steady-state, intermediaries have an incentive to discipline their note issue, 
and not overissue notes to default in the future. This incentive compatibihty requires that notes 
eventually return to their issuer. Again for the sake of concreteness, I start by assuming that 
this occurs at the end of each period, when all intermediaries participate in a clearing market, 
where they return any notes to the initial issuer. Below, I will also take into consideration other 
clearing mechanisms, as well as different assumptions concerning note-issuing privileges.
Given a transactions cost of Pq for accepting notes (and assuming that there are no costs 
involved in the clearing process), proposition 4 characterizes the Cash-in-Advance equihbrium, 
provided that intermediaries have an incentive to refrain from overissuing. The equilibrium 
behavior of intermediaries and the circulation of notes is characterized as follows: Each period 
begins with half of the producers holding their production good (those who previously con­
sumed) and half of the producers holding fiat object, i.e. a note issued by the intermediary
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to whom they sold their production in the previous period. Intermediaries begin each period 
with one note outstanding and a reduced unit of their consumption good. They then sell this 
unit in exchange for the bank notes held by visiting producers who purchase their consumption 
good, and withdraw this note from circulation. Afterwards, they purchase an integer unit of 
their consumption good from some producer who wishes to sell his production, and pay for 
it by issuing a new note. After all transactions with producers are completed, intermediaries 
meet in a clearing market and exchange the notes they withdrew from circulation. Since every 
intermediary had one note outstanding, the market clears, and the following period begins with 
each intermediary having one note outstanding.
Under the conditions of proposition 4, such a free banking equilibrium is evolutionarily stable 
and may account for the emergence of a fiat object, if it provides intermediaries with the right 
incentives to participate in the clearing mechanism and not overissue. These incentives depend 
on the comparison between the short-term gains from overissuing, and the potential long-run 
punishment in case of default. In the present case, if an intermediary decides to overissue and 
default, she can issue one note during one period, and not accept someone else’s note in return 
for her consumption good; she is then found out at the end of the period, when she fails to clear 
her note in the clearing market. Her short-term benefit is then equal to Pq + — <7io) U. The
cost of default depends on the punishment structure. In the most lenient case, this punishment 
might simply involve the loss of her note-issuing privileges; given the open entry condition, the 
intermediary could become a producer, and continue without any welfare losses.^^ Alternatively, 
the most severe punishment might involve total exclusion from the market (as a producer or an 
intermediary) for all future periods - which would amount to the loss of all future consumption. 
Whatever the punishment mechanism, the cost of punishment must exceed the short-term gains 
of over-issuing.
Under alternative note-issuing and clearing arrangements, notes may not be redeemed im-
 ^' This statement relies critically on the existence of open entry into intermediation, i.e. note-issuing. A 
related discussion by Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides [5] of private note-issuing in a search model discusses 
a stable private money equilibrium relying solely on the withdrawal of note-issuing priviledges as an incentive 
mechanism, but in their environment there is no open entry into the banking sector, i.e. note-issuing priviledges 
are exogenously fixed, and default leads to the loss of seignorage (i.e. essentially scarcity) rents. See also 
Hell wig and Lorenzoni [12], who discuss reputational mechanisms for sustaining note circulation in a Walrasian 
equilibrium with borrowing constraints.
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mediately, but circulate for several periods. This may happen, for instance, if the clearing 
market opens only infrequently, and instead notes are returned to the producers within the 
same period. Alternatively, only a hmited number of types may issue and clear notes, and 
hence notes stay with the pubhc or non-issuing intermediaries for several periods until they 
are returned to the issuer. To provide a specific example, return to the environment studied 
initial, where type i produces good i -|- 1. If notes are issued only by type 1 intermediaries 
(and only type 1 agents participate in the clearing), these notes circulate for N  periods before 
they return to the initial issuer (From type 2 to type 3 to type 4 to... until they reach type 
N  producers, and then type 1). In that case, a single producer might be willing to become a 
"rogue" intermediary, and start issuing notes, without ever exchanging back the consumption 
units. Since the notes take N  periods until they return to the issuer, the intermediary does 
not have to redeem any notes immediately. Hence, it takes N  periods to detect someone who 
overissues notes, and thus the short-run benefit of over-issuing increases. Similarly, the time of 
circulation of a note increases, when note clearing takes place less often, or not at all. Since an 
overissuing intermediary is detected only once the note is redeemed, the short-run benefits of 
over-issuing are proportional to the expected time of circulation of the notes.
While far from complete as a theory of free banking, this discussion points to some of the 
features that determine the stabihty of a free banking system. Clearing arrangements and the 
length of time a note circulates determine the short-run gains from over-issuing. These short- 
run benefits are contrasted with the long-run costs of default, determined by the harshness 
of punishment, as well as the potential loss of seigniorage or monopoly rents. Note that the 
clearing arrangements have no direct allocational purpose, but simply serve to decentralize 
the monitoring of the intermediaries’ note-issuing activities. Finally, the model points to a 
coordination problem that arises in the clearing of notes: the equilibrium described above 
relied on the participation of intermediaries in the clearing market, and this participation was 
individually rational, since in order to clear her note, the intermediary had to return a note 
she collected to the initial issuer. There is, however, an alternative equilibrium, in which all 
intermediaries, instead of returning the notes they collected to the issuer, decide to return them 
to the producers within the same period, or withdraw them without clearing them, keeping 
them as reserves. Since no intermediary is clearing any notes, there is no reason for any
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intermediary to participate in the clearing, and if clearing notes is associated even with a 
small cost, intermediaries collectively prefer the no-clearing equilibrium. But then, the clearing 
market ceases to perform its monitoring role, and some intermediaries may find it optimal to 
default. Summing up, the model suggests that free banking regimes are stable, when:
(i) Notes circulate only for short periods, and quickly return to the issuer through a well- 
functioning clearing system, and
(ii) The loss of seigniorage or monopoly rents after a default provides incentives not to 
overissue.
I conclude this discussion with a brief review of some historical free banking episodes. 
Proponents of free banking typically point to Scotland as a country where free banking was 
extremely stable throughout several centuries. As is extensively discussed by Smith [30] in 
her classic analysis of free banking, the Scottish banking system indeed fulfills the conditions 
laid out here, providing the most clear-cut example: Although labelled as "free" banking, the 
banking sector really had an ohgopofistic, almost cartell-hke structure with a small number of 
large players. These bankers met on a very regular (weekly) base to clear notes, and notes 
stayed in circulation for short time periods only. In addition, they were subject to unhmited 
liabihty in case of a default. Over a stretch of approximately three centuries, Scotland had 
virtually no banking panics or defaults. Another example of free-banking success was the 
Suffolk bank system in nineteenth century New England, described for example by Smith and 
Weber [29]. The Suffolk Bank, one of the biggest note-issuing banks in the area, internalized 
the cost of running a clearing market by accepting the notes of other banks at parity, if these 
banks made a large up-front deposit. Other regions in America did not have as sophisticated 
clearing mechanisms during the free banking era in the nineteenth century, and thus had longer 
times of note circulation, and coupled with a legal system that made default more acceptable 
than in most European countries and free entry into banking, this lead to a higher degree of 
instability, banking panics, and defaults.
An intriguing final example for the ultimate failure of a free banking system despite initial 
success is Switzerland during the nineteenth century, as described by Neldner [23]. Although 
the system performed reasonably well by all conventional accounts (even though highly compet­
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itive, it was unusually safe, didn’t lead to bank panics or failures throughout almost the entire 
century, and no noteholder ever incurred a loss due to default), it ultimately failed and was 
replaced by the Swiss National Bank in 1907. According to Neldner, while the system initially 
was very successful, during the last third of the nineteenth century, it suffered from overissuing 
of notes and a malfunctioning of the clearing market, even though very sophisticated clearing 
arrangements did exist. During this time period, the position of note-issuing banks was weak­
ened by the arrival of non-issuing commercial banks, who held a competitive advantage in the 
market for loans. This gradually led note-issuing banks to reduce the clearing of notes, in fear 
of receiving their own notes in return, and having to pay in species. Within a very competitive 
environment, this led to an overissue of notes, and ultimately the deterioration of the exchange 
rate towards the French franc and an outflow of species from the country. The banks, however, 
did not return the notes which they received in exchange for the species to the issuer, preferring 
to return them directly to the market, and thus further slowing down the clearing process. 
While the exact causal hnk between these events is not entirely clear from Neldner’s analysis, 
one possible interpretation might be that a weakening of the note-issuing banks led them to 
gradually reduce the clearing activities, i.e. switch from one equilibrium in the clearing market 
to another, in a collective attempt to maintain their economic viability.^^
1 .7  C on clu sion
This paper studied a decentralized trading economy in which intermediaries induce the use 
of a common medium of exchange. As such, intermediation and money are complementary 
phenomena. Strategic interaction of intermediaries leads to a Cash-in-Advance constraint, 
such that trade sequences with intermediaries follow the well-known pattern that “goods buy 
money and money buys goods, but goods don’t buy goods” (Glower [7]). As opposed to many 
other models of monetary exchange, this pattern comes as an equilibrium outcome and not an 
assumption of the model. The second central result is that the characteristics of a monetary 
equihbrium with intermediaries differ fundamentally from those of equihbrium models without
Remarkably, the note-issuing banks were willing to collectively restrain from clearing notes, but they were 
unable to coordinate to limit the amount of note-issuing, even though this would have improved their competitive 
position relative to the commercial banks.
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intermediaries. By coordinating its deviations, a small coalition of intermediaries can induce 
producers to use transaction strategies that ultimately lead to an efficient equilibrium. Under 
some additional conditions, the unique evolutionarily stable equilibrium leads to a Cash-in- 
Advance constraint for a fiat currency. I further study how this equilibrium can be implemented 
in a free banking equilibrium, in which fiat money is brought into circulation as debt certificates 
issued by intermediaries.
A series of questions cannot be properly addressed within the framework of this model. 
Most importantly, production and consumption choices remain outside the model. As in many 
related models, I have simply assumed the existence of an underlying Walrasian equilibrium, 
which in the absence of search frictions also represents an optimum. Production and Consump­
tion choices are exogenously given in such a way that in a frictionless economy, all markets 
would clear at the relative price of 1. In an environment where trade is subject to frictions, 
assuming that consumption and production decisions do not depend on decisions about trade is 
problematic, since decision-makers would take into account their opportunities for trade when 
they decide what goods to produce or to consume. They may decide to produce one good 
because it is easy to trade, even though they are more efficient at producing a different, less 
marketable good. This problem does not appear, however, in discussions on exchange in decen­
tralized economies with frictions, neither here, nor in the literature on which this paper builds. 
Furthermore, I have effectively abstracted from the problem of embedding a theory of prices 
into this decentralized trading economy, assuming that transactions take place at the implicit 
Walrasian prices. Under what conditions these prices prevail in a search or otherwise non- 
walrasian economy is an open question, since within each transaction, price formation would 
have to be modelled the result of some bilateral bargaining process, and hence also depend 
on the trading partners’ outside options, which in turn  depend on the trading environment. 
However, as discussed in the context of proposition 1, the liquidity demand for the medium of 
exchange creates some inherent price distortions away from the Walrasian equilibrium.
Finally, it should be noted that the model presented here relies on some ad hoc assumptions 
about intermediation. Most importantly, the idea that a limit to intermediation generates a 
need for intermediaries to introduce a common medium of exchange requires some reflection.
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Precisely which technical restrictions aflFect the behavior of intermediaries, and how do they 
alter a given trading environment? While such constraints are taken as given in this context, 
further thought is needed in order to assess the validity of the way intermediation is introduced 
into the trading environment here, and the robustness of the results that follow from it. Also, 
the evolutionary stability arguments rely on the assumption that intermediaries are immediately 
accessible to producers; this effectively enables them to coordinate on an arbitrarily small scale. 
In an environment, where intermediaries are not immediately accessible to their customers, 
say, when intermediaries are simply more efficient at searching for matches, the evolutionary 
stability argument breaks down.^^ While this paper takes the stand that such coordination will 
eventually occur, whenever it is feasible, questions arise as to how intermediaries coordinate, in 
short, what happens along the transition towards the long-run steady-state.
Despite these technical shortcomings and open questions, the results presented here provide 
some more general insight into the role of intermediation. The complementarity of the medium 
of exchange and intermediation and the non-stabihty of inefficient transaction patterns both 
follow from three basic assumptions about the environment:
(i) A Pareto-optimal, market-clearing allocation, which would result from a competitive 
equilibrium in perfect markets, cannot be attained because of a form of market imperfection,
(ii) some agents have a technology to alleviate the imperfection by offering intermediation, 
and by offering this technology to the economy, they can make arbitrage profits from a price 
spread, and
(Hi) the success of intermediaries depends on how they can deal with their own constraints.
In general, we know many reasons for frictions in a competitive economy, and the many facets 
and different forms of intermediation all respond to these imperfections. Here, I have considered 
search frictions as the underlying imperfection, however, one might try to apply the same logic
Consider for example a random matching environment, where intermediaries find matches at a faster rate 
than producers. One would conjecture that the meeisure of agents who need to coordinate to break an inefficient 
equilibrium is decreasing in the frequency with which they encounter an intermediary, i.e. the more efficient 
intermediaries are in the matching process, the easier it is to break out of an equilibrium. This conjecture is 
open to future research.
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to study how intermediation interacts with decentralized market instruments to alleviate other 
frictions, such as the lack of public memory mentioned initially, informational asymmetries, 
contracting constraints or other forms of credit market frictions. When these forms of market 
imperfections arise, intermediation performs a screening activity between both sides of the 
market, for which a price spread is charged. The success of intermediaries depends mostly on 
appropriating a large volume of transactions, and on establishing a repeated, credible interaction 
with their customers. This transfers the problems of price-setting and market allocation to the 
intermediation sector. Many features traditionally attributed to competitive markets, such as 
market clearing, the use of money and Cash-in-Advance constraints, can thus be explained as 
being in the interest of intermediaries who organize market exchange to alleviate an imperfection 
and take arbitrage gains from it.
Beyond these implications for the theory of intermediation, the results developed here also 
have some implications for existing Walrasian macroeconomic and monetary theory. The inter­
mediation model combines frictionless market transactions a la Walras with an explicit, bilateral 
structure of exchanges. It thereby provides a channel, by which price-setting and information 
transmission can plausibly be discussed (although this is beyond the scope of this paper). The 
model further provides an evolutionary approach towards the development and structure of 
competitive markets. Extensions and simplifications of the intermediation model may thus 
prove useful to analyze questions in monetary and macroeconomic theory for which the existing 
theory has come to its hmits due to the ad hoc structure of markets and monetary exchange.
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Public Inform ation, Private  
Inform ation, and the M ultip licity  o f  
Equilibria in C oordination Gam es
S um m ary  o f C h a p te r  2 I  study coordination games with incomplete public and private in­
formation and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher-order beliefs. As the 
players ’ signals become more and more precise, the equilibrium manifold converges to the corre­
spondence of common knowledge equilibria, whenever the variance of the public signal converges 
to 0  at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals. 
The same condition also determines the convergence of common p-belief to common knowledge, 
which leads to a simple intuition for its origin, and an immediate generalization of the former 
results about equilibrium convergence.^
JEL classification numbers: C72, D82
Keywords: Global Games, Equilibrium Convergence, Common Knowledge, Higher-Order 
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2.1  In tro d u ctio n
Over the past couple of decades, models with multiple equilibria have been prominent in think­
ing about coordination failures. Arguably the best known example are the bank runs in Di­
amond and Dybvig [4]. In the related context of speculative attacks against a currency peg, 
multiple equilibria are at the heart of so-called second generation models, following Obstfeld
[19]. In the simplest version of the multiple equilibrium model of speculative attacks, if all in­
vestors run on the currency, the central bank will abandon the peg. If investors anticipate this, 
they will all run. On the other hand, if investors anticipate that the peg will be maintained, 
they wiU not run on the currency, and the central bank has no reason to devalue. TypicaUy, the 
existence of multiple equilibria depends on a state parameter, such as the amount of reserves 
that a Central Bank is wilhng to commit in case of an attack. Equihbrium multiplicity makes 
it impossible to draw determinate economic predictions or policy implications from dynamic 
analysis or comparative statics, and quahtative conclusions are often restricted to informal pre­
dictions as to how policies may alter expectations, or act as a coordination device towards one 
equihbrium.
In recent years, the multiplicity of equihbria in coordination games has been criticized as 
the artefact of an impUcit assumption that the state is conunon knowledge. Carlsson and van 
Damme [2] argue that the coordination game without uncertainty should be viewed as the 
limit of a sequence of incomplete information games. They posit a so-called “global game” 
structure, in which players receive noisy, private signals about the game’s payoffs, and show 
that this incomplete information game has a unique equilibrium. Moreover, equilibrium actions 
at each state converge to one of the equilibria of the common knowledge game, and this hmit is 
independent of the distribution of private signals. Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium 
in the coordination game with common knowledge that is also consistent with Carlsson and 
van Damme’s hmit continuity postulate with respect to noisy private signals. Uniqueness 
follows from the higher-order uncertainty inherent in the information structure: Whereas the 
private signal may provide very precise information about the fundamental, it provides less 
precise information about what the other player has observed, and it provides no information 
at aU about one player’s private signal relative to the other players’ private signals. Even if
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uncertainty about the fundamental is small, at the margin, players remain highly uncertain 
about each other’s actions. This precludes the possibility of multiple equilibria.
This paper reconsiders the equilibrium selection procedure proposed by Carlsson and van 
Damme, and further explores the link between higher-order uncertainty and equihbrium selec­
tion in the context of global games with public and private information. Consider the case where 
the no-uncertainty limit is approached by a sequence of incomplete information structures, in 
which players have access only to a more and more precise pubhc signal. The structure of the 
game is then essentiaUy identical to the common knowledge game: Players face uncertainty 
only about payoffs, but not about the information of other players. The game has multiple 
equihbria, which converge exactly to the ones of the game under common knowledge, as the 
pubhc signal gets more and more precise. The convergence of equihbria in the game with in­
complete pubhc information thus differs substantially from the private information game. In 
general, the no-uncertainty hmit of a sequence of incomplete information games will depend on 
the hmiting path. This raises the first question underlying the analysis in this paper: Under 
what conditions on the information structure wiU the coordination game have multiple equihb­
ria, and when will the equihbrium be unique? The arguments for uniqueness of the equihbrium 
in the private information game, as well as for multiphcity under pubhc information relied on 
higher-order uncertainty, i.e. what players know about each others’ information. This leads to 
a second question: When does a sequence of information structures converge to common knowl­
edge? This paper studies these questions separately, first, by exphcitly considering equihbrium 
convergence in the context of a well-understood example, then by deriving the level of common 
belief (cf. Monderer and Samet [12]) in the information structure. The results on common be- 
hef convergence then lead to an immediate generalization of the equihbrium convergence result 
beyond the initial example, without making exphcit payoff assumptions.^
It turns out that the ratio of the standard deviation of private signals to the variance of 
public signals determines the answer to both questions.^ Whenever this ratio becomes infinite
^Throughout this paper, I study information structures with normally distributed signals. Extensions to other 
distributions are possible, but beyond the scope of this paper.
^This condition comes as a consequence of the statistical properties of the information structure. The 
discussion leading up to Theorem 3 below provides some intuition for its origin, as well as its necessity and
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in the limit, i.e. whenever the variance of the public signal converges to zero at a rate faster than 
^ the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals, the incomplete information game 
converges to the common knowledge game, and higher-order uncertainty vanishes. Whenever 
the above ratio converges to zero, the incomplete information game converges to the private 
information game studied by Carlsson and van Damme, and higher-order uncertainty remains 
at a maximal level. Whenever the ratio converges to a finite constant, this limit determines 
the number of equilibria, as weU as equilibrium strategies. Once again, these results are best 
understood by considering the effect of public information on higher-order uncertainty: In 
contrast to the private information environment, the pubhc signal enables a player to make 
some inference about other players’ beliefs relative to his own, and therefore about the other 
players’ actions. If this pubhc information is sufficiently precise, relative to private signals, 
its coordinating effect becomes so large that it induces multiple equihbria. If the existing 
information is very precise, only a smaU amount of pubhc information is needed to create a 
large coordinating effect, and thereby multiple equihbria.
2.2  R e la te d  L iteratu re
To understand the imphcations of these results, it will be useful to place them within the context 
of the theoretical and applied global games literature. A series of authors have used Carlsson 
and van Damme’s private information equihbrium to perform a comparative or dynamic analysis 
in a coordination game of economic interest. Among others, Morris and Shin [15] apply it to 
speculative attacks in a game with a continuum of players. Goldstein and Pauzner [5] analyze 
how the inununity of a bank against runs depends on interest rates and debt contracts. Rochet 
and Vives [20] discuss the effects of a lender of last resort policy. Morris and Shin [17] provide 
an excellent survey that does better justice to this rapidly growing hterature than this short list. 
The results in this paper cast doubt on the validity of the use of the private information hmit as 
an equihbrium selection in a coordination game with multiple Nash equihbria under common 
knowledge. Whenever the pubhc information retains some informative value relative to private
sufficiency for common belief convergence.
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information, the incomplete information game converges to the common knowledge game, as 
information becomes more and more precise. Even if the equilibrium is unique, its hmit is 
still dependent on the convergence of the afore mentioned variance to standard deviation ratio, 
and the public signal has considerable effect on equilibrium actions. The private information 
equihbrium is thus in stark contrast with the public information limit, and any comparative 
statics conclusions that are derived from the private information equilibrium do not appear to 
be robust to the equilibrium effects of pubhc information.
It should be noted that this paper is not the first to study the effects of pubhc information 
in a global games context, however, it is the first to explicitly consider equilibrium convergence 
in a pubhc information setting. Its predecessors are mostly interested in comparative statics 
with respect to the information structure in environments with a unique equihbrium away from 
the hmit. The empirical relevance of pubhc disclosures in the context of most coordination 
games of economic interest provides a natural motivation for such a study, both to understand 
its equihbrium effects (Morris and Shin [16]), and to draw conclusions about the design of 
disclosure pohcies, eg. Morris and Shin [18], Metz [10]. In an analysis of coordination effects in 
the pricing of debt, Morris and Shin [16] are the first to point out that with normally distributed 
signals, it is the ratio of the standard deviation of private information to the variance of pubhc 
information that matters for determining the number of equihbria and equihbrium strategies. In 
their survey paper, they extend this result to a more general class of symmetric infinite-player, 2- 
action games. Our result that the variance to standard deviation ratio also determines whether 
higher-order uncertainty vanishes leads to an interpretation and generahzation of their results 
that does not rely on payoff assumptions.
This leads us to relate the results in this paper to the hterature on higher-order uncertainty 
and robustness of equihbria to incomplete information. This hterature starts outs from a 
number of examples, where smah payoff uncertainty has large strategic effects because of a 
lack of common knowledge (eg. Rubinstein [21], Carlsson and van Damme [2]). This apparent 
disparity between the equihbria of the common knowledge game and its incomplete information 
perturbation raises two questions: First, what kind of common knowledge equihbria are robust 
to incomplete information perturbations, and second, when are two information structures
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similar, in the sense that they lead to similar outcomes in the same game? In particular, 
when does an incomplete information structure with smaU pay-off uncertainty lead to equilibria 
similar to common knowledge? The answers to both of these underlying questions are typically 
phrased in terms of the players’ belief structures. In response to the first question, Morris, Rob 
and Shin [14] define the notion of behef potential^ for 2-player information structures, and show 
how it can be used to iteratively eliminate actions over a part of or the entire state space. Kajii 
and Morris [8] study the robustness of equilibria to arbitrary incomplete information structures, 
and also use behef potential to give a characterization of equilibrium robustness in terms of 
p-dominance.^ These papers both set out to derive uniqueness conditions for games with a 
large amount of higher-order uncertainty. While they contribute to our understanding of how 
higher-order uncertainty affects equihbrium selection, uniqueness and robustness conditions are 
usually given in terms of the behef structure of players, and thereby fail to fuhy make the 
connection between the signal structure and the role of higher-order uncertainty in equihbrium 
selection.
Likewise, definitions of strategic proximity of information structures (Kajii and Morris [9]) 
or convergence to common knowledge are typically speUed out as conditions on the structure of 
higher-order beliefs, rather than the signal structure. As a useful way of formalizing higher-order 
uncertainty, Monderer and Samet [12] introduce the notion of behef operators and common p- 
behef in analogy with knowledge operators and common knowledge. An event E  is common 
p-behef among a set of players 5  at a state w, if at w, all players in S  beheve with probability 
at least p (henceforth: p-believe) that E  has occurred, all players in S  p-believe that ah others 
p-beheve that E  has occurred... and so on. For any information structure, we can thus define 
a common behef function p {E, F, S) by assigning to each couple of events E, F  and set of 
players S  the highest p G [0,1] such that E  is common p-belief among players in S  at every 
state w G F . In the hmit of a sequence of information structures, an event E  is then said to 
be common knowledge in F , if p { E , F , S )  1. Despite its seemingly complicated definition
^The belief potential of an information structure is the highest probability p ,  such that, for any information 
set of either player, some statement of the form “player i believes with probability at least p  that player —i  
believes with probability at least p  that player i  believes with probability at least p  ... that the true state is in 
the original information set” is true at every state.
'’A strategy profile a is a p-dominant equilibrium at state w, if, for every player i,  it is optimal to play Oj, 
whenever a_i is played with probability at least p.
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on the entire hierarchy of beliefs, common p-behef has a number of qualities that make it 
appeahng for the use in the context of global games. A simple fixed point characterization 
dispenses us from taking into account the entire hierarchy in determining common beliefs - we 
will make much use of this property to determine common beliefs in the signal structures of 
global games.® Common p-belief also preserves lower hemi-continuity with respect to the set of 
equihbria. To be precise, if an action profile a is a p-dominant equilibrium over a set of states 
E,  and p {E, F, S) > p, then there exists an equihbrium where a is played (at least) in F.  It 
follows that, if p { E , F , S )  —> 1, i.e. E  becomes hmit common knowledge at F,  every strict 
equihbrium in E  can be locally supported at F.  The common behef function thereby provides 
a summary statistic of higher-order uncertainty that preserves hmit continuity with respect to 
the equihbrium manifold.^
Focusing on players’ behefs rather than signals leaves open the question how a signal struc­
ture translates into a behef structure. Our discussion of convergence of common behef resolves 
this issue for information structures with pubhc and private signals, such as they appear in 
most global game applications, and thereby links equihbrium selection issues to the level of 
higher-order uncertainty. We find that, as long as the variance of pubhc information converges 
to 0 at a rate faster than  ^ the rate of convergence of the variance of private information, the 
common behef converges to 1 in probability. Furthermore, the logic underlying the proof of our 
common behef convergence result provides a simple intuition for the origin of this condition 
on convergence of the signal variances. Common belief convergence thus provides a reinterpre­
tation of the uniqueness condition that is more general and (arguably) easier to interpret in 
the context of the models to which it is applied than the condition on the variances of public 
and private information. If, as Morris and Shin argue, common information effects contribute 
to explain puzzles in debt pricing, price data may actually lead to quantitative estimates of 
common p-belief among market participants, and it may be possible to assess the apphcability 
of the global games equihbrium selection by estimating the level of common behef that markets
®In their analysis, Monderer and Samet focus on a countable state space. Kajii and Morris [7] extend their 
results to uncountable state spaces that are relevant here.
 ^Upper hemi-continuity is already implied by the disappearance of payoff uncertainty. Monderer and Samet’s 
original result stated that every equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of e-equilibria. Rephrasing this in terms 
of p-dominance or strict equilibria is immediate.
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are capable of generating.
That public announcements are important in creating (approximate) common knowledge 
has been recognized in a variety of examples. Furthermore, following Monderer and Samet’s 
equilibrium approximation as common behef approximates common knowledge, it will come as 
no surprise that the same condition on the information structure should determine equilibrium 
selection and common behef convergence. However, beyond merely confirming this intuition, 
our independent proof of common behef convergence, coupled with lower hemi-continuity of the 
equihbrium manifold, provides an immediate extension of the previous conclusions to a much 
larger class of games, without having to rely on payoff assumptions. It thereby provides a new 
methodology for characterizing equihbria in incomplete information games. Separating the ef­
fects of assumptions about the information structure from the effects of payoff assumptions also 
highhghts the effects of each on equihbrium selection. In particular, we can relate the deriva­
tion of common p-behefs in an information structure with only private signals to equihbrium 
selection in the private information game: In this case, common p-behef is independent of the 
overall level of noise, and bounded away from 1. In particular, we can relate our derivation of 
common behef in an information structure with private signals only to equihbrium selection in 
a private signal information structure to equihbrium selection in private information games: In 
this case, the level of common behef is independent of the overaU level of noise, and bounded 
away from 1. The uniqueness result of Carlsson and van Damme is therefore not at odds with 
Monderer and Samet’s approximation of strict equihbria under incomplete information with 
common behef close to 1. However, the view that the sequence of private information games 
approximates the game under common knowledge is inaccurate.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts, followed by a conclusion, which 
discusses some of the practical implications for global game apphcations. In section 3, we 
introduce the general set-up for incomplete information games. In section 4, we study as an 
example the game considered in Morris and Shin [16]. However, while their analysis focuses 
on comparative statics in an environment with a unique equihbrium, we explicitly discuss the 
possibihty of multiple equihbria and convergence to common knowledge in anticipation of the 
more general results that follow. Section 5 defines the common behef function and examines
77
its convergence properties. Section 6 introduces the notion of p-dominance, which is then used 
to generalize the equilibrium convergence result encountered in the initial example.
2 .3  T h e  G en eral S et-u p
Consider a normal form game G = (5, A, tt) where S  denotes the (possibly infinite) set of all 
players, A = and A{ =  {1,..., iVj} denotes the finite set of actions for each player i E S,
and TTi (9,ai ,a-i)  denotes payoff to player i of playing action ai when all other players follow 
action profile a_i, for all (o,, a_i). Payoffs depend on a fundamental variable 0 G M.
In a finite player game, we let the number of players be I.  In the infinite-player version of 
this game, we impose a httle bit more structure: Consider a game with I  different classes of 
players, each represented by a continuum of players (normalized to have a measure 1 for each 
class, so that the total population size is I).  Players in each class are identical. Each player in 
class i has access to actions Ai = {1,..., jV%},and payoffs for players in class i are Tr^  (^, a*,p), 
where p =  ( p i , ..., p /) and pj =  {pj (1 ),..., pj (Ni)} represents the distribution of actions across 
types, i.e. /Xj (a) indicates the measure of players in class i that play action a.
The timing of this finite or infinite player game is as follows: Initially, nature draws a 
fundamental 0 G M. To simphfy the exposition, assume that the prior distribution of 9 is 
uniform over the entire real line.® Each player then receives noisy signals about 9. After forming 
their beliefs about 9, players simultaneously decide on their action.
We make the following assumptions concerning the information structure: Generically, each 
player observes a private signal (observed only by him) and a common signal (observed by all 
players) about 9. In the limiting case, where the variance of the common signal is infinite, we 
return to the information structure with only private information. Similarly, as the variance of 
the private signal becomes infinite, the information structure converges to a situation in which 
there exists only public information.
*Such an “improper prior” is not essential for our results. One could easily adapt the model to include a 
proper prior distribution of 6.
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Explicitly, assume that all private signals are independent and identically normally distrib­
uted. Given a state 9, player j  observes xj  = 6  + vj, where Vj ~  N  (0,6^). In addition, all 
players observe y — 9-\-v, where -y ~  iV (O, rf ) .  To complete the notation, we let $  (•) and (p (•) 
denote the cdf. and pdf. of a standard normal distribution, respectively. Finally, 
denotes the relative importance of the private information, and ae the ex post uncertainty 
about the state.
Throughout this paper, information structures are parametrized by o? and ols. Define xj =  
o?Xj +  (l — y as the posterior expectation of player j  about 9. Standard statistical results 
imply that ex post, player j  befieves that 0, conditional on y  and Xj is normally distributed 
with mean xj and variance
0 I Xj,7/~ iV (x ],o ;V ) . (2.1)
This information structure also appears in Morris and Shin [16], where a common prior 
takes the place of the pubhc signal. The various cases mentioned above can be interpreted as 
special cases of this formulation. The private information equilibrium corresponds to the case, 
where =  1. In that case, xj =  Xj, and agents draw no information from the pubhc signal. 
If _  0, then xj =  y and all players have identical posterior behefs. For ot 6 (0,1), players 
draw some information from both signals.
We should note that the framework with an infinite number of players has some analytical 
advantages. Assuming that the law of large numbers holds,® 9 fully characterizes the distri­
bution of signals over the population, and the proportion of agents whose signal faUs below
a certain threshold is given by the value of a normal cdf. For a given realization of 9 and y,
posterior expectations are normahy distributed over the population and given by
Xj I 0 ~  iV {c?9 + ( l  — a^) y, a^e^) . (2.2)
®See Judd [6] for a discussion of the role of the law of large numbers for a continuum of random variables. 
One might be concerned whether the order of limits that are taken (with respect to the number of players and 
with respect to the information structure) affects the results in the infinite player game. Throughout the paper, 
I will show that the same results apply for games with a finite or infinite number of players.
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We impose the following regularity conditions on expected payoffs in the finite or infinite 
player incomplete information game:
C 1 For an arbitrary player i, posterior expectation xi, and strategy profile (a^, a_i), as ae 0,
Fff (tTj ( 0 ,  f l j,  Û—i )  I Xi)  >• TTi (X j ,  d j ,  O—i ) .
(C l) requires that for all players, expected payoffs converge to realized payoffs whenever 
the level of noise in the information structure vanishes. Roughly speaking, it rules out the 
possibihty that unboundedly large, but highly unhkely negative payoffs influence a player’s 
choice of action. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for (C l) is that payoffs are bounded 
over the state space. It is easy to check that (C l) is necessary and sufficient to guarantee that, 
if (i) the state is 6 *, and {ii) a is played with probabihty close to 1, the expected payoffs will 
be close to {9*, a). We impose the following additional restriction:
C 2 There exist 6  and 6 , and action profiles a and a, such that for all i, under complete 
information, is a strictly dominant action for player i, whenever 6  < 0 , and âi is a strictly 
dominant action for player i, whenever 6  > 9.
Under (C l) and (C2), theorem 1 in Milgrom and Weber [11] establishes the existence of 
a perfect bayesian equilibrium in the incomplete information game, provided that ae  is suffi­
ciently small. The following section studies an example of this general incomplete information 
game, and discusses equihbrium convergence directly from the convergence of conditions on 
equihbrium payoffs. The example thereby anticipates the general convergence result that we 
set out to prove in the remainder of the paper.
2 .4  A  S im p le  E xam p le
Consider a game played by a [0, l]-continuum of risk-neutral players, who ah choose between 
two actions a and b. For any player, the payoff to playing a is always r  > 0. The payoff to 
playing b depends on the proportion of players playing 6, as well as a parameter 9 ( “economic
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fundamental”): it is /  > r, if the proportion of players who choose to play b exceeds c { 9 ) ,  
and 0, if less than c { 9 )  players play b. If exactly c ( 9 )  players play b, they receive a payoff of 
c ( 9 )  is strictly increasing and continuously boundedly differentiable, and there exist 9  and 
9 ,  such that c { 9 )  =  0  and c (0) =  1. We assume a timing of this game and an information 
structure as introduced above for the general case, with nature drawing a fundamental 0 € M, 
and players observing normally distributed private signals and a normally distributed pubhc 
signal. Players then simultaneously decide whether to play a  or b.
This framework rephcates the reduced-form model of speculative attacks against a cur­
rency,^ ^  and appears, with shght variations, in most global games apphcations. We observe 
that this game has multiple equihbria, if 9  is common knowledge and falls inside a “critical 
region” [0 ,^ . In one equihbrium, all players play a, in a second equihbrium, all players play b,  
and finally, there exists a mixed strategy equihbrium, in which players randomize with proba­
bihty c { 9 ) .  I f  9  > 9 ,  ah players play a  in the unique equihbrium, while \ i  9  < 9_, all agents play 
b  in the unique equihbrium.
Equihbria of this game under incomplete information, as well as their convergence properties 
for different paths of convergence for a e  and a ^  are easily derived by directly considering the 
payoff structure. For simplicity, we restrict attention to symmetric “threshold” equihbria, i.e. 
pairs of thresholds { x * , 9 * )  such that a player plays 6, whenever his posterior expectation fahs 
below X*, and receives a payoff of / ,  whenever 9  <  9 * .  In other words, in a symmetric threshold
equihbrium, whenever 9  <  9 * ,  a t  least c { 9 * )  players play b.
For the moment, take y  as given. If the threshold state, below which the payoff to b  is / ,  
is ^*, a player wih choose to play 6, as long as the expected payoff, given his posterior behef, 
satisfies r  <  f  F t ^ 9  <  9*  | One observes that the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in
Under uncertainty, the payoff for exactly c { 9 )  players playing b will not affect strategies and payoffs, but 
under common knowledge, this assumption preserves the third, mixed-strategy equilibrium and guarantees that 
the equilibrium manifold of this game is connected.
'  ^For instance, in the speculative attacks interpretation of this model, /  corresponds to the discrete gain to 
speculators after a successful devaluation, r  to the interest rate premium on a domestic bond, and c (9) to the 
level of reserves that a central bank would be willing to commit to defend the currency peg. In the speculative 
attacks paper of Morris and Shin [15], the devaluation premium /  (0) is a function of the fundamental. Assuming 
/  (9) constant simplifies the exposition without changing the results.
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Xj. It follows that there exists a unique threshold expectation x*, given by the payoff indifference 
condition {PI)
r ^ f -Prie  < e * \ x * ) ,  (2.3)
at which a player is indifferent between a  and b. By monotonicity, all agents with expectations 
below X* strictly prefer b, and all agents with expectations higher than x* strictly prefer a.  
(2.3) can be rewritten as
Rewriting (2.4) defines xpj  (#*):
xpi  (6 *) =  r  -  0  ^. (2.5)
Next, suppose all agents follow a threshold strategy x*. From (2.2), the fraction of players 
playing b given 9 and x* is 0  • The return to b is / ,  iff c{9) < ^
From the monotonicity in 9 and x*, it follows that the return to b is f ,  if 9 < 9*, where 9* is 
given by the critical mass condition {CM)
(2.6)
This can be rewritten as
X C M  {e \  2/) =  (1 -  O?) y +  (c (4*)). (2.7)
Since (•) is defined on (0,1), x q m  is well-defined and strictly increasing for values of 
e  {9,W). Differentiating {CM)  yields
dxcM  («*.!/) ^  (2.8)
99* V y ( $ -^ c ( g * ) ) )
For given y, actions in any threshold equilibrium are implicitly defined by the intersection 
of the Pl-condition with the CM-condition. Since xcm  (^*, 2/) converges to —oo or -foo as 9
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approaches 6  and 9, respectively, and xpi{9*)  is linear, continuity implies that xpi{9*) = 
Xcm for some 6 * G (ê, ^)- Therefore, there always exists a symmetric threshold equilib­
rium. By examining (PI)  and {CM)  more in detail, we can give conditions for uniqueness or 
multiplicity. We have the following lemma (Morris and Shin [16]):
L em m a 4 There exist multiple equilibria, if  and only if
1 — Q!^  (f {9)
P roof. There exist multiple equilibria, if and only if for some 9* G (9,9), x p / (9*) =  
Xcm  (Q*,y) and Moreover, if  ^ for some 9* G (9,9),
then there exists y such that xpj  (9*) = x q m  2/)- Thus  ^ for some 9* is
necessary and sufficient for the existence of multiple equilibria. Using (2.8) and the fact that 
(2.5) implies ^ = 1, one rewrites this condition as (2.9). ■
We determine equilibrium convergence as oe: —>• 0 by considering the joint convergence of 
the (PI) and (CM) curves. Substituting (PI) into (CM) and rearranging, one obtains
r  -  7 ^ ® “' (c{e*)) =  y  +  ( 7 ) ,  (2.10)
(2 11)
1 — O!^  1 —o r a  \ f
and
de* 1 -
Observe that the r.h.s. of (2.10) approaches -t-00 and —00 , as 9* approaches 9 and 9, 
respectively. For intermediate values of 9*, the r.h.s of (2.10) is increasing, if is sufficiently 
large. The following three lemmas discuss the hmit behavior of equilibria of this coordination 
game.
L em m a 5 Suppose —*■ 0. Then the unique limit equilibrium 9pr is the private information 
equilibrium, implicitly defined by f  ( 1  — c (9pr)) — r.
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P roo f. —> 0 implies o —> 1, and it follows from (2.10) that $   ^{c{6 pr)) — ^   ^ ( f ) ’
or 1 — c {9pr) —* j -  ■
Lemma 5 revisits the uniqueness result in an environment with private information only. 
Morris and Shin [15] proceed to show by interim ehmination of strictly dominated strategies 
that this threshold equihbrium is the unique equihbrium of the game.
L em m a 6 Suppose oo, as ae —* 0. Then, there are three equilibria in the limit, if
y G (9,9). The set of limit equilibrium thresholds is (^9,9,y).
P roo f. Fix k = For sufficiently large k, k = two solutions, which we
denote by 9 (k) and 9(k), i.e. the local maximum and minimum of the r.h.s of (2.10). Clearly 
there exist values of y, such that some 9i € (9 (k) ,W) and 9^ G (9,9 (k)) are simultaneously 
supported as equihbria. Since 9{k) 9 and 9{k)  —> as fc —> oo, it foUows that there
are hmit equihbria at 9 and 9. Since at both of these, k < ’ there also exists an
intermediate equilibrium, for which k > As fc —> oo, (2.10) imphes that this
equihbrium converges to 9* = y. Now, let ÿ  (k) and y (k) denote the upper and lower bounds 
of the critical region of y. We have:
y { k )  =  5 ( / : ) - i 4 . - i ( c ( 5 ( i ) ) ) - i $ - i ( 0 ,
y(k)  = ( 0 .
A s k  OO, (c (9 (k))) —» 0 and 0, and hence ÿ (A;) 9. Similarly, ^  (fc) 9,
since (c {9 (k))) ^  0. ■
Among other cases, lemma 6 considers the case in which there exists some valuable pubhc 
information in the hmit (a < 1), and shows that under this structure, there exist multiple 
equihbria, if the common signal fahs inside a critical region. These three equihbria converge 
in probabihty to the equihbria of the common knowledge game: Whenever 9 £ ( 9 , ^ ,  then, 
whenever y falls inside the critical region, there exist three equihbria. As ae —>• 0, in one of 
these, the probabihty of devaluation goes to 0, in a second the probabihty of devaluation goes
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to 1. The third equilibrium converges to the mixed strategy equilibrium. As ae converges to 
0, 9* converges to y in such a way that the probability of devaluation converges to c{6*).
Using the same approach as above, lemma 4 discusses the case where —>■ k < oo. If 
k — has more than two solutions, there may be more than three equihbria. We rule
this out by assuming that ^ unique inflection point. Let k* — min ’
[^ 1^ ]
Then:
L em m a 7 (i) Suppose k < k*, as o; —>• 1 and ae —> 0. Then, there is a unique limit
equilibrium, whose threshold varies continuously with y over ( 0 , .
{ii) Suppose —^ k > k * ,  as a  1 and ae —+ 0. Then, there are multiple limit equilibria,
all with thresholds continuous in y. One equilibrium threshold 6 \ 6 (9{k) ,9)  is decreasing 
in y for y  G {—oo,ÿ{k)),  the second equilibrium, 62 € (^,^(fc)) is also decreasing in y for 
y e  {y{k),  00). A third equilibrium ^3 G {9 (k) , 9 (k)) is increasing in y, for y e  (y (fc), ÿ (&)) • 
For sufficiently large k, y { k ) > 9  {k) and y{k)  < 9  (k).
P roof. Except for the last statement, all of lemma 7 follows directly from (2.10), (2.11) 
and the proof of lemma 3. y{k)  > 9{k)  and y{k)  < 9{k) in the limit, iff (c(0(/c))) > 
— (c(9(k))),  or 9(k) > 9pr > 9(k),  where 9pr denotes the private information 
equilibrium defined above. This will necessarily be the case for sufficiently large k. ■
If is sufficiently large, the critical region of the private signal is strictly included in 
the critical region of the fundamental.^^ Since the hmit equihbrium depends both on the 
convergence of and the realization of y, the coordination game with pubhc information 
no longer satisfies noise independence. It foUows from (2.11) that the effect of y on 9* is 
potentially much stronger than the relative importance of the pubhc signal. To be precise, 
the relative importance of the pubhc signal 1 — is multiphed by a publicity multiplier, 
which is strictly larger than 1, if 6 is sufficiently smah. This publicity multipher locally goes to 
infinity, as the game approaches the zone of multiple equihbria, and y  approaches the boundaries
*^This will not generally be true: note that 9 ( k )  —^ £ ( k ) ,  as k  —* k*,  but their limit need not be equal to the 
private information equilibrium, so 6 {k)  >  9 ,r >  9 { k )  will no longer be satisfied.
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y{k)  and ÿ{k). Thus, even if there is a unique equilibrium, public information may have 
a disproportionately large impact on equilibrium strategies, both in and away from the limit. 
Morris and Shin [16] use precisely this effect of pubhc information in order to account for 
coordination effects in the context of debt pricing. We summarize our results in Theorem 1:
T heo rem  1 (z) I f  is sufficiently high and y falls in a critical region, this game has three 
equilibria. As > oo, the critical region for y converges to [6,6^, and the set of limit
equilibrium thresholds is {^, 0 , 2/}.
{ii) I f  is sufficiently low, there is a unique equilibrium. As —> 0, the equilibrium
threshold 6* converges to the private information equilibrium.
{Hi) I f  converges to a finite constant, there may be one or multiple equilibria in the 
limit. The critical region for the fundamental and for the public signal, for which multiple 
equilibria can be supported are both increasing in the limit of .
Theorem 1 contains the first central result in this paper, (z) states that the multiple equihb­
ria obtained in the benchmark model with common knowledge continue to exist under incom­
plete information, as long as players have access to a valuable common signal, and the overaU 
level of noise is sufficiently low. If > oo, equihbrium actions converge to the ones obtained
under conunon knowledge, and the equihbrium manifold converges to the equihbrium manifold 
under common k n o w le d g e .In  the hmit, multiple equihbria exist, if y falls inside the same 
critical region as 0 under common knowledge. Thus, any sequence of incomplete information 
games for which —» oo, as ae  —+ 0 , approximates the conunon knowledge game, (zz) states
the analogous result for the private information equihbrium, which is approximated as the hmit 
of any sequence of information structures, for which —*■ 0 , and (zzz) discusses equihbrium 
convergence for finite limits of . Contrary to the hmits to both the common knowledge 
game and the private information game, equihbrium actions in ah hmit equihbria vary with the 
realization of y in this case.
* I^t is important to note that y  cannot be interpreted as a sunspot. If y  has no informative value at all, then 
the Morris and Shin’s result continues to hold. Rather, in the case where the existence of sufficiently precise 
common information leads to multiple equilibria, traditional sunspots might be viewed as one way of selecting 
among them.
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Ex post level of noise
Figure 2-1: Multiplicity vs. Uniqueness
Returning to the initial parametrization, We find that the variance of the
public signal must go to 0 no faster than the standard deviation of the private signals, in order 
to maintain uniqueness. This condition first appears in Morris and Shin [16]. In their survey 
paper, Morris and Shin [17] show that the same condition applies to any infinite-player, 2- 
action games, provided that payoffs are boundedly differentiable. As long as ^  > oo, the limit
equilibria also converge to the equilibria under common knowledge. Theorem 1 is summarized 
in figure 1.
Overall, multiple equilibria are more likely to exist in this game, when the ex post level 
of noise is low, and when the relative importance of the public signal is high. As the level of 
noise goes to zero, the economy always exhibits multiple equihbria, unless the public signal 
becomes perfectly uninformative. Both statements can be explained by the role of information 
in explicit coordination on one equilibrium. The pubhc signal gives a player information not 
only about the state, but, much more importantly, about what other players have observed
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relative to one’s own private signal (and what they are therefore likely to play). As signals 
becomes more and more precise, the players ultimately have better and better information 
about other players’ beliefs possibly even if the public signal becomes infinitely less informative 
than the private signal. In the next section, we return to the general set-up to formalize this 
connection between the equilibrium structure and higher-order uncertainty for a very large class 
of finite and infinite player games.
2 .5  H igher-O rder B e lie fs
2.5.1 D efin itions
Let us now return to the game outlined initially. The hterature on higher-order behefs typically 
defines a “state space” Q. sufficiently rich to include aU uncertainty within the game, and the 
information that each player has is defined by a partition on that state space. In a finite player 
game, we can easily replicate this formulation by defining a state as a realization (0 , y, x i , ..., x /), 
the state space as Q = and player i ’s information partition by realizations of y and x*.
Following Monderer and Samet [12], at a state w, we say that an event E  is common p- 
belief among a set of players S, if (i) each player in S  p-beheves that E  has occurred, {ii) 
each player in S  also p-believes that all players in S  p-believe that E  has occurred, (in) each 
player in S  also p-believes that ah agents in S  p-believe that ah players in S  p-believe that E  
has occurred... and so on. We thus define the common belief function p {E ,F ,S )  by assigning 
to events E  and F  and a set of players S  the highest probability p, such that E  is common 
p-belief among players in S , for all u  £ F. This definition provides a continuous transition 
from incomplete information to common knowledge, where the latter corresponds to the case 
where p {E, F ,S )  —> 1, for ah E, F  and S.
In most environments, characterizing the common behef function from the entire hierarchy 
of beliefs may be a very difficult task. Using a simple fixed point argument, we can provide 
an alternative approach to derive the common behef function. Monderer and Samet [12] define 
an event E  to be p-evident for a set of players S, if, whenever E  occurs, it also p-beheved by 
ah players in S. They show that an event E  is common p-belief among players in a set S  at
a state w, if and only if there exists a p-evident event F  (for players in S) such that u  E F, 
and whenever F  occurs, E  is also p-beheved by all players in S. In analogy with the common 
belief function, we can define an evidence function p {E, S) that assigns to each set E  and 
group of players S  the highest p, such that E  is p-evident in S. In fact, we can easily prove 
that p { E ,E ,S )  = p {E ,S ) , for all E  and S. For simphcity, we will write p {E ,S )  =  p{E )  and 
p {E, F^S) — p {E, F) whenever S  refers to the whole set of players.
Defining a state space as above is rather inconvenient for the infinite-player game. Instead, 
we make use of the law of large numbers to summarize the distribution of signals across the 
population by the fundamental 9, and we can define a state as a reahzation of 9 and y, and 
the state space as Also, since payoffs depend on the measures of agents of each type that 
play each action, and not on their exact identities, it is more natural to define the conunon 
belief function and the evidence function with respect to the measure of agents that have a 
common befief, i.e. we let p {E ,F ,m )  be the highest p, such that, whenever F  occurs, E  is 
common p-belief among some measure m  of players, and we let p {F, m) be the highest p, such 
that, whenever F  occurs, a measure m  of players also p-believes F. One of the appealing 
consequences of the infinite player game is that for any fundamental event 9 E Eq aX\. events of 
the form “a measure m  of players p-believes F'o” can be reduced to events of the form 9 E E \, 
for an appropriately defined E \. We will make use of this reduction of higher-order events into 
fundamental events to derive the common belief function for threshold events^'^ directly from 
the entire sequence of higher-order events, and thereby provide an illustration of Monderer and 
Samet’s fixed-point characterization of common p-belief by p-evidence.
To unify the notation between the two cases, we will use the notation for the infinite player 
game, p (E, F, m), and include the finite player case in this notation by noting that p {E, F) in 
the finite player case is equivalent to p (£', F, 1) in the infinite player case.
'events where the state falls below or above a given threshold in the set of fundamentals
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2.5.2 T he infinite player case
In a game with a continuum of players, two observations considerably simplify the derivation of 
the common belief function p {E, F, m). First, once again by virtue of the law of large numbers, 
0 is a sufficient statistic for the posterior distribution of expectations in the population of 
players, and therefore for their first-order beliefs. Second, the belief operator preserves the 
relative order of players within the distribution of beliefs. For any two players i and j ,  and 
events E  : 6 < 9* and E' : 9 < 9', if i attaches higher probability to E\ than j ,  he will also 
attach a higher probabihty to F 2. The first observation imphes that a set of measure m  of 
players p-beheves that 9 < 9q, whenever 9 falls below some 9\. Thus, for any first-order event 
E q : 9 < 9q  ^ the second-order event “a set of measure m of players p-believes Fq” is equivalent 
to some suitably defined other first-order event E\ : 9 < 9\. By iteration, we can therefore 
represent the entire sequence of higher-order events by first-order events. It follows from the 
second observation that at their intersection in the state space, Eq is common p-behef among 
a set of players of measure m.
We now use this procedure to derive the p (F, F, m) for threshold events of the types 9 < 9 q
and 9 > 9 Q. Consider an arbitrary event E q 9 < 9q. A player p-beheves that 9 < 9q, whenever
his posterior behef x j satisfies
which defines the first-order threshold expectation x q  as
xo = 9q -  060^1 (p ).
A mass m  of players p-believes that 9 < 9q, whenever
f  Xq -  a^9 -  (1 -  a^) y \
which defines a new first-order event F i : 9 < 9^, where 9^ is given by
91 = ^  (xo -  (1 -  O!^ ) y) -  6 0 "! (m ).
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A player p-believes that a mass m  of players p-believe that ^ whenever
Proceeding in this way, we can recursively define the sequence of threshold expectations and 
fundamentals by the following two equations:
Xk =  e i -  ip)  (2.12)
i^k-1  — (1 — ÿ ) —  ^{m) . (2.13)
Substituting (2.12) into (2.13), and rearranging, we find
^k+i  "  ^ ^2 ^  ( * ' 1  ip )  +  (m )) .
This difference equation has as a solution
% - ! / -  J “ ^2  (p) +  (™)) =  ^  -  y -  ( $ " '  (p) +  a * " '  W ) ^  •
(2.14)
This sequence of thresholds diverges monotonically, as long as
% - y - T ^ * - '  (p) -  {-) ^ 0-
In order to sustain a common belief p with respect to 6 < 9q, it is necessary that the 
sequence of thresholds is monotonically increasing or stationary — otherwise the intersection 
of all higher-order events will be empty. If is monotonically increasing, E q : 6  <  9 q
is common p-behef among a set of players of measure m, ift 9 < 9\, where 9^ is derived from 
(2.14) for k = 1. 9i is decreasing in p and m. Therefore, for any event £*0, increasing p ox m  
reduces the set of states at which E q becomes common p-belief. Common p-belief about E q of 
a proportion m of players about an event 0 is maximized when 9\ — 9q, or
oi^e
% - y - ;  2 $ - '  (P) -  :--------------(m) =  0 , (2.15)1 — OL 1 — 0:
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which yields
p{Eo,Eo,m ) = $  U e t -  y) (m) j  . (2.16)
Let p{9 < 6^, m) = p { E q , E q , m) be the common belief of a mass m  of players about event E q , 
whenever E q has occurred, as defined by (2.16). Note that this is equivalent to the evidence 
function that we have defined above - a manifestation of the fixed point characterization of 
Monderer and Samet. One observes that the common behef function is decreasing in m  and 
increases, as the prior probabihty that 9 < 9q increases {y decreases). Theorem 2 now follows 
immediately:
Theorem  2 Assume that —>• oo and q£ —»■ 0. Then,
(i) For any 9q >  y, p{9 < 9Q,m) —> 1. For finite ae, p(9 < 9Q,m) is decreasing in ae.
{ii) For any 9q < y , p{9 < 9Q,m) —>■ 0. For finite ae, p{9 < 9Q,m) is increasing in ae.
{in) p{9 < 9Q,m) os a  —> 0, holding ae constant. p{9 < 9Q,m) is increasing
in a (holding ae constant).
{iv) I f  a  = 1, p{9 < 9Q,m) = 1 -  m.
This theorem has various implications. First, it states that the common signal generates 
convergence of p {9 < 9Q,m) to 1 , as long as its variance converges to 0 at a rate at least as fast 
as the rate of convergence of the standard deviation of the private signals, provided the pubhc 
signal falls inside E q . The theorem also highhghts the very different nature of common p-behef 
in an environment with only private signals, and shows that in this case, higher-order behefs 
do not depend on the variance of private noise. We also observe that a lower level of noise 
reduces higher-order uncertainty (common behefs are closer to 1), and that a higher relative 
informativeness of the private signal results in more higher-order uncertainty. W hether the 
common behef about an event converges to 0  or 1 is determined by the location of the common 
signal.
We can apply a simple symmetry argument to derive common beliefs about events of the 
type 9 > 9q '. At 9q , the mass of players 1 — m, who do not p{9 < ^Q, m)-beheve that 9 < 9q  
must 1 —  p { E q , m)-believe that 9 >  9q , or p{9 >  9q ,1 — m) =  1 — p{9 <  9q , m).
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Let us briefly return to the previous example to link higher-order beliefs to equihbrium 
strategies. In the context of the previous example, consider an event E  : 9 <6*. ^  p {9 < 9* ^ m) > 
J  ÎOT m  > c{9*), then there exists an equilibrium, in which players play b (at least) whenever 
they p-believe that 9 < 9*. To see this, it suffices to recognize that if players play this strat­
egy profile, the proportion of players playing b will exceed c{9*), whenever 9 < 9*. Since 
p{9 < 9*,m) > J , it is then optimal to play 6, whenever E  is p {9 < 0*, m)-beheved. More­
over, since E  is common p{9 < 0*,m)-belief, it becomes common knowledge that all players 
optimally play 6, whenever they p{9 < 0*, m)-believe 9 < 9*, and that the return to b is / ,  
whenever 9 < 9*. Similarly, whenever 1 — p{9 > 9Q,m) < j  for some m > 1 — c{9*), there 
exists an equihbrium in which players do not play b (at least) whenever they p{9 > 9Q,m)- 
believe that 9 > 9q. We can then give a reinterpretation of the Nash equihbrium conditions 
in terms of common behefs. Comparing the condition for a Nash equihbrium (2.10) with the 
derivation of common behefs in (2.15), we find immediately that any Nash equihbrium solves 
P (0 < 05 ,c(g5)) =  ^.
To complete the derivation of the common behef function in the infinite player case, consider 
events of the type E  : 9 E [9\, 92]. 1 > m2 > mi > 0. Whenever 9 E [^1, ^2], there is a measure 
m2 — mi of agents who have common p(9 < ^2, m 2)-belief that 9 < ^2, but they all attach 
probabihty less than p{9 < ^ i,m i) to the event 9 < 9 \. Therefore,
p{9\ < 9 < 92,rri2 -  m \) > p{9 < 92, m 2) - p { 9  < 9 i ,m { ) .
We also have p{9\ < 9  < 92,m) < p{9 < 92,m) and p{9i < 9  < 92,m) < p{9 > 9 \,m )  =
1 — p (^ < ^1, 1 — m). The fohowing coroUary foUows immediately from theorem 2 and these 
observations:
C orollary  1 Consider an arbitrary sequence of incomplete information structures, such that 
> 00 and ae 0. Then the following are true for all m < 1;
(0 p{9i < 9  < 92, m) 1 for all m  < 1, iff y E (^1,^ 2).
[ii) p { 9 i < 9  < 92,m) -»■ 0, i f y ^  [^1,^ 2]-
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2.5.3 T he finite player case
In an information structure with a finite number of players, we can no longer appeal to the law 
of large numbers to summarize the distribution of private information in the state variable, and 
considering the entire hierarchy of beliefs becomes rather difficult. Instead, using Moderer and 
Samet’s fixed-point characterization of common p-belief through p-evidence, we can provide a 
simple proof that extends the common belief convergence result in theorem 2 and corollary 1 
to finite player games. This proof has the further advantage of highhghting the origin of the 
convergence condition that we have encountered throughout this paper.
Return to the finite player information structure introduced in section 3 and consider a 
’’fundamental event” E  : 6 G 2^]- Given a realization of y, any higher-order event of the 
form “all players beheve with probability at least p that E  has occurred” is defined on the 
space of private signals, and we can easily compute its evidence from the posterior beliefs. Note 
that p-evidence is not a useful concept for fundamental events E, since there always exist signal 
reahzations such that ex post a player attaches very low probabihty to the event E, even though 
E  has occurred. For the information structures under consideration, the evidence function for 
any interval in the fundamental space will therefore typicaUy be 0. However, the evidence 
function is very easy to determine for “signal events”, i.e. events of the form X  : X{ Ç: X i,\/i, 
Xi Ç R. In this case, p{ X)  is simply given by
p {X)  =  min Pr{xj  G Xj^Wj ^ i \ x i ) ,i\Xi£Xi
i.e. the lowest posterior probabihty that any player i attaches to the event that aU other 
players have received signals within X - i,  given that his signal hes in Xi,.and X  is common 
p(X)-belief, whenever it occurs. Now, consider a sequence of information structures =
{q: ,^ anSn}^-i, and let pn (•) denote the evidence function defined by information structure In- 
Using Monderer and Samet’s fixed point characterization, we have the following definition of 
convergence of common p-behef:
D efin ition  5 As n 00 , E  beœmes common p-belief with probability 1, if there exists a 
sequence of sets X'^, such that (i) min^e£;Pr (X” | 0) —> 1, (ii) hm„_,oo Pn > P, (in)
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liminfn^oo.xiGX" Ft {6 e  E  \ Xi, y ) > p  for ail i.
We are now able to prove the following useful lemma:
L em m a 8 As n oo, E  becomes common p-belief with probability 1, if  and only if  there exists 
a sequence of signal events X'^, such that liminf„_>oo,xi6X;* Pr E E' | X i , y )  > p for all i and 
minggE Pr | 0) ^  1.
P roo f. We need to show that in the above definition, {%) and {ii) imply {in). But note 
that for any x*,
, , ,  , . de
> m nJ^Pr {xj  e  X j  \ 9 ) - FT{d G E  \ Xi , y )
and lemma 8 follows immediately. ■
As a direct consequence of lemma 8, we find that we can construct the sequence of signal 
events separately for each player. For each i, we need to construct a sequence X ” =  [x„,x„] 
in such a way that minggg Pr | 0) —> 1 and minx-gxf Pr € E  | Xi,y) 1. A necessary 
and sufficient condition that min^^E Pr (X ” | 0) —> 1 is that the upper and lower bounds of the 
signal event converge to the end points of E  from above and below at a rate strictly slower than 
the rate at which £„ —^ 0; formally, this condition is equivalent to oo, and >
—oo. minijxiGXf F t {9 G E  \ Xi,y) 1 is satisfied, whenever minx^GXf oo and
maxx^exf —oo. Since some x% G X" lie outside E, this clearly necessitates
that y G (^i, ^2), and y G (^1,^2) is also sufficient, when the variances of the pubhc and 
private signals converge at the same rates, i.e. hmn->ooCïn < 1- If the variance of the pubhc 
signal converges at a rate slower than the variance of the private signal, we also need that 
9i — E {9 j x„, y) 0 and 92 — E {9 j x„, y) —>■ 0 a t  a  rate strictly slower than the rate at which
95
ctn£n 0. Normality implies that E  {6 | x^ ,y )  — oc^x^ +  (l — a^) y, which converges to 6i at 
the same rate as ( l  — 0, provided that ( l  — —> 0 at a rate slower than —» 0. For
convergence to common knowledge, we therefore need that ( l  — a^) —> 0 at a rate slower than 
the rate at which an^n —» 0, or ^77^ —*■ 00. This finding is fully spelled out and proved in the 
following theorem whose content parallels theorem 2 and its corollary:
Theorem  3 Consider an arbitrary sequence ofinformation structures o:n£n}^i,
such that 777^ —^ 00 and anSn —>•0, as n  00, and event 9 G [ 1^, 2^]-'
(i) I f  62 > y > 9i, then, with probability 1, [9\,62\ becomes common 1-belief among all 
players in the limit, as n cx).
{ii) I f y < 9\ or y > 02, then there exists no p >  0, such that in the limit, [^1,^2] w common 
p-belief with probability 1 among all players.
{Hi) I f  ^7g”' —* k < 00, then there exists no p > 0 , such that, in the limit, [61,62] is common 
p-belief with probability 1 among all players.
Proof. Let Pn ( ) denote the evidence function generated by For an arbitrary funda­
mental event E  : 6 £ [^1,^ 2] construct a sequence of signal events : X{ G , V% by
setting x^=^ 6\ — Xn Xn =  ^2 +  for a pair of sequences of positive real numbers Xn 
mingggg  ^ Pr {X ^  | 0) —> 1 if and only if 7^ 00 and 7^ —>• 00. In addition,
P r (£ |x , . v )  =  $  - . (j  ^V  ^ h  ~ ~ 4
V CtnSn / V OCn£n J
for arbitrary ijj  ^ and Xn- Setting
+  (1 -  « » )  ( ^ 2  - y ) + a l  { X n  ~  X j )  
Ol-n^ n
«nX n +  (1 -  « n )  (^1 ~  V)  +  Oil  U n  “  ^ i )
Oln^n
V'n =  ^ (1 -  ttn) -  y)
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and
we find that Pr (E  | X i , y )  —>■ 1, as —>• oo and 0, whenever y  G (^1,^2) for any
sequence Xi € [x^,Xn], so that that Pn (%") —>• 1. Moreover, for arbitrary 'ijj^  and Xni such that 
^  > 00 and ^  00, Pr (E  I y )  —>• 0, as 00 and a„£:„ 0, whenever y  < 9 \  or
y  > 62, or when —* k < 00. ■
In addition to providing an intuition for the necessity and sufficiency of the condition that 
—* 00 and anSn —>• 0 , this argument also suggests that the same condition apphes beyond 
the case of normally distributed signals that we study here. Note that up to lemma 8 , no 
step of our argument hinged on the use of normal distributions. In theorem 3, we simply 
compared the rates of convergence of x^ (xn) to 0i (^2) and of E  (9 \ X i , y )  to x%. To satisfy 
min0g[0j 02] Pr (%" | 0) —> 1 in general, the sequence will still have to satisfy that x„ (xn) 
converges to 9i (^2) at a rate slower than 6» —» 0. We can also form a “best linear estimator” 
9 = a ^ X i  +  (1 — y  and note that 9 —* X i a t  the same rate as (l — a^) 0. Whenever the
fully bayesian E{9  | X i , y )  converges to Xj at the same rate as 9, therefore, the same condition 
will apply, regardless of distributional assumptions.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of common belief convergence when —*■ 
k < 00. The last part of theorem 3 shows that sustaining any level of common belief (other 
than 0) about a fundamental event E  with probability 1, when E  has occurred, is impossible. 
However, for signal events, we have already observed that the evidence function and hence 
common behefs are well-defined and easy to determine, and generically take on strictly positive 
values between 0 and 1. W ithout going into the details of the derivations, in the case where 
=  0 , i.e. an environment with private signals only,the p-evidence of a symmetric signal 
event X  : Xi < x, Vi, is given by p { X )  = j ,  where I  denotes the number of players, i.e. the 
common behef about a threshold event for player signals is j .  Moreover, whenever a player 
observes a signal x% < x, he attaches a probabihty at least 1 — y to the event that at least 
k — 1 other players have also observed signals below x - note that these formulations correspond 
exactly to those obtained for the p-evidence function in the infinite player case. For bounded 
intervals in the signal space, these values also serve as upper bounds for the common-belief
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function (and in the limit as  ^ 0, the common belief function converges exactly to these 
values for any symmetric signal event).
2 .6  E q u i l i b r i u m  C o n v e r g e n c e
2 .6 .1  j9-D om inance
.1
In a finite-player game, we use the definition of p-dominance provided by Morris, Rob and Shin 
[14]: In a complete information normal form game G = (S', A, t t ) with a finite set of players
S =  { 1 , 2 , action prohle a =  (ai, is a at state
if, for all q > p,
(g, (^, &-,&_%)] - g +  min [rr^  (^, -  7r* (^, a-, (1 -  g) > 0 ,
“-i
i.e. if 9 is common knowledge, and if all other players play with probability at least p, then 
action n, is optimal for player i, for all i: Any strict Nash equilibrium is p-dominant for some 
p < 1.
For a game with an infinite number of players, we need to use a slightly different definition 
of p-dominance. In an infinite-player normal form game G =  (S, A,7t), let a — ( a i , ..., a /) be a 
pure action prohle, and let m < 1. W ith a slight abuse of notation, a is said to be a 
p, egrtz/zbnum of this game at if, for ah g > p and all p, such that (ui) > m
for all 2 , and arbitrary
[yr^  (0, p) -  7T^ (g, U-, p)] g +  (^, u^ , p') -  (0, a-, p')] (1 -  g) >  0,
i.e. if 9 is common knowledge, agents in class i have a strictly dominant action a ,^ whenever 
with probability p or higher, the measure of players playing a_« exceeds m, for all i. Any strict 
Nash-equilibrium at 9* is p, m-dominant for some values of p < 1, m < 1, in a neighborhood of
^'^IVe will be using the s tric t version o f p-dom inance. Weak p-dom inance would be defined by replacing the 
stric t w ith a weak inequality in  the definition.
To unify the notation between the finite and infinite player game, note that p-dominance 
in the finite player game is equivalent to p, 1-dominance in the infinite player game. We will 
therefore simply refer to p, m-dominance from now on.
2.6 .2  Equilibrium  Convergence
Consider now a sequence of information structures such that an6 n —*
0, and let p„ , m) be the common belief function derived by information structure We are 
now able to state and prove the following equilibrium convergence proposition for the sequence 
of incomplete information games G x
P ro p o sitio n  5 Consider a game G = (S', A, tt) satisfying (C l) and (C2) and suppose a is 
a strictly p,m-dominant Nash equilibrium of G for all 6 E E  = [^i, ^2]- U the sequence of 
common belief functions satisfies hm„_oo Pn (E, F, m) = p (E, F, m) > p for some F  Ç. E , then 
G X has a sequence of Nash Equilibria, in which, for sufficiently high n, all players play
according to a, (at least) whenever they p-believe that F  has occurred.
P roo f. Note first that for a given posterior expectation x  ^ [^1,^ 2], as an£n —*■ 0,
P r (F  I x) —> 0. Thus, in the limit, if F  is a common p (F, F, m)-belief, and p (F, F, m) > 0 nec­
essarily, in the hmit, a player p (F, F, m)-beheves F , only if his posterior expectation x  satisfies 
X G [^1, ^2]- Now, suppose player i after signal x  beheves with probability at least pn (F, F, m)  
that at least a measure m of players of each type play according to a_j. The expected payoff 
difference A„ (a*, between actions and an arbitrary alternative satisfies
^  min [E0 {TTi{e,ai,p) \ x ,e  G E) -  Eq {7Ti{0 ,a'i,p) \ x , e  e  E)] ■pn{E,F,m)
+  min [Ee (jTi (0, a*, p') | x) -  Fg (tt  ^ (0, a', p') | x)] (1 -  pn (F , F, m )) .
Given x, as ae —> 0, Fg (tt  ^(0, a ,^ p) j x ,0  e  E) 7Ti (x, aj, p), Fg (tt* (0, a'^ , p) \ x ,0  G E)
7Ti(x,a'^,p), Ee{'ïïi{0,ai,p') | x) 7Ti{x,ai,p') and Ee{'Ki{0,a[,p') | x) -»• 7Ti{0,a'-,p'). As
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n —)• oo, therefore, for all 0 e  [^1,^ 2]
A n ( a i , a ' )  A ( a i , a ' )
^  min [TTi {9, ai, jj.) -  m  (9, a ', /z)] • p (B, F, m)
+  inin [iTi [9, m, p!) -  (6>, a ', p')] - { 1 - p  {E, F, m))
>  0
by the definition of strict p-dominance, and since p {F, F, m) >p.  ■
As an immediate consequence of proposition 5, we observe that we can separate the effects 
of payoff assumptions from the effects of assumptions concerning the information structure. We 
can now combine the common behef convergence theorems with proposition 5 characterizing 
equihbrium convergence to generahze the characterization of equihbria in theorem 1.
C oro llary  2 Consider a sequence of incomplete information games G x satisfying (C l)
and (C2). Suppose a is a p,m-dominant equilibrium in some interval F  = [^1,^ 2], o,nd p < 1. 
Suppose also that there exists a sequence Fn, such that pn {F, Fn, m) —*■ 1 and Pr (F„ \ F ) 1, 
as ae —> 0. Then G x { /n } ^ i  has a sequence of Nash Fquilihria, where, in the limit, whenever 
9 E F , with probability 1, a is played by a measure of players at least m  .
The following theorem now follows from this corollary and common behef convergence, 
and discusses equihbrium convergence for a game with payoff structure G and a sequence of 
information structures { /n } ^ i  =
T heo rem  4 Consider a sequence of finite (infinite) player, incomplete information games G x 
{In}^=i satisfying (C l) and (C2). Suppose a is a p,m-dominant equilibrium in some interval 
F  — [^1, ^2], and p < 1. Then, G x has a sequence of Nash equilibria, in which a is
played with probability 1, if and only i f  satisfies an£n 0 and 00 , as n 0 0 ,
and 9i < y  < 92-
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Theorem 4 provides, in various ways, a generalization of Theorem 1 (%). For symmetric 
(finite or infinite player) 2-action global games with the unique pure strategy equihbrium a 
for 9 < 0, pure strategy equilibrium b ior 9 > 6, the theorem implies that as —» 0 and 
> oo, there are multiple threshold equilibria, with two of the thresholds converging to 9, 
and 9, as seen in the initial example. An immediate extension of theorem 4 also imphes that 
we can sustain non-monotonic equihbria. As an example, let 9 < 9i < 9i < 9_2 < 92 < 9 in a, 
2-action global game. It then follows that, as an£n 0 and —>■ oo, there also exists a
non monotonic hmit equihbrium, in which a is played with probability 1 in the hmit, (at least) 
whenever 9 < 9 o t  9 £ ^2], and b is played (at least) whenever 9 > 9 or 9 E [^1, ^1] - in fact
any such coUection of disjoint compact intervals coupled with a locally p-dominant equihbrium 
for each interval can be sustained as an equihbrium in the hmit. In other words, convergence 
of common behef to common knowledge guarantees not only the existence of three threshold 
equihbria with action profiles locally converging to the common knowledge equihbria, but also 
the approximation of non-monotonic equihbria of the common knowledge global game.
2.7 C on clu sion
This paper studied incomplete information games and examined equihbrium convergence, as the 
level of noise in the information structure vanishes. In particular, we analyze the convergence 
of equihbria, as common behefs converge to common knowledge, and provide an intuition into 
the determinant underlying convergence condition that, if the variance of the pubhc signal 
converges to 0 at a faster rate than the standard deviation of the private signals, common 
behefs of players converge to common knowledge. W ith respect to global game applications, 
the foUowing conclusions emerge from the analysis: First, a unique equihbrium is less likely 
to occur if pubhc information is informative relative to private information, and/or if the 
oyeraU level of noise is smaU. Second, the equihbrium convergence results cast doubt on recent 
papers, in which the private information limit is used as an equihbrium selection to perform 
a comparative static or dynamic analysis. Such a selection presumes that common behefs are 
low and bounded away from 1. However, it is not a priori clear that in the environments under 
consideration, pubhc information would not enable players to generate high common behef, and
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thereby coordinate their actions, nor, if the equilibrium is unique, that it will be independent 
of existing pubhc information.
One could in principle extend the analysis in the present paper to information structures 
that move away from the separation into fully public and fully private information, or add 
uncertainty about the extent to which certain signals are observed within the population. It 
appears that any such extension will validate the principal conclusions that emerge from this 
analysis: As long as the information structure generates common p-belief sufficiently close to 
1, one will be able to sustain any equilibrium that also exists in a common knowledge game. 
Moreover, for small degrees of payoff uncertainty, any small change in the information structure 
will affect equilibrium strategies mostly through its effect on common behef. Finally, as long as 
at some level, players have a common prior about the information structure, presumably, the 
formal analysis will be similar to this paper.
There are economic arguments in favor and against the existence of truly “common informa­
tion.” One view is that, even if public information exists, this information may be interpreted 
in different ways by different players, and therefore leads to different behefs ex post. To be spe­
cific, suppose in the currency crisis example used in section 2, that the fundamental 6 represents 
the “toughness” of the central bank in defending against a speculative attack, and 9 = R  + /ztt 
depends on the central bank reserves R  and the rate of inflation tt . R  and tt may be publicly 
announced, but the true weighting parameter fi is not known. Instead, each player has his own 
“model” /Zj, which is a noisy signal of ji. This model uncertainty translates into private signals 
as in the environment studied by Morris and Shin.^®
But this example, as much of the global games hterature, including this paper, rehes on the 
game being static and one-shot. In reality, many of the episodes to which static global games 
are applied are dynamic. It is not clear that model biases of this kind would survive, if the 
game was played repeatedly over time, and players either commonly observed outcomes, or had 
the possibility to communicate with each other. Monderer and Samet [13] provide an example, 
in which the common observation of a stochastic process over time leads to convergence of
’I am indebted to one referee for suggesting this example.
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common p-belief to common knowledge, or, in the language of the previous example, there is 
very high common belief about which is the right model to apply. Angeletos, Hell wig and Pavan
[1] study a simple dynamic model of speculative attacks, in which common knowledge about 
equilibrium strategies (i.e. common knowledge about what each player will do, conditional 
on his information) is sufficient to break equilibrium uniqueness in each period. However, the 
incidence of devaluation in the long run still very much depends on the convergence condition 
for the variances of pubhc and private signals encountered here.^^
Unfortunately, we know relatively little about how markets aggregate information over time, 
and how common beliefs are formed. From a theoretical perspective, it is easy to construct 
environments, in which public information may or may not be sufficiently precise to allow 
common beliefs to converge to common knowledge over time. To be explicit, consider the 
following scenario: Let time be discrete and infinite, and the number of players be infinite. 
Suppose agents observe a common signal in each period with a variance constant over time, 
and in addition start also with a private signal. The variance of the public information declines 
at a rate If each player now has the possibility to communicate his private information to 
one other randomly drawn agent in the population, and in turn, learns his private information, 
the variance of private information will decline at an exponential rate, much faster than the 
variance of the public signal (This relies on the fact that private communication becomes much 
more efficient at revealing information, but never leads to public revelation). On the other 
hand, if some player has the possibility to communicate his information to a non-zero measure 
of agents in each period, then in time, all players would share the information this player has, 
and the variance of public information would also decline at an exponential rate, thus making 
convergence to common knowledge a possibility.
defense of the argument against truly common information, one might argue that players not only disagree 
about the right model to apply, but also, disagree about how to interpret observations drawn over time, so as to 
update their model bias and achieve common belief about the underlying parameter. In principle, this simply 
places the same opposition of arguments at a higher level in the belief hierarchy. The more general point is that, 
whenever Bayesian players have a common prior about the process ex ante, and they commonly observe public 
outcomes over time, their posterior beliefs will converge so as to generate common belief. If a common prior 
does not exist, or if the arrival of new private information more than offsets the convergence of posterior beliefs, 
the flow of public information may not be able to sustain high common belief over time. However, convergence 
of common p-belief over time occurs in the long run, whereas, for most applications, we are rather interested in 
short run outcomes with a possibly limited degree of common belief.
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How markets aggregate information to form common beliefs is mostly an applied question. 
In reality, information revelation in markets will depend on the exogenously given environment, 
as well as on strategic choices by players. As conjectured in the previous paragraph, the ability 
of some players to act “publicly”, or to communicate with a large number of other players may 
be sufficient to generate common behefs close to 1. Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin [3] 
study an environment, where a single investor has substantial financial wealth ( “Soros”), so 
that his decision infiuences other investors and ultimately the hkehhood of devaluation (even 
when his action is not directly observable, the existence of Soros makes small investors more 
aggressive). It would be interesting to compare this strategic effect to an environment, in which, 
in addition, Soros may influence other players by making pubhc announcements. FormaUy one 
would have to examine whether pubhc information can be generated by strategic revelation of 
private information.
Alternatively, one may argue that the central bank can pubhcize information to the markets. 
Listed companies and banks are legaUy obliged to pubhsh data on cash flows and profitability 
on a regular basis. If the present model is anything to judge on, one would conclude that, if 
increased transparency of either the markets or the central bank (in the form of better pubhc 
information being released to market participants) leads to an increase in common behefs, it 
may have a destabilizing impact on the market - a conclusion rather opposite to standard 
wisdom, and which follows from the reduction of higher-order uncertainty with more precise 
pubhc information.^*
Summing up these comments, we conclude that, in order to fully evaluate the global games 
approach as an equihbrium selection in applications of coordination games, we wiU need a 
better understanding of how private information is revealed to the pubhc over time, either 
strategically, or through exogenous announcements (by legal requirements, for instance), and 
whether, within the environment of interest, the revelation of pubhc information is sufficient to 
generate conunon behefs close to conunon knowledge.
'®see Morris and Shin [18] for a formalization of disclosures in a principal-agent environment similar to this. 
The notion of transparency employed here, as well as in their papers, requires that players agree on how to 
translate a series of data into information about 9.
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Chapter 3
Public A nnouncem ents, A djustm ent 
D elays, and th e B usiness Cycle
S um m ary  o f C h a p te r  3 Building on Woodford (2001), I  study the effects of a lack of com­
mon knowledge on nominal adjustment. In particular, I  show how the speed of price adjustment 
following a shock depends on the information structure among price-setters. The provision of 
public information leads to a reduction of higher-order uncertainty, and hence to more rapid 
price adjustments, but it potentially comes at the cost of an increased exposure to informa­
tional noise. I  extend my analysis to allow for other disturbances, showing that higher-order 
uncertainty may account for the persistence of any kind of shock; and I  briefly discuss some 
implications for the design of monetary policy, most importantly showing that an increased de­
gree o f monetary transparency reduces the short-run output gains of unanticipated inflation, 
and hence may serve as an implicit commitment device for a discretionary central bank.^
JEL classification numbers: D82, D84, E31, E32
Keywords: Higher-Order Uncertainty, Incomplete Nominal Adjustment, Transparency
am grateful to Olivier Blanchard and Andre Kurmann for helpful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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3.1 In tro d u ctio n
W hat is the relation between the supply of money, prices and real output in the short run? In 
particular, why do prices not adjust immediately after a money supply shock? The theoretical 
hterature around these two questions has emphasized two potential causes of incomplete nom­
inal adjustment, each of which has led to important subsequent insights on the dynamics of 
price adjustments and expectations about the conduct of monetary pohcy: lack of information 
or ’’misperceptions” originally developed by Phelps [12] and Lucas [9], and adjustment costs or 
real rigidities that prevent an immediate adjustment of pricing decisions.
Despite its theoretical success, the incomplete information model rims up against a powerful 
criticism, when used as a descriptive model of business cycles: The theoretical model predicts 
that prices should fully adjust once the information about aggregate shocks becomes avail­
able; however most macro-economic data is available after only short delays, and incomplete 
information can therefore not account on its own for the observed delays of price adjustment.
In the original version of Lucas, uncertainty about monetary shocks is revealed with a 
delay of one period, and prices are determined by market-clearing in a competitive dynamic 
general equilibrium model with incomplete information. In contrast, the more recent new 
Keynesian models emphasize the role of prices as strategic variables in an environment of 
imperfect competition. This change of emphasis has profound implications for the underlying 
strategic interaction, since prices are strategic complements.
A recent article by Woodford [16] introduces strategic pricing into an incomplete information 
model similar to Lucas. Woodford also alters the information structure, assuming that infor­
mation comes in the form of private signals to the price-setting decision makers, but the true 
state never becomes common knowledge. His analysis develops a simple intuition why monetary 
shocks have persistent real effects, even when they are accurately observed by price-setters: al­
though firms may have precise information about the pohcy shock, they lack information about 
each other’s beliefs; in fact, they have no information at all about what their behefs are relative 
to the population average. In an environment of strategic complementarity, however, precisely 
such higher-order behefs are necessary to forecast the behavior of other agents, and Woodford
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shows that the existence of higher-order uncertainty can lead to substantial nominal adjustment 
delays.
The purpose of this paper is to expand and develop Woodford’s idea. My first objective is 
to explore the effects of higher-order uncertainty in as simple and accessible a model as possible, 
that is also sufficiently flexible to extend or adapt to other contexts. The second objective is to 
study the role of the information structure in detail: Since the composition of the information 
structure determines the degree of higher-order uncertainty, as quantifled by the departure from 
common knowledge, Woodford’s results suggest that it should also have an influence on nominal 
adjustment. Using some recent insights from the theory of global games, which emphasizes the 
coordinating effect of pubhc information (cf. Morris and Shin, [10]; Hellwig [7]), this paper 
then explores this fink between the parameters of the information structure, in particular the 
precision of pubhc and private information, and the process of nominal adjustment. For these 
purposes, the paper develops a version of the Lucas-Woodford model that is sufficiently simple 
and flexible to study the dynamic imphcations of a whole range of information structures.
Before highlighting the paper’s main results, it will be useful to motivate my approach 
towards modeUing the information structure, in particular the separation of information into 
pubhc and private signals. Woodford studies an environment, in which individuals have access 
only to private information. He bases his information structure on the famous ’’island” para­
digm, which is meant to represent the informational differences between agents. Moreover, he 
appeals to limits in individual information processing capacities. As argued by Sims [13], this 
can account for a ” private signal” information structure like Woodford’s, even when the relevant 
economic data is publicly observed. Here, I take a more hteral view of the information structure. 
While it is important to emphasize the role of differential information, the island paradigm has 
the drawback that it allows for no informational interaction among decisionmakers; in other 
words, in Woodford’s economy a price-setter has no clue about how his information compares to 
the population average. More realisticaUy, information processing within a market environment 
relies to a large extent on interaction and communication, and in the process, decisionmakers 
do learn about each other. In this respect, public disclosures and the processing of information 
by the media play an important role, and Morris and Shin [11] emphasize the importance of
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such publicly available information as focal points for beliefs, even if the information does not 
filter through to everyone. The hypothesis that a decisionmaker has access to idiosyncratic 
and pnblic signals is therefore motivated not only as a more accurate description of reality, 
but also as an attempt to capture the informational differences, whether they are the result 
of decisionmakers using different sources of information, or the result of limited information 
processing a la Sims, at the same time as taking into account the fact that various channels 
of communication serve to coordinate expectations. The degree to which the population is 
capable of processing information is captured by the parameters of the information structure, 
in particular the relative importance of pubhc information, and the overall degree of noise. As 
discussed in Hellwig [7], these informational parameters are related to the degree of common 
p-behef, which quantifies the departure from common knowledge in the information structure, 
and hence the degree to which individual decisionmakers are capable of efficiently coordinating 
their decisions.
On theoretical grounds, the analysis discusses, how the inflation-output trade-off depends 
on the importance of higher-order uncertainty, measured as a function of (i) the degree to which 
pricing decisions are strategic complements, and (h) the parameters of the information structure. 
In particular, the provision of public information reduces higher-order uncertainty and therefore 
leads to a faster adjustment of prices and smaller, less persistent effects of monetary shocks on 
output; on the other hand, a higher precision of pubhc information may increase the macro- 
economic exposure to informational noise. This second effect becomes important in particular 
when public information is relatively noisy. The informational noise effect is at the heart of the 
static model by Morris and Shin [11]; indeed the formal analysis in this paper extends some of 
their results into a context that is of interest to dynamic macroeconomic theory. I also explore 
some of the welfare imphcations of changes in the market’s information structure. Augmenting 
the model by an objective function for the central bank along the hnes of Kydland and Prescott
[8] and Barro and Gordon [2], I show that the provision of precise pubhc information may 
serve as an imphcit commitment device against inflationary biases: By committing to disclose 
public information, the central bank reduces the effects of monetary shocks on output, thereby 
reducing the temptation to use monetary pohcy to stimulate output. However, the provision 
of pubhc information may come at the cost of increasing informational noise, if there is a lower
110
bound on the precision of public information.
The model provides closed-form solutions for prices and output in response to the underlying 
aggregate demand and supply disturbances, as well as informational noise; the underlying infor­
mational parameters can potentially be inferred from the data, and the model itself leads to some 
interesting testable implications. Moreover, the modelling approach appears to be sufficiently 
flexible to be applied in other macroeconomic contexts, in which strategic complementarities 
play a role, for instance investment or demand spill-overs. The paper thus makes the additional 
methodological contribution of proposing a solution technique for embedding higher-order un­
certainty into dynamic macroeconomic models, and the arguments suggest that higher-order 
uncertainty coupled with strategic complementarities may be the cause of persistent effects not 
only of monetary shocks, but of other aggregate disturbances as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 introduces the main model, the 
informational assumptions, and discusses the main analytical building blocks. Section 3 presents 
the paper’s main theoretical results regarding the link between the information structure about 
monetary shocks and the inflation-output trade-off. Section 4 extends the analysis to allow 
for higher-order uncertainty regarding other disturbances; in particular, it is argued that the 
Woodford’s insight regarding the persistence of monetary shocks applies also to supply shocks. 
Section 5 augments the initial model to discuss the welfare imphcations of information provision 
by the central bank, and informaUy discusses the role that the monetary policy regime, and 
in particular explicit monetary targets, have in reducing higher-order uncertainty. Section 6 
concludes by discussing the paper’s main implications and potential other applications.
3.2  T h e M od el
3.2 .1  S et-u p
There is a large number of price-setters in monopohstic competition a la Dixit-Stiglitz.^ When 
solving the price-setter’s optimization problem, the first-order condition implies that each price-
^see Woodford [17] for a detailed discussion of the micro-foundations of household and firm behavior, on which 
this model is based.
I l l
setter sets the log of his own price p\ according to
p i ^ E t ( p i )  + ( l - r ) E i { y , )  (3.1)
yt denotes the log of real output relative to its steady-state value (which here is normalized to 0), 
Pt denotes the population average of log-price, and El  (•) = E  [• \ denotes the expectations 
operator conditional on i ’s information set as of date t, and r € (0,1). The monetary 
authority targets the log of nominal output, denoted 6t, which is assumed to be generated as 
an (exogenous) linear process from a sequence of monetary policy shocks Allowing
for some finite degree k of integration.
A ^ 6 t  — O' £ t  +  ^ 2  ^ s ^ t - s  , (3-2)
s=l
where ~  iV (0,1), and st is iid over time. Substituting 6t = Vt+Pt  into (3.1) yields
pi = rEi{pt) + { l - r ) E i { e t ) .  (3.3)
r thus measures the degree to which individual pricing decisions are strategic complements.
As a consequence of the Dixit-Stightz model, r is increasing in the elasticity of substitution
between different goods (i.e. in the degree of competition), and decreasing in the degree of 
convexity of the cost function. As the economy becomes perfectly competitive (or as the cost 
function becomes linear), r converges to 1.
In period t, a price-setter has access to noisy information about 9t, to be precise, one process 
of private information and a process of public information
x l ^ 6 t +  Ouu\\ N  (0,1)
and
Z t ^ 6 t +  OyVt', N  (0,1), 
where and dd processes, independent of each other, as well as of
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{£f-s}^ 0- Finally, 9t becomes commonly observable with a delay of T  periods, that is, at time 
t, {et-T -s}'^o  (or equivalently, {O t-T-s}^o)  is common knowledge among all price-setters. 
I make this last assumption for pure convenience, and for computational reasons. Nothing 
prevents T  from being very large, in which case we approach an environment, in which 9 never 
becomes fully observable.
It will be convenient to introduce a vector notation for both the fundamental process and 
the processes of pubhc and private information: define as the column vector of realizations 
of 9 from period t — T-|- 1 up to period t; let m t-r  denote the expectation of 9t-r, based on the 
common knowledge of {£ t-T -s}^ 0’ let Mt denote the vector of m t-r, for r  =  0, ...,T  — 1. 








\  { 
and Et =
\  et-T+i /  \  mt-T+i




Qt = Mt + crBEt,
where B  is some T  x T  upper-triangular matrix whose entries are derived from (3.2), with 











\  a;^_T+i /  \  ^ t - T + i  /  \  v t - T + i  /
i.e. XI and Zt denote the vectors of pubhc and private signals available to price-setter i. The 
vector of pubhc signals is then written as
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At time t, the state of the economy is summarized by ({^t-T-s}^0 ; Z(), while i ’s information




where (6t) denotes the s-th order average expectation, i.e. {9t) = 9t, {9t) =
Et {9t) denotes the population average expectation over 9t, and {9t) = Et Et^^^ (^z)j-
In words, Et^^^ (9t) is the population average expectation of the population average expectation 
of the ... (repeat s times) ... of the population average expectation of 9t. Note that the average 
expectations operator in general does not satisfy the law of iterated expectations; in fact it 
satisfies it if and only if all available information is public. The average price is given by
oo
P, = ( l - r ) J 2 ^ ^ Ë ; ^  (»,) (3.5)
s=0
and the log of real output yt is given by
OO
% =  ( l - ' - ) g r ' k - % < ' + " ( @ , ) l .  (3.6)
5 = 0
The deviation of real GDP from its trend level is therefore a weighted average of the deviation 
of all average higher-order expectations. In order to fully derive the dynamics of price and 
output adjustments following a monetary pohcy shock, we need to work out the dynamics of 
higher-order average expectations. This is done in two steps: I first derive a linear filtering 
equation for El (Qt) as a function of the signal processes XI  and Zt. By averaging over the 
filtering equation, I then find a linear relation between 0* and Et (0t), which is iterated to solve 
for (3.5) and (3.6). These steps are carried out in the two subsequent lemmas.
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3.2.2 O ptim al F iltering
We begin the analysis by deriving a linear filtering equation for E\{Qt)- Standard results imply 
that the signal process {X^, Zt} can be aggregated into
ai + al ' o-2 +  (j2
For further reference, define E =  as the ex post noise in the signal process and
a  =  as the relative importance of private information. A simple way to express F j (0^)
in the required matrix form is to proceed by maximum hkelihood estimation. The log likehhood 
function L  (©<; El-Mt} for the inference problem is given by
L { e r ,s lM t)  =
I -A '
2E 0 , - e ; )  (6 , - h ; ) . (3,7)
Maximizing L  with respect to 0^ to solve for E\ (0^) yields as a first-order condition
(B B 'Y ^  {Ei (6 ,) -  M,) +  Y  {Et (6 ,) -  H’) =  0 
which has as a solution
El (6 ,) -  Aft = / t  +  -Ô {BB')
- 1
- 1
(Ei -  Mt)
We have shown
L em m a 9 For an information structure satisfying the assumptions of the previous section, the 
posterior expectation of individual i about 0 ( satisfies
E l{ Q t ) - M , = oA  {XI -  Mt) +  (1 -  a) A {Zt -  Mt) (3.8)
where




It should be noted that maximum likelihood methods can be used to obtain a similar linear 
filtering equation far more generally, for instance to account for "learning", i.e. a gradual in­
crease of the public and private signal precisions over time. Also, note that, if v is an eigenvector 
of B B ', with corresponding eigenvalue A, then v is also an eigenvector of A, corresponding to 
an eigenvalue of A — A (A -|- ^ . Since B B ' is positive definite, it follows that all eigenvalues
of A are positive and strictly between 0 and 1. Again, this property can be shown to hold 
generally.
The matrix A determines the weights that a Bayesian estimate of Ot attributes to past 
observations. The coefficients in A only depend on the ratio between E and i.e. the 
importance of signal noise relative to fundamental noise. We can thus separate the effects 
resulting from the composition of the information structure (parametrized by a ) from the effects 
coming from signal noise in the inference problem, parametrized by a^/E , and the effects of 
fundamental shocks, i.e.
3.2 .3  H igher-order expectations
In the next lemma, I use the hnear filtering equation (3.8) to recursively derive an expression
for (©«)]:
Lemma 10 Suppose that i ’s Bayesian posterior of 0  ^ satisfies
Ei (0 ,)  - M ,  =  N i  {Xi -  M t )  + N i  (Z, -  M t )  
where N \ is positive definite and all its eigenvalues are strictly smaller than 1. Then,




Proof. Averaging (3.8), we determine the average expectation:
El {Ot) - M t  = Ni {Ot -  Mt) + N2 {Zt -  Mt) (3.11)
and f  s expectation of the average expectation equals
£ ^ [ ^ ( e , ) ] - M ,  =  N i [ N i { X i - M t )  + N 2 { Z ,- M ,) ] + N 2 { Z ,- M ,)  
= N f { X i - M , )  + [lT + N i] N 2 { Z ,- M t) .
Iterating the procedure provides expressions for all higher-order expectations,
Ei (0 ,)] - M ,  = {X} -  M t) + [It  -  [ I t  -  -  M )
and
(9 ,) -  M, =  (0 , -  Mt) + [It  -  % ] " '  [ I t  -  %  (Zt -  M t) . (3.12)
Substituting into (3.4) and (3.5) yields
( l - 7 - ) J ^ r » [ E ’ [S^ <''> (0 ,)] - M ,]
s=0
s=0
+  ( l - r ) ^ r «  [ f r [ h  -  Nf+^] N 2 (Z, -  Mt)
s=0
=  (1 -  r)  [It  -  rATi]-' N i  ( X \  -  Mt) +  [It  -  Mi]“ ‘ %  (Zt -  Mt) 
-  (1 -  r) [It  -  Nx [It  -  rMi]-* %  (Zt -  Mt)
=  (1 -  r) [It  -  rlV i]-' AT, (X) -  Mt) +  [It  -  r lV i|- ' %  (Z, -  Mt) 
=  [It  -  rJVi]-‘ [(1 -  r)  Nx (X} -  Mt) + %  (Z, -  M ,)] .
’Since It  — X N i is invertible, for |A| <  1, all the matrix operations below are well-defined.
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p\ is then given by the first entry of (3.10). As a first result, one observes that this dynamic 
model dehvers (quahtatively and formally) the same implication as the static model of Morris 
and Shin [11]: when taking his pricing decision, the price-setter discounts his private information 
by a factor (1 — r), and he thus over-reacts to public information (i.e. reacts more than if the 
coordination motive were absent).
3 .2 .4  Im pulse R esponses
Applying the previous lemma to the present information structure and averaging over i, we 
then find an expression for pt as a function of the processes of the fundamental and the pubhc 
information process. The dynamics of price and output adjustment then depend on the dynamic 
processes of ©f, Zt, and X \, which can now be substituted to compute the impulse response 
functions of y t,p \, and pt with respect to the shocks et, u\, and vt. Using the above results, the 
average price is given by the first entry of
OO
(6 ,) -  A/,] =  [ I t  -  raA ]” '  A [(1 -  r ) a  (0 ; -  M,) +  (1 -  q) (Z, -  Mt)]
=  (7 (1 — ra) [It  — raA]“  ^X B E t
- { - { l - a ) a y [ l T - r a A ] - ^ A V t  (3.13)
s=0
and output is the first entry of




- { I - a )  ay [It  -  m A ]“ " A 14 (3.14)
The first row of the matrix (1 — ra)  [It  — raA ]”  ^A B  therefore measures the response of 
prices to a current or past monetary shock. The impulse response of output and prices to 
informational shocks is given by the first row oî {1 — a) ay [It  — ro:A]~^ A. Using (3.9) to solve 
for (1 — ra)  [It  — roA ]”  ^A gives
{ l - r a ) [ l T - r a A ] - ^ A =  7t +  7 ( ^ ^ ')   ^ (3.15)
- 1
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where 7  =  ^  Thus, up to a scaling effect of cr, the impulse response of prices and output 
to monetary shocks only depends on 7 , which I interpret as an index measuring the importance 
of higher-order uncertainty: If ar — 0, then higher-order uncertainty is either irrelevant {r = 0 
implies that there is no coordination motive) or inexistent (a =  0 implies that all information 
is common, hence there is no higher-order uncertainty). In that case, 7  =  ^ ,  and the impulse 
responses correspond to the ones obtained if price-setters set their prices equal to their bayesian 
estimate of 6t', formally, impulse responses are given by the filtering matrix A. Alternatively, 
if Q =  1 , we find ourselves in the environment of maximal higher-order uncertainty, studied by 
Woodford [16], in which 7  =  7  is (i) increasing in i.e. the relative importance of
signal noise, (w) increasing in a, i.e. the relative importance of private information, and (iii) 
increasing in r, the importance of strategic complementarities. In the extreme case, where r 
is close to 1 and a  =  1 , i.e. in a highly competitive market with no public information, 7  
can become arbitrarily large, even for low values of E. Since r  is a function of the degree of 
competition, we thus conclude that more competition lead to more higher-order uncertainty. 
Furthermore, 7  is increasing in (7^.(since an increase in cr„ raises both a  and E), and in <7^: 
Taking the derivative of 7  with respect to au, while holding and r  fixed, we find
da  
dau
1 - r  da  . da
 2 ' o _ ^  0 , since ^  — < 0 .
Ô7 d 'a \  1 - a  ' \  — a
dau dau a^ \ — ar <7  ^dau 1 — ar
(1 -  a r f  dau dau
When changing au, the effect of improving information always dominates the compositional 
effect, due to an increase in the private information component. A reduction of au therefore 
leads to an overall reduction in higher-order uncertainty, and thus reduces adjustment delays 
and the exposure to informational noise.
The impulse responses of output to informational shocks, on the other hand, depend on
the above matrix, as well as a scaling factor — a) a^. Solving as a function of 7  and ay, the
impulse response to informational shocks is given by the first row of
(1 — a) ay [It  — raA ]  ^A =  — 7  \It  +  7  {BB')  ^ . (3.16)ay \- J
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Apart from a scaling factor cr, the impulse response function thus depends on the one hand on 
higher-order uncertainty through 7 , on the other hand directly on i.e. the informativeness 
of public information relative to the fundamental process. Changing the composition of the 
information structure thus has both a direct effect and an indirect effect on the impulse response 
of prices and output to informational shocks.
3 .3  M ain  R e su lts
General solutions are now easily computable for any given matrix B. Using the previous 









■^T +  7  {BB') -1
-1
Vt (3.17)
( l - r ) ^ T - ’ [ e , ( e , ) l  =  <T7 (B S ') ^ \ I t  + 'i(B B ')  ‘1 ‘ b £ ,
s=0
It  + 1 {BB')A - 1
- 1
Vt (3.18)
(3.17) and (3.18) illustrate the effect of higher-order uncertainty on the delays in price 
adjustment: If 7  =  0, i.e. if information is disseminated infinitely quickly, and the fundamental 
immediately becomes common knowledge among the price-setters, then prices adjust to the full 
information level without delay, and monetary shocks have no effect on output. If 7  >  0, then 
there is uncertainty and a lack of common knowledge of fundamentals. Only then output is 
affected by monetary shocks, and higher values of 7  lead to longer adjustment delays and more 
important output effects. How important output effects are depends on the ex post noise in 
the information structure and on the importance of private information: The more important 
private information is, the longer the adjustment delays are, due to higher-order uncertainty. 
In this respect, the benchmark case where all information is common and prices are set equal
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to  the Bayesian posterior in each period, provides an upper bound for the speed of adjustment. 
Since 7  > prices adjust less than they would, if  there was no higher-order uncertainty. 
Higher-order uncertainty thus amplifies price stickyness.
In addition to the monetary shocks, informational shocks affect prices and output. These 
shocks have effects similar to ’’supply shocks” , insofar as any increase of prices also leads to 
a corresponding decrease in output. The impact of informational shocks depends positively 
on 7 : The more important higher-order uncertainty is, the more important is the influence of 
noise in public signals. Moreover, holding 7  fixed, a decrease in cr^  also leads to an increase 
of exposure to informational noise. As emphasized by Morris and Shin [11], changes in (7y 
therefore have an ambiguous effect, for fixed values of r  and ay. On the one hand, a decrease 
in (jy decreases higher-order uncertainty, and therefore reduces delays of price adjustment and 
informational noise indirectly; on the other hand, improved pubhc information may lead to an 
over-exposure to informational noise, since price-setters over-react to pubhc information. Note 
that the overall exposure to informational noise is non-monotonic with respect to cr^ : If CTy is 
very large, price-setters pay httle attention to pubhc signals, and hence, informational noise has 
httle effect on output. When ay is very small, there is httle first and higher-order uncertainty 
about 0 f, which means that price-setters are able to react almost immediately to monetary 
shocks, and coordinate their price adjustments. ^
To complete the discussion, I briefly comment on the effects of r  close to 1, i.e. a high 
degree of strategic complementarities, or market competition. We have already observed that 
this leads to large values of 7 , and hence to more delays in price adjustment, however note 
that in the special case where a  =  1, i.e. in a highly competitive market with no common 
information, prices can take arbitrarily long to adjust, even when the private information is 
very precise.
In the remainder of this section, I illustrate these points explicitly, by setting T  =  1 and 
T  — 2, and solving in closed form. I then show numerical solutions for impulse responses, when
^The same discussion applies, if we consider a reduction of and (Xy in equal proportions, i.e. reduce S  
while holding a  fixed, or if we hold E fixed, while reducing a, i.e. increase the public information component of 
the information structure.
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T  is large.
3.3 .1  T  =  1
The case T  =  1 provides a simple extension of the static model of Morris and Shin [11] into a
ll —^dynamic contexts. In this case, B  = [1], and it can easily be checked that It  + J  {BB')~ =
(1 +  7 )~^. Writing the current average price and output as functions of the aggregate shocks, 
we find






H-------— — Vtcr„ 1 +  7
7a £ t------ — — Vt
(T v l+ 1
Substituting (3.19) into (3.20), one obtains
(3.19)
(3.20)
y t =l {Pt - f nt )  ivt (3.21)
Since Pt — mt is unexpected inflation, (3.21) is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.^ 
The slope of the PhiUips curve depends on higher-order uncertainty. Thus, as higher-order 
uncertainty increases (7  increases), output becomes more sensitive to unexpected inflation.
The short-run volatihties of unexpected inflation and output are
E  {pt -  mt) =
Ey'i =
( 1 + 7 ) ^
7 (^T^
1 + 7 ^ -
1 + 1  —  O’,,(1 + +
whereas the correlation between output and unexpected inflation is
E  [yt {pt -  mt)] -
7 cr
( 1 + 7 ) '
> 0.
® Similar expressions can be derived in the general case. In that case, m t  no longer corresponds to the common 
expected price level, since some public information was revealed, without the fundamental becoming common 
knowledge. Lagged price and output levels therefore also enter into the equation to account for the unanticipated 
current effects of past monetary shocks.
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The variance of output is increasing in 7. The effect of 7 on the variance of inflation is am­
biguous: If 7 is large, inflation volatihty is mostly due to informational shocks, in which case, 
reducing 7 reduces the volatihty of inflation. If 7 is small, inflation volatility is mostly due to 
noise in the monetary policy process, and reducing 7 increases the short-run response of prices 
to monetary shocks. Finally, we observe that the model generally predicts a positive correlation 
between output and unexpected inflation, unless ck: =  0, i.e. when there is no element of private 
information.
Full information revelation after one period precludes the discussion of any meaningful 
dynamics and persistence of shocks, since prices fuUy adjust after one period. To understand 
the effects of the informational parameters on adjustment dynamics, I therefore turn to the 
case, where T  = 2.
3 .3 .2  T  = 2
Let b denote the effect of a past monetary shock on the current value of 9, or






{BB')  ^ =
1 - b  
—b 1 +  6^
I t  + 1 {EB')A - l
- 1
(1 -I- 7) -f 6^ 7
1 + 7 + 76^  76
76 1 -I- 7
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Substituting into (3.17) and (3.18), we find
1 + 7 + 76^P t - m t  = a
+ — 7
(1 +  7 )  ^+  6^7 
1 +  7 +  76^
1 - 7
yt =
(y-ii L ( l+  ' ) Ÿ  +  b^ 7 
(1 + 7 ) 7
Vt +









(1 +  7 ) +  b'^ 'Y (1 + 7 ) +  b^ 'Y
/ ■Vt + 71 +  7 +  76^




It is straight-forward to show that
d f  (1 + 7 ) 7
dnf V(l + 7) +6^ 7
(1 +  7 )  ^+  7252
(1 +  j Y  +  ^ 7 ] 
2 (1 + 7 ) +  7 ^^
d7V(l + 7r + f-V [(1 + ^ )2+ 527]
> 0
> 0
A decrease in 7  increases the response of prices to both current and past monetary shock. On 
the other hand, the coefficients on vt and v t-i  are increasing in 7  so that reducing higher-order 
uncertainty also leads to a reduction of the effects of current and past informational shocks on 
output. However, as we have observed in the case where T  — 1, a reduction in (jy may actually 
lead to an increase in the effect of informational noise on output, if pubhc information is very 
diffuse. We conclude that the results that were highhghted before apply to both current and 
past monetary and informational shocks.
3 .3 .3  Large T
In this section, I numerically solve for the impulse response function in the case of an example 
where T =  30 is set sufficiently large, so that by the time a monetary shock becomes common 
knowledge, it has almost entirely been factored into pricing decisions. I follow Woodford in the 
specification of the monetary policy process, assuming that
A9t — pA9t-i + cret (3.24)
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Figure 3-1: Monetary Shocks, (5,10)
i.e. the first difference of nominal GDP follows an AR(l)-process. I fix r =  0.85 (the value 
used by Woodford) and p =  0.9. I then vary the informational parameters to illustrate the 
comparative statics effects that were identified above. The figures below plot impulse responses 
to monetary and informational shocks for values of {(TuiCTv) of (5,10), (3.33,20), (5,1) and 
(5,100). The first two pairs of parameters yield a value of 7  =  62.5, and hence illustrate the 
effects of compositional changes that leave the degree of higher-order uncertainty unchanged, the 
last two pairs illustrate the effect of changes in when compared with the first. We observe 
that the reduction in higher-order uncertainty associated with improved public information 
leads to faster price adjustment, we also observe that the exposure to informational noise is 
non-monotonie, and tends to be largest for intermediate values of Oy.
As was already observed by Woodford, it comes as a property of any incomplete information 
model of price adjustment that output peaks before inflation does, since it takes time for a 
monetary policy shock not only to become knowledge, but common knowledge among price- 
setters. The above graphs illustrate that this feature, which is in line with empirical VAR 





Figure 3-2; Informational Shocks, (5,10)
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Figure 3-4: Informational Shocks, (3.33,20)
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Figure 3-7: Monetary Shock, (5,100)
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Figure 3-8: Informational Shock, (5,100)
information structure. As a quantitatively testable description of nominal adjustment following 
a monetary shock, the present model remains incomplete, since it abstracts from monetary 
transmission channels other than incomplete information, as well as abstracting from other 
shocks. Note however, that the delays in price adjustment, and hence the lead of output effects 
before price effects is entirely based on learning. One should thus expect that to the extent that 
other shocks are also subject to higher-order uncertainty, the impulse responses they generate 
will exhibit similar features.
3 .4  Supply Shocks
So far, the analysis focused on the effects of monetary shocks, and incomplete information about 
the monetary policy process. As noted by Woodford [16], restricting the analysis to a unique 
source of shocks highlights the fact that in contrast with Lucas’ original model, the existence of 
an additional source of noise is not necessary to generate incomplete nominal adjustment; rather 
the presence of higher-order uncertainty along with strategic complementarities is sufficient to
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generate output eflFects; moreover, higher-order uncertainty leads to substantial persistence. The 
model, however, can easily be augmented to allow for supply shocks, as well as higher-order 
uncertainty about the latter, which leads to some interesting additional insights.
I therefore augment the model by assuming that the level of potential output, follows 
a hnear stochastic process, again allowing for some finite degree of integration. In this case, 
(3.1) continues to hold, if we adjust yt for fluctuations in potential output, i.e. the price-setting 
equation becomes
pi = E l(pt) + { l - r ) E i  (yt -  %) (3.25)
The model can be solved using the same techniques as in section 2. Averaging (3.25), then 
substituting forward to express pt and yt as functions of the exogenous processes 9t and ÿt 
yields
OO
Pt = (1 -  r) (%) -  (%)1 (3.26)
3 = 0
OO OO
yt =  (I -  r) [g, -  3 ; ' '+ "  (g,)] +  (1 -  r)  ^  (%) (3.27)
S = 0  5 = 0
To solve (3.26) and (3.27) explicitly for impulse responses to monetary, real and informational 
shocks, on can again proceed along the same lines as section 2 .
To interpret (3.26) and (3.27), note that 9 t—ÿt the market-clearing price level that would 
prevail under common knowledge of the two processes. The realized price level pt is therefore 
a weighted average of average higher-order expectations o f the full-information market-clearing 
price, yt can be decomposed into a component due to monetary shocks and a weighted average 
of higher-order expectations concerning the potential output level. The first component reflects 
the incomplete nominal adjustment. The second term is new, and is due to fluctuations in 
potential GDP that do not become common knowledge. Because of higher-order uncertainty, 
real GDP responds only sluggishly to variations in potential GDP. Moreover, the stronger the 
coordination motive, the stronger the delays in adjustment. The analysis thus suggests that 
higher-order uncertainty may possibly account for the persistence of shocks other than monetary 
shocks; such as technology shocks. In the extreme case, where r is close to 1 and factor-specific
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higher-order uncertainty is important, output potentially remains far from the potential level 
for a long time.
Since we can separate the effects of Ot and ÿf, assuming an information structure as above for 
each of the two components leads to identical impulse response functions as previously.® Real 
disturbances have the same, but opposite effect on prices as they have on output, however, the 
output gap y t—ÿt responds to real shocks as it does to nominal disturbances. Most importantly, 
the factor-specific degree of higher-order uncertainty determines to what extent a disturbance has 
persistent effects on prices and output. I conclude this discussion by observing that, although 
higher-order uncertainty may well explain the persistence of shocks, it is unable to account for 
amplification, at least in the short run: Since higher-order expectations are much more sluggish 
in responding to current information than first-order expectations are, the effects of a supply 
shock on output are dampened rather than amplified.
3 .5  Som e P re lim in ary  T h o u g h ts  on  M o n eta ry  P o licy
The previous discussion has highlighted the impact of the information structure on the output- 
inflation trade-off. In this section, I study the welfare effects of information provision by the 
Central Bank. A recurring theme in the scientific debate about the optimal conduct of monetary 
policy is the role of Central Bank transparency, i.e. the desirability of supplying the private 
sector with precise information about (i) the objectives of monetary pohcy, (ii) the macro- 
economic data on which the central bank bases its decisions, and (in) the actions taken by the 
central bank. The main argument in favor of monetary transparency is based on the need to 
monitor: The better the information provided, the easier it is to evaluate the Central Bank’s 
behavior ex post and analyze whether the pohcy objectives have been met. Transparency is 
thus necessary to monitor whether or not the Central Bank adheres to imphcit or exphcit rules 
that govern the Principal Agent relationship between the society and the central bank. This
®More generally, if the processes for 0t and 'ÿ^  are correlated (for example when the monetary authority in 
part responds to its own estimate of the output gap), the techniques of lemma 1 and 2 can be used to derive 
higher-order expectations about the full-information market-clearing price.
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is emphasized in particular in the context of inflation targeting, where an independent central 
bank retains full authority over its policy actions, and is held accountable for th em /
In this section, I discuss the effects of transparent monetary policy in the present model. 
Some of the information that price-setting flrms have access to comes from the central bank, 
and hence, an immediate implication of the previous results is that the information the central 
bank provides to the public not only has a role for monitoring purposes, but also has a direct 
influence on coordination among price-setters, and hence the inflation-output trade-off. This 
coordination effect of information provision is the focus of this section. Formally, I embed 
the present model into a simple model of monetary policy a la Barro and Gordon [2], taking 
the aggregate demand process as in part under the central bank’s control. The analysis is 
far from being exhaustive, the main purpose being that of showing that by augmenting the 
previous model by a formalization of the central bank’s objective, we have a natural framework 
in which to formally study the role the interplay between monetary transparency and the 
market’s information structure.
To fully understand the role of transparency, it is important to tie this notion to parameters 
of the information structure. Here, I adopt the view that a higher degree of transparency means 
a higher degree of ’’common knowledge” ; within the model, this is achieved by a better provision 
of public information. This view is also taken by Morris and Shin [11]. The motivation behind 
this use of the term ” transparency” lies in the fact that pubhc information coordinates the 
market’s first- and higher-order expectations, whereas private information doesn’t (see Hellwig
[7] for results Unking the information structure to higher-order uncertainty).
3.5.1 Transparency as an Im plicit C om m itm ent D evice
In this section, I study the role of transparency in an environment, where the central bank 
cannot commit to a particular policy rule. The monitoring role of transparency in the commit­
ment Uterature was already highlighted; here I show that in an environment characterized by 
discretion, transparency can act as an implicit commitment device: Even if the central bank
^see Bernanke and Mishkin [3] and Svensson [15] for discussions of inflation targeting that emphasize the 
monitoring role of transparency.
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is discretionary and tries to use monetary policy to stimulate output, the provision of precise 
public information decreases the effectiveness of pro-active monetary policy, and hence serves 
as an implicit commitment device that reduces the inflationary bias. However, improved public 
information also comes at a cost, since a reduction of the variance of public information raises 
the macro-economic exposure to informational shocks, at least in environments with a high 
degree of informational noise; and the higher the pressure put on the central bank to stimulate 
output, the more it has an incentive to commit to the provision of precise public information.
To illustrate this point formally, consider the previous model, with T  = 1 for simphcity. 
Suppose that a discretionary central bank controls the growth rate of nominal GDP with some 
noise; i.e. 6t satisfles
Ot = Ot-i +  4- (3.28)
where fii is under the central bank’s control, and £t is a monetary pohcy shock. In each period, 
the central bank has a target for the growth of 9 and for real aggregate output, i.e. it minimizes 
with respect to the loss function
t=0
where ,0 < 1 is the discount rate, and the per period loss function is
L  (Mt) =  Et (% -  e t - i f  +  bEt {yt - y ' f ,
taking as given the private expectations about the present and future conduct of monetary pol­
icy. The output target y* may be different from the potential output level, which is normalized 
to 0. The use of a money growth target instead of an inflation target in the loss function is 
made for convenience, it eliminates any dynamic effects resulting from the choice of ytf An 
inflation target would lead to the same results, but is technically more involved since the ef­
fects of discretionary monetary pohcy on inflation are spread over two periods: immediately 
through unexpected inflation in the current period, and once the information about the growth 
of nominal GDP is commonly available (i.e. the foUowing period), through higher anticipated 
inflation. Here, I abstract from this additional complication.
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Price-setters form expectations about the central bank’s course of action, and set prices 
according to the noisy information available about the realization of 9t. Going along the same 
hnes as before, the output gap then satisfies
1 +  7 (7„ 1 +  7
As a function of /r^ , the loss function can thus be rewritten as
67^
Vt
^  i^'t) — fJ't + +
( 1 + 7 ^
267 
1 +  7 iy^t- y-t)y* +  by
*2
The first-order condition with respect to fif. is
which, together with the rational expectations hypothesis that — fit, yields
Substituting into L (fit) yields an expression for the ex ante expected loss:
67^E L  = 1 +
+ 1 +
(1 + + J
67^
by*2









Hence, the inflationary bias is increasing in 7 , the degree of higher-order uncertainty about 
6t. The expected loss can be decomposed into three components: The first measures the cost 
due to the inflationary bias, the second measures the cost due to monetary shocks, and the 
last component is due to informational noise. We observe that the first two components are 
decreasing in 7  (and hence \n a^), but changes in <7  ^ have ambiguous effects on the loss due to
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informational noise: If cr^  is large, the increase of exposure to informational noise that results 
from a reduction in dominates the reduction of higher-order uncertainty, while for small 
values of <7^ , the opposite is true. Maximizing E L  with respect to <7^  then necessarily leads to 
a corner solution: Ideally, the central bank would want to set <7  ^ as close to zero as possible; 
i.e. provide very precise public information (be very transparent): this ehminates higher-order 
uncertainty, and therefore the effects of monetary shocks on output as well as the inflationary 
bias. In practice, it may well be impossible to pursue such an information pohcy; rather, there is 
some lower bound on cr^ . In that case, it may be optimal to provide no pubhc information at all, 
to insure the market against informational risk, while at the same time accepting more higher- 
order uncertainty. At what lower bound on <7  ^ it becomes optimal to commit to transparent 
provision of information depends on the output target: The more biased the output target is, 
the more the central bank has an incentive to provide precise pubhc information.
3.5.2 Policy Targets and th e  Inform ation Structure
We can use the insights of this model to discuss the impact of the monetary regime on the 
information structure, and hence the output-inflation trade-off. The hterature on monitoring 
monetary pohcy usually advocates that pohcy should be conducted within a framework that 
provides well-specified targets. The beneficial effects of such a framework and of pohcy targets 
with respect to the information structure are easily understood: The framework, as well as the 
targets, reduce higher-order uncertainty about the central bank’s objectives, and hence about 
the course of its pohcy conduct. FormaUy, specific targets eliminate higher-order uncertainty 
about the values of y* and b in the central banker’s objective function, and hence reduce higher- 
order uncertainty about the resulting pohcy variable dt-
In addition, the targets themselves act to coordinate expectations about the targeted vari­
ables; within the model, they act as a pubhc signal about pohcy. A similar role of coordinating 
expectations is played by pubhshed forecasts. Svensson’s interpretation of inflation targets as 
inflation forecast targets (i.e. the central bank should design its pohcy so that its forecast of 
inflation is consistent with the target, cf. Svensson [15]) captures precisely this idea: to the 
extent that forecasts are unbiased, they act as a pubhc signal about inflation. Monetary regimes
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typically differ about what variable is targeted, and hence also about the degree of higher-order 
uncertainty about prices. In the terminology of our model, a regime that targets money growth 
reduces higher-order uncertainty about 9t, an inflation target affects higher-order uncertainty 
about prices. As was observed in (3.26), the inflation-output trade-off depends on higher-order 
uncertainty about the ’’full-information market-clearing price-level” ; since the inflation target 
provides a pubhc signal about the latter, one would conjecture that an inflation target is more 
beneficial in terms of its informational effect than a money growth target.
3.5.3 The Signaling R ole o f M onetary Policy
Finally, the model points to the role that central bank transparency may have in stabihzing out­
put following supply shocks: The analysis in the previous section has highhghted the possibility 
that in an environment characterized by a high degree of strategic complementarities, adverse 
supply shocks can have highly persistent output effects, if there is higher-order uncertainty; in 
other words, even if everyone privately believes that potential output is higher, output remains 
depressed because of low higher-order expectations. In this case, transparency about supply 
shocks may also be beneflcial, since the creation of common expectations about output reduces 
the persistence of the effects of real shocks.
The provision of pubhc information about supply shocks can come through two channels: 
First, such information may come from the provision of public forecasts of potential output 
or the output gap. Second, even if such forecasts are not pubhc, some information becomes 
available, if the central bank conditions monetary pohcy on its own estimate of the supply shock. 
If higher-order uncertainty is small, the "surprise" effect of monetary pohcy on output is smaU; 
nevertheless, the central bank may want to condition its pohcy on its estimates of potential 
output, if this increases welfare by coordinating expectations about potential output.®
®This idea mirrors results in Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan [1], who study the informational role of policy 
choices in a global coordination game with multiple equilibria under common knowledge. In their environment, 
the information conveyed by the policy choice enables the market to coordinate on one of multiple equilibria, 
and this multiplicity is the root cause of the policy traps discussed in that paper. Here, the preferences of the 
central bank are aligned with those of the price-setters, and hence inducing better coordination will be beneficial 
from the central bank’s point of view.
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3 .6  C on clu d in g  R em ark s
Building on Woodford [16], this paper has developed a model of monetary business cycles, in 
which higher-order uncertainty about the fundamental driving processes, coupled with strategic 
complementarities between price-setters leads to potentially long adjustment delays for prices 
after monetary shocks and hence to important short-run effects on output. The main motivation 
of the analysis was to discuss the effect of the information structure on the inflation-output 
trade-off; specifically, the model showed how price stickiness becomes more important, the more 
relevant higher-order uncertainty is (quantifiable as a function of the information structure and 
of the degree of strategic complementarities). The provision of precise public information thus 
accelerates nominal adjustment, but potentially comes at the cost of a higher exposure to 
informational noise. Finally, embedding the nominal adjustment model in a simple version of 
the monetary pohcy model a la Barro and Gordon [2] shows how the provision of precise pubhc 
information may serve as an imphcit commitment device against inflationary biases.
The results in this paper have several positive, normative, and empirical imphcations. The 
comparative statics results rely more on the context of strategic complementarities with incom­
plete information than on the specific environment studied. The conclusions about the role of 
the information structure therefore should be expected to extend to other contexts of decision­
making with strategic complementarities. Nor are the effects of higher-order uncertainty tied 
to the nature of the shock; the model suggests that higher-order uncertainty can lead to persis­
tence of any kind of shock. Woodford’s insight about monetary shocks may therefore be helpful 
in understanding persistence in other environments as well, for example of technology shocks 
in an RBC model.
Among the normative aspects of the analysis, I have highlighted the role of transparency as 
providing commitment against inflationary biases; I should also mention the negative impact 
that the degree of competition has on higher-order uncertainty: The higher the elasticity of 
substitution between products is, the more important the strategic complementarities between 
prices are, and the slower the nominal adjustment after a monetary shock. The positive effects 
of increasing competition are therefore in part offset by a negative welfare effect due to higher 
persistence of shocks.
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The paper furthermore leads to potentially testable empirical implications: In particular, it 
points to the effects of the monetary policy regime on the information structure, and raises the 
question whether there is an empirical link between the way monetary policy is conducted and 
the inflation-output trade-off. The informational parameters can potentially be estimated from 
time-series data, which leads to the question whether the changes in information processing 
over the last 20 years have changed the inflation-output trade-off, or have otherwise altered 
the transmission channels of monetary pohcy. There seems to be at least informal evidence 
about how the underlying parameters have shifted: Morris and Shin [11], for example suggest 
that changes in the use of the media have reduced informational noise, but have also raised 
the pubhc information component in flnancial markets (lowered a), while the conventional 
wisdom on product market hberahzation suggests an increase in r.^ Furthermore, evidence in 
Stock and Watson [14] suggests that the variance of underlying shocks has decreased; what 
remains unclear is how these reductions in the variance of shocks compare to the reduction 
in informational noise, i.e. the ratio How these changes have altered the inflation-output 
trade-off and the exposure to informational noise remains a priori ambiguous.
Estimating the informational parameters (and possibly testing for their changes) is also of 
interest with respect to the recent debate on the decline of US output volatihty (see Blanchard 
and Simon, [4], or Stock and Watson, [14], for an overview). These papers try to determine 
to what extent changes in the conduct of monetary policy have contributed to stabihze output 
growth, and the theoretical contribution of this paper suggests that the monetary pohcy changes 
of the 1980’s, to the extent that they have altered the information structure, have influenced 
output volatility not only through the redeflnition of policy objectives, but also through their 
direct effect on the structural parameters.
It should be noted that, as a descriptive model of monetary business cycles, the present 
model is highly simplifled, and rehes on information as the unique transmission channel for 
shocks. The analysis rehes on informational assumptions, which, although more complex than
^In his account of Greenspan’s activity at the Fed, Woodward [18] suggests based on discussions with the Fed 
chairman that starting in the mid-90’s, increased competition prevented firms from responding to a loosening 
of monetary policy by raising prices. While I haven’t found any similar evidence in the academic literature, the 
statement seems to be broadly consistent with the view that an increase in r  led to an increase in 7  during the 
90’s.
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Woodford’s, are very simplistic. The methodology, however, can easily be adapted to more 
complex information structures that involve a gradual learning of the process, or a shift from 
private to public information over time. The model relied on (i) the linearity of best responses, 
which by forward substitution led to an expression of strategic variables as weighted sums of 
higher-order expectations about the underlying fundamental processes, and (ii) on the deriva­
tion of average expectations out of the information structure. Average expectations can easily 
be computed for any kind of environment, by first deriving a filtering equation hke (3.8) for the 
fundamental process, and then using the filtering equation to relate average expectations about 
the fundamentals to the fundamental process itself; iteration to higher orders then completes 
the procedure.
Due to its fiexibihty, the present model of higher-order uncertainty might therefore be 
useful as a vehicle for studying the role of the information structure in various other dynamic 
contexts, starting with a more exhaustive analysis of the role of transparency in the conduct of 
monetary pohcy. Another empirically appealing extension might be to combine the analysis of 
incomplete information with sticky prices a la Calvo [5]. As was discussed before, the incomplete 
information model can replicate the finding of VAR estimations that following a monetary 
shock, output peaks prior to inflation; however the model cannot account for persistent effects 
on output and inflation beyond the point at which the initial shock becomes common knowledge. 
Combining the incomplete information with some forms of price or investment rigidities might 
therefore lead to a further increase of the persistence of inflation. A combination of incomplete 
information with rigid price adjustment might also be helpful for a theoretical understanding 
of the insights drawn from the ’’new Keynesian” models, where the forward-looking nature of 
pricing decisions relies on a strong inter-temporal coordination of expectations. Whether such 
coordination of expectations remains feasible in the presence of informational differences is a 
yet unresolved question.
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